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  Abstract 
 
The Secularisation of Identity in a Religious World: 
A Case Study of the Atayal Bienjing Village 
 
I-Chun, Wang 
 
This study analysed the religious transition of the Atayal people of Bienjing village in 
Miaoli, Taiwan, and how it influenced the Atayals’ conceptualisation of both the 
ethnic and cultural identities. The study focused on the Atayal people’s mass 
conversion to Christianity in the early 1950s, which not only changed their worldview 
and cultural values but also altered their sense of belonging, as well as the idea of 
being an Atayal person. In investigating the process and influences of this conversion, 
I analysed the ritual performances, cultural values and cultural memories of the 
Atayal people to determine their understanding of the tenets of Christianity. I also 
examined the power structure, education and daily practices in the village to 
investigate how the social reproduction of religious beliefs influenced the production 
of their identity. As a result, rather than looking at the religious affiliations of 
individuals, their engagement in religious practices or the influence of religion on 
public matters, I proposed a new mode of ‘secularisation’ that looks at the experience 
of the sacred. By comparing the experiences of the sacred before and after the 
conversion, I have illustrated how, instead of being a religious act, the Atayal 
people’s turn to Christianity was a process of secularisation that divided the Atayal 
world into the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular,’ as distinct from its previous status as a 
whole sacred entity, thus differentiating the domains of ‘religion’ from ‘culture’. 
Therefore, the modern Atayal identities—individual, social and ethnical—are also 
being secularised and multiplied. Such a change of the mode of identity from a 
religious perspective, I also argue, not only deserves further exploration for future 
studies on aboriginal groups’ identities and religious conversions in Taiwan but also 
serves as another aspect in the discussion of the idea of secularisation in general. 
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Foreword 
Religion has long been taken as a conspicuous trigger of conflicts. The major 
conflicts in recent decades between nations, cultures and even people who share the 
same neighbourhood have mostly arisen not just because of politics, economic 
factors or a gap in power, but also because of differences of religion (Gillespie, 2008; 
P. Jenkins, 2002). Certainly, it would be problematic to claim that these conflicts 
were kindled solely by religious passion, but whether these conflicts contained a 
desire for improved social, political or economic circumstances, religion was the just 
banner under which the conflicts were fought. Nevertheless, together with the rise of 
globalisation, the trend of religious conversion has been one of the notable 
phenomena of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Scholars may once have 
predicted that the development of modernity would signal the end of religion, but the 
trend of religious conversion has challenged that notion (Hanson, 1997; Stark, 2000; 
Tschannen, 1991). These two seemingly contrary phenomena become arguable in the 
discussion of the fate of religion in the modern world, for on the one hand modern 
minds have become independent from the reliance on churches in most matters 
(Berger & Kellner, 1974); whilst on the other, new religious movements have also 
developed and rapidly prospered, attracting many to convert from their original 
beliefs, or create new ones (Patridge, 2004). 
    Religious transitions in modernity have attracted dedicated studies not just 
because they mark the subversion of an individual’s worldview, but because they 
signify the mutation of relationships between the individual and their cultural 
surroundings (Buckser & Glazier, 2003). As Walter Benjamin once stated: ‘memory 
creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to 
generation’ (1968:97). The changes of religious memory would alter the chain of 
religious practices and traditions. In Herskovits’ words, ‘one synonym for culture is 
tradition’ (1948:17), and cultural memory is closely integrated with religious 
phenomena (Assmann, 2006). Such changes in cultural traditions via the transition of 
religion are particularly apparent whilst religious conversion is taking place. Whether 
it happens individually or collectively, religious conversion always involves a series 
of social processes and incorporation that influence the cultural construction of 
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reality (Buckser & Glazier, 2003). That is why the rapid growth of the Christian 
population in the Global South caught the attention of academics, as the North is 
facing the greatest apostolic movement away from Christianity since the coming of 
modernity (P. Jenkins, 2002, 2006), and religion – or the Christian religion, at least – 
is heading towards two entirely different destinies in modern times.1 
    Intrigued by this modern global religious shift, the early theoretical and 
empirical studies of conversion were mostly based on the context of Christianity, and 
it is only in recent years that the focus of religious conversion studies has gradually 
spread to other religions such as Judaism, Hinduism and Spiritualism (Buckser & 
Glazier, 2003). Regardless of which religious context is taken, these paradigms of 
conversion have all indicated the intertwining of the structures of religion, politics and 
identity that influences modern lives far more than people are aware of (Buckser & 
Glazier, 2003), and the conflicts that have arisen as a result of these religious 
transitions have even more perplexing aspects entangled with the social and 
individual perception of conversion. Therefore, it is the aim of this study to examine 
how understandings of religion – that is, ways of conceptualising ‘religion’– affect the 
perception of cultural surroundings, as well as to provide a model of the construction 
of identity – ethnically, individually and culturally – in relation to religious 
conversions.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Global South’ is used in tandem with the term ‘global North’, which usually refers to the wealthy, 
secularised and developed countries that are mostly located in the Northern Hemisphere; it is not 
merely a reference for geographical status, but also an economical and cultural indication of those 
regions which, rivalling the Churches of the East and West, Walbert Buhlmann (1976) calls the ‘Third 
Church’. 
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction
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1.1 Research questions 
Anthropologists have categorised Taiwanese indigenous communities as peoples 
belonging to the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) families (Bird, Geoffrey and 
Taylor, David, 2004; Hill, Pedro, 2007), which are traditionally characterised by 
animism and customs such as bonfires, face tattooing, leather coat manufacture and 
round dance (S. Wang, 2001). However, these traditional cultures have faced the 
crisis of disappearing since the Second World War, with conversion to Christianity 
being popular among indigenous groups (S. Huang, 1986; Y. Huang, 1983). The 
Christianisation of indigenous groups has naturally aroused the attention of 
anthropologists in Taiwan, but only a few of them have analysed religious transition 
with respect to the dialectic relationship between culture and faith, rather than in 
relation to the social and economic reconstruction in modern society (Chang, 2001; S. 
Huang, 1986). In 1982, research statistics showed that 185,635 indigenous people had 
converted to Christianity, which was 62% of the indigenous population of the time 
(306,138), whilst some other studies pointed out that the actual number might be even 
higher (Y. Chang, 2001). This Christianisation of indigenous groups has been called 
the ‘miracle of the 20th century’ (Y. Chang, 2001). 
    If it is something of a conjecture to say that religious conversion to Christianity 
is the reason for the disappearance of tradition, at least we can reckon that at some 
point it was the rapid and fundamental change in the construction of modern societies 
that prompted the shift of social structures. Some academics see the religious 
transition of Taiwanese indigenous groups as the result of the interaction of internal 
forces, such as the local social context and family structures (Chang, 2001; S. Huang, 
1980), whilst others conclude that it is due to external forces like the vigorous, 
denominational missionary approaches and doctrines, which are more ‘philosophical’ 
than indigenous religion, with more organised missionary institutions (Y. Chang, 
2001; Shi, 1976). In addition to investigating the process of religious transition, 
Huang Ying-Kuei’s (1983) synthetic research on the changes in the cultural traditions 
and values among indigenous groups also points out the importance of looking into 
the historical context and more specifically the relationship between the religious 
transition and the shift in social structure, as the factors and motives would vary 
during the process of religious transition. 
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Through the efforts of anthropologists, it is now possible to argue that the 
existing concepts used by sociology and anthropology, such as ‘religion’, ‘faith’ or 
‘religious conversion’, might not explain the aspects of religious transition that have 
taken place in indigenous societies, which are unlikely to divide the religious aspects 
from the moral orders, social life and codes of conduct. Converting to Christianity 
thus might also be said as leading to the metamorphosis of the life itself of indigenous 
groups. Furthermore, anthropological studies also developed and practised the 
approach of taking both the outer social and economic conditions and subjective 
understandings in order to analyse religious transition; that is, only when the social 
changes that are caused by certain conditions are considered subjectively as religious 
problems by the locals can they be recognised as the critical factor affecting their 
religious life (Chang, 2001; Y. Huang, 1991).2 
Though these studies of religious transition highlighted the possible processes of 
the religious changes taking place among Taiwanese indigenous groups, they did not 
explain how the cultural traditions change with the groups’ religious beliefs. Nor did 
they indicate the ways in which these changes in cultural traditions affected the 
different groups’ ideas of the self, or how the ‘external forces’ function with the 
groups’ religious structures. Further, they could not give a satisfactory answer as to 
why it is Christianity that pervades among the indigenous groups in modern Taiwan, 
and not Buddhism or Taoism, which the indigenous people would have been exposed 
to through their contact with the Han Chinese. Meanwhile, these studies of the 
cultural and social changes of indigenous societies due to religious conversion seem 
to suggest an equal religiosity between the pre-conversion and the post-conversion 
religious beliefs that operated on the agents, when the modern religious life of 
Taiwanese indigenous communities is in fact highly disparate in terms of religious 
attitudes, cognition, experience and action. Bearing these aspects in mind, in this 
study I will examine how and why the Atayal indigenous people in Bienjing village in 
Taiwan converted to Christianity, what this religious ‘conversion’ means to them, and 
how this ‘conversion’ changed their perception of the cultural surroundings and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For example, in Huang Ying-Kwei’s (1991) article Dehanin and the Social Crisis: A Further 
Discussion on the Religious Conversion of the Bu-Nun People in Donpu, he points out that the 
Japanese policy of rice farming in their late regime in Taiwan, although subverting the Bu-Nun 
people’s economic structure and therefore affecting their traditional agriculture rituals, did not became 
the impact factor of their religious conversion to Christianity until years after, when there was an 
outbreak of malaria and the people started to believe it was the change in rituals that had caused the 
god (Dehanin) to bring death upon the people. 
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identities.3 I will argue that the seemingly ‘religious’ act of converting to Christianity 
led to the ‘secularisation’ of the Atayal society and identity. 
Before presenting my data, however, I will first identify and discuss a range of 
texts that have a direct bearing on my research. In the following sections I shall 
clarify and critically assess the concepts I’m using in this study to give a more 
comprehensive background to the research questions. 
1.2 To frame the question / Literature review 
1.2.1 Secularisation and modernity 
Max Weber (1946: 155) stated that the modern world was characterised ‘by 
rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the 
world”. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life 
either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct 
and personal human relations’ (as quoted in Glasner, 1977: 44). This phenomenon of 
‘rationalisation and intellectualisation’ during modernity is what has been widely 
recognised as ‘secularisation’ by sociologists and anthropologists. Yet, because of its 
different usages in different contexts and in relation to different experiences, 
‘secularisation’ has become a controversial and discrepant term when it comes to the 
discussion of religion in the modern world. In order to clarify the idea of 
‘secularisation’ used in this study, it is necessary to define, or at least to disambiguate, 
the connotations of ‘secularisation’ that appear throughout this study, as well as to 
review and examine some of the most influential theories in order to demonstrate my 
idea of ‘secularisation’. 
    The classic notion of secularisation was employed by renowned sociologists 
such as Weber (1946) and Durkheim (1961). Anthropological studies on the status of 
religion in modern society also understood secularisation as describing the decline of 
religion along with the progression of modernity (Finke, 1992; Hadden, 1987; Stark, 
2000), and the term was used to address the retreat of religious power in modern 
society in regard to the reliance on the ethics, institution and normative guidance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To remain the anonimousity of the village, I’ve changed its name to ‘Bienjing’. 
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religion (Woodhead and Heelas, 2000). For example, A. F. C. Wallace (1966) and 
Bryan Wilson (1966, 1976) claimed that the development of science would eventually 
end the influences of religion and the belief in supernatural power. Wilson (1976, 
1998) even argued that modern religious sectarian movements were essentially 
‘secularised’, as they were usually formed by rational, scientific choices. These 
secularisation ‘prophets’, however, were soon challenged by the growth of religious 
activities in different parts of the world, which led to the review, redefinition and 
questioning of the grand narrative of secularisation in this sense (Berger, 1997; 
Dobbelaere, 1987; Hanson, 1997; Tschannen, 1991). Some academics have even seen 
the notion of secularisation as a mistake and argue that the world is in a period of 
religious revival rather than decline (Berger, 1997; Martin, 1965; Stark, 2000).  
Of those new definitions and understandings of ‘secularisation’, José Casanova 
(1994) pointed out that they usually contain three discourses: secularisation as 
religious decline, secularisation as differentiation, and secularisation as privatisation 
(1994:7). Some academics have also simplified secularisation theory, devising three 
propositions: vanishing – the undermining of religious power towards society and 
individuals in modernity; differentiating – the disunion of secular matters from 
religious norms and institutions; and weakening – religions are marginalised and 
pushed into the personal, private sphere (Woodhead and Heelas, 2000:429). The 
difficulties of applying complex phenomena to a specific term and its aforementioned 
muddled meanings made Shiner (1967) suggest that ‘we drop the word entirely’ (as 
quoted in Swatos Jr. & Christiano, 1999). However, the value of the changing 
definitions and connotations of secularisation is that the term has been employed in a 
variety of ways to discuss the fate of religions in modern times. Therefore, the debate 
regarding secularisation should focus on how to grasp the dynamic relationship 
between modernity and religious transition, rather than dwell on its former thesis of 
the decline of religion. 
Other than following the Weberian view of seeing rationality as the modern basis 
of religious belief and institutional formality, some scholars chose to understand the 
construction of modern religiosity from the macro-view of societal transition by 
keeping the idea of ‘secularisation’ but with a new, more nuanced definition. 
Dobbelaere (1981, 2002) viewed secularisation as a process with three dimensions:  
laicisation, religious change and religious involvement. This view interpreted 
secularisation as a complex set of religious transition phenomena: firstly, an evolution 
	  	   12	  
process with the disengagement of social institutions from religion, which itself 
becomes a subsystem; secondly, the turn of the internal focus of religion from divinity 
to earthly matters; and, finally, the reduction of participation among individuals. 
Casanova (1994) later developed this multi-dimensional idea of secularisation by 
pointing out that it is constructed by these related yet independent 
dimensions/movements, although the direction and intensity of changes are not 
always consistent. Here, secularisation became a phenomenon with internal tension 
that is compatible with both the activation of individual religiosity and the decline of 
religious influence, as an individual could have a strong religious belief without 
building his/her religious identity and life on or around a certain institution or group 
ritual practice (Davie, 1994). 
The social transformation of religiosity indicates the obligation felt by 
individuals living during the time of high modernity to make sense of their lives in 
new ways, without the guidance of institutional religion. This struggle of modern 
humans is what Berger (1974) called the ‘homeless mind’ in the absence of the 
‘sacred canopy’, and what Giddens (1991) referred to as the ‘existential anxiety’ of 
identity caused by the increasing social reflexivity in ‘high modernity’. It is, 
nevertheless, the reason Hervieu-Léger (2000:93) urges us to view modernity as 
something that is intrinsically paradoxical: it generates what ‘is of essence contrary to 
it, namely heteronomy, submission to an order endured, received from outside and not 
willed’. On the one hand, in modernity the ‘affirmation of the autonomy of the 
individual which undermines the authority of tradition paradoxically rekindles’ 
(Hervieu-Léger & Lee, 2000:93); whilst, on the other, this affirmation of the 
autonomy of the individual also produces the need for beliefs in new socialised forms 
(Hervieu-Léger & Lee, 2000). Secularisation here is thus a paradoxical phenomenon 
leading simultaneously to both the prospering and the degeneration of religious 
activity, and characterised by its dialectic relationship with modernity, in the sense of 
both constructing and being reconstructed by modernity. 
A criticism of the multi-dimensional, de-institutional idea of secularisation is its 
restriction to the Christian European environment. The insufficiency of this new 
theory of secularisation, just as in its classic notion, is the historically specific context 
of Europe’s domination by the Christian church, and the fact that European society 
has always been characterised by individualism. The lack of academic attention to, 
and interest in, religious experiences outside Europe made some scholars suggest 
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framing ‘secularisation’ in specific societies under a specific historical context – 
namely, Western Europe after the Enlightenment – so that the variety of societal and 
religious transition could be viewed more flexibly on a global scale. A religious 
experience outside Europe that contradicted secularisation theories, for example, 
would be the thriving of Christianity in modern countries such as America, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Korea (Davie, 2002). In order to give a more 
comprehensive spectrum of secularisation theories, Davie (2002) applied Eisenstadt’s 
(2000) notion of ‘multiple modernities’, wherein ‘modernity’ adopts different modes 
according to the varied contexts of politics, economy and culture in different societies. 
European modernity, while being the origin and the reference of different modernities 
when constructed among other non-European societies, is only one of the possibilities 
of practising modernity itself. The religious forms and transitions under this point of 
view can of course have multiple evolutions and results. Hervieu-Léger (2003) also 
suggested using the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ as the better solution to the 
problem of the singular linear and universalist views of ‘classical’ secularisation 
theories. She argued that, generally speaking, even though the canonical power of 
religious institutions is decreasing in modern societies, with regard to the different 
relationships between politics and religion in different cultures the influences of the 
religious symbolic structure can vary. This approach to secularisation no longer 
focuses on the influences of rationalisation or autonomy in the practice and belief of 
religion, but considers instead how religion invisibly constructs ‘a’ modernity both 
historically and culturally. In other words, it is not a certain universal principle of 
secularisation that determines the fate of modern religion; rather, its forms and ways 
are determined by the cultural summation of the religion (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). 
The concept of multiple modernities offers another means of expressing and 
analysing the complex scenes of religion under different conditions of modernity that 
avoids the Eurocentric fault; however, those different modes of modernity which 
seem to be anti-Western and anti-modernity are, to a great extent, still modern 
(Eisenstadt, 1999a). This paradox of ‘other’ modes of modern civilisations is 
generated from the antinomy of modernity itself. From the very beginning, Eisenstadt 
argued, modernity (as developed in the West) has had its internal contradictory 
dimensions of totalising and multiplicity, control and autonomy, which have been 
referenced and reconstructed in its global expansion by different localities (Eisenstadt, 
1999b). Nevertheless, which precise aspects of European modernity are being referred 
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to when European modernity is cited as a reference for these different modern 
civilisations? Even though some might have their own answers, such as reflexive 
institutionalisation (Eisenstadt, 2000), contextual histories (Hervieu-Léger & Lee, 
2000) or specific forms of subjectification (Brown, 2001), it still leads the question 
back to where secularisation starts: to what extent can a certain religious transition be 
called ‘modern’ (Zizhe, 2008)?  
Indeed, the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ (Davie, 2002; Eisenstadt, 2000; 
Hervieu-Léger, 2003) helped to free the dilemma of the theories of secularisation 
from their Eurocentric views and the varied results of religious transition in different 
modern societies; yet it does not satisfactorily solve the question of understanding the 
relationship between modernity and religion. Whereas the concept of 
multi-dimensional secularisation has its narrative flaw in a certain context (Christian 
Europe), the approach towards society, organisation and the individual is still 
influential for the studies of religious transition in all modern civilisations (Beyer, 
1999).  
Interestingly, Berger (2012: 313) later adopts a rather different approach where 
he argues that the advocators of secularisation have ‘confused secularization with 
pluralization, secularity with plurality’. Modernity, he argues, does not necessarily 
produce a decline of religion, nor necessarily produce a deepening process of 
pluralisation. This discrepant development of religion in the modern world is what 
Alfred Schütz called the ‘Relevance Structure’ (Berger, 2012; Chojnacki, 2012) – that 
in modernity, people can have both ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ characteristics, rather 
than being simply one or the other. Berger further refers this back to Casanova, who 
states that ‘all institutions have correlates in consciousness’ – in other words, when 
religious organisations are extracted from secular ones (for example, the separation 
between the state and the church, and science from theology, which have been driven 
by the rationalisation of modernity), the same differentiation would consciously 
happen individually and societally. This does not mean that religion has been omitted; 
only that it is separated from secular matters. A good example of the shift between 
these two identities in modern lives would be whether a person visits a doctor as well 
as seeking religious help when they are ill. Berger (2012) calls this ‘natural’ 
separation of the secular and religious in modern societies the ‘default discourse’ of 
modernity, which, again, leads the development of modern religion towards not one 
certain destiny, but plurality – that is, if there is any trait to be named as the universal 
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necessary religious production of modernity, it is plurality. 
    Berger’s notion of the ‘default discourse’ of modernity avoided the circular 
nature of the aforementioned religious development argument, and also solved the 
uncertainty left by the concept of multiple modernities. However, such an idea still 
seems to be insufficient to explain, or analyse, the modes of religious transition – if 
we are not to view them as ‘secularisation’ – in those non-European contexts. Simply 
stating that the modern religious movement is pluralistic cannot help us to understand, 
for example, the massive conversion from the native religious beliefs to Christianity 
in Africa or Asia, or to predict how such changing religious lives will be manifested 
in modernity.  
    In this thick ethnography of the Taiwanese indigenous Atayal community, 
therefore, I shall challenge, or at least give an alternative perspective on, the concept 
of secularisation. We will see how the religious transitions of the Atayal people 
occurred in terms of the experience of the ‘sacredness’ that framed their model of 
‘secularisation’, whilst existing religious institutions continued to play an important 
role in the people’s public and private lives. Henceforth, instead of using it to talk 
about the relations between religious institutions, practices and individuals, I use the 
term ‘secularisation’ in this study to refer to the decline of sacredness and its 
separation from secular life with particular regard to the Atayal people’s conversion 
to Christianity. 
1.2.2 On religious conversion  
Studies of religious transition around the world have indicated the various, and 
sometimes contradictory, trends of religious development in different cultures and 
regions. However, one thing we can know for sure is that religious transitions or 
religious movements have their own characteristics that are manifested in social and 
cultural contexts (Jean Comaroff, 1985; van Binsbergen, 1981). For example, the 
religious conversion to Christianity in South Africa was generally in the interest of 
‘healing and sustaining good health’ (Pauw, 1980:328); in South Korea, Christianity 
was used to better adapt (materially) to the modernisation process after the war 
without compromising traditional Korean cultural values and ethics (Kim, 2000); and 
Latin America’s turn to Protestantism from Catholicism stemmed from the needs of 
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economic improvement, spiritual satisfaction and social connections (Stark & Smith, 
2010). These cases of converting to Christianity matter to the studies of religious 
conversion because, to a certain extent, it was the global expansion of Christianity in 
the twentieth century in a supposedly secularised modern world that drew the 
attention of many anthropologists and sociologists to the subject, and thereby framed 
the early discussions of conversion in general within the Christian (semiotic) context 
(Robert W. Hefner, 1993a; Rambo, 1993; YÜ, 2014).  
    The evangelical roots of the Christian paradigm of religious conversion can be 
traced back to St. Paul, who dramatically ‘converted’ to Christianity from Judaism on 
his way to Damascus (in Acts 9:1-31, English Standard Version). It can later be seen 
in John Wesley’s conversion to becoming a ‘real’ Christian by having a holy inner 
experience in 1738 (Wesley, 2005). The psychologist James Williams (2012: 155) 
described such a state of mind of conversion as a ‘great oscillation in the emotional 
interest’ that results in a ‘wavering and divided self’. Nock (1933:7) viewed Christian 
(and Jewish) conversion as ‘the reorientation of the soul of an individual, his 
deliberate turning from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a 
turning which implies a consciousness that the old was wrong and the new is right’, 
which can be marked by a transformative event. Another example of this sudden turn 
of religious belief is the Roman emperor Constantine the first, who allegedly 
converted to Christianity by seeing the sign of God before he won the Battle of 
Milvian Bridge (Gerberding & Cruz, 2004), prior to which he had seen a cross of light 
in the sky with the words ‘in this sign you shall conquer’. These examples thus served 
as the reference for the conceptualisation of conversion to Christianity in early 
literature. 
    However, as many studies showed later, religious conversion is ‘very rarely an 
overnight, all-in-an-instant wholesale transformation that is now and forever’ (Rambo, 
1993:1); rather, it is a ‘process’ that does not always involve a complete ‘change of 
religion’ or repudiation of the past. For example, as Jordan Paper (1999) stated, 
religious belief in many East Asia countries has an ‘ethnic’ character that defines the 
culture and the society, so that Catholicism in China is ‘expanded’ to include 
ancestral tablets in the household, in order to facilitate continued engagement with the 
traditional world view. Even within the same ‘religion’, conversion also happens in an 
individual’s transition between different denominations to ‘add on’ (which was how 
A. D. Nock (1933) described pagans’ conversion to Christianity) one’s idea of the 
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(religious) world without abandoning previous beliefs (Rambo, 1993). In such cases, 
conversion can be said to be, in Peter Stromberg’s (1990:43) words, a ‘constantly 
recreated’ religious view of the world. These different accounts of religious transition 
therefore highlight another fundamental factor in defining the essence of religious 
conversion, assuming that religious conversion is to change, conceptually or 
institutionally, from one religion to another (Boullion, 1982; Needham, 1972) – that is, 
what is religion? 
    I don’t intend to expand the focus of this study to dwell on the definition of 
religion, though I shall clarify the Atayal participants’ ideas about religious 
conversion and ‘religion’ in later chapters. Nonetheless, just as Jack Goody’s (1986) 
study of the Ashanti people in West Africa showed that they did not have an 
independent idea of ‘religion’ until they were able to compare their beliefs with 
Christianity and Islam, oral societies’ ‘religion’ is usually inseparable from the social 
activities (Goody & Watt, 1968; Goody, 1961, 1977, 1986, 1987). Such 
characteristics of their idea of religion are distinct from the Christian West’s reference 
to religious belief or churches as being opposite to the secular, social aspects 
(McGuire, 1987). These essential differences on the experience of religion are why 
anthropologists such as John and Jean Comaroff (1991) questioned whether the 
classic Christian paradigm of ‘conversion’ could faithfully encompass the meaning of 
religious transitions in non-Western societies. Meanwhile, anthropological studies 
also began emphasising the factors and contexts that resulted in transitions in 
religious affiliation. From Robin Horton’s (1971) intellectualist approach to 
Ifeka-Moller’s (1974) take on social and cultural structures, studies of religious 
conversion not only further explored the models of religious conversion, but also 
revealed the complexity of religious conversion, which could involve changes at 
many levels, such as in political policies (Kipp, 1993), ethnic boundaries (Shepherd, 
1996) or socio-economic structures (Robbins, 2004) as well as in the personal and 
spiritual spheres.  
    These different approaches and results of religious conversion studies also 
suggest the importance of understanding the changes in people’s view of the world 
(Horton & Peel, 1976; Horton, 1971, 1975) as well as in the social and cultural 
structures (Robbins, 2004). When discussing the genesis of a new religion, in 
particular, a historical framework should be established, and the regional 
characteristics carefully considered (J. M. Atkinson, 1983; Geertz, 1973b; van 
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Binsbergen, 1981) in order to fully comprehend the subject’s social, cultural and 
symbolic background, how they interacted with outer events, and how they were 
‘reproduced’ and ‘transformed’ by the use of the converted religious belief (Chen, 
1999; Jean Comaroff, 1985; John Comaroff, 1982; van Binsbergen & Schoffeleers, 
1985). Religious conversion, therefore, is treated by many later researchers as a ‘long 
conversation’ between different factors and agents (Buckser & Glazier, 2003; Jean 
Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991). In other words, religious conversion has to be taken as 
‘multi-causal’ (Ikenga-Metuh, 1987:25) and a ‘dialectic process of world building’ 
(Berger, 1967; Robert W. Hefner, 1993a) that is appropriated by the converters 
(James & Johnson, 1988).  
    The issue of cultural continuity/discontinuity in religious conversion has also 
been raised during the seeking of cultural reproduction and transformation. Influenced 
mostly by the conversion to Christianity, many anthropological studies before Joel 
Robbins (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2007) tended to focus on the continuity of the 
cultural elements, such as symbols, logics, structures and power dynamics, during 
religious transition, even when the characteristics of religious syncretism and 
bricolage had been noticed.4 It was exactly this anthropological tradition of treating 
discontinuity in religious conversions as something that is too ‘self-evident’ to be 
further discussed (Chua, 2012) that led Robbins (2007) to criticise many past studies, 
including that undertaken by Jean and John Comaroff (1991), for ‘sidelining’ the 
implications of Christian culture to the converters (Gooren, 2014), when Christianity 
itself should be seen as a ‘system of meaning with a logic of its own’ (Robbins, 
2007:7). Robbins, along with other anthropologists who share similar ideas, such as 
Fenella Cannell (2006), Matthew Engelke (2004, 2010), Olivia Harris (2006) and 
Brigit Meyer (1998, 1999), thus urge cultural anthropologists to treat religious 
conversion as an action of ‘discontinuity’ and ‘rupture’ between ‘the past, the present, 
and the future’ (Robbins, 2007: 11). Although Robbins’ idea of the anthropology of 
Christianity was also criticised for being ‘oblivious to the Protestant bias’ (Hann, 
2012) which failed to engage with other Christians (Rogers, 2009) and ignored the 
multi-faceted character of Christianity that could result in continuities as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, see: Nock, Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion (1933); Arthur F. Glasser, 
Conversion in Judaism (1992); Robert W. Hefner, Conversion to Christianity: Historical and 
Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation (1993); Buckser and Glazier, The 
Anthropology of Religious Conversion (2003); Hindmarsh, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative 
(Hindmarsh, 2007); and Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (1991). 
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discontinuities in different ways (Chua, 2012), his discourse of discontinuity is still 
remarkable in evaluating the impact of Christian conversions, and his attempt to align 
both anthropological analysis and native exegesis also provided an alternative tool to 
review the relations between culture and religious transition (Chua, 2012).  
    However, as well as taking the native exegesis into the analysis of religious 
conversion, Peter Gow’s (2006) study of the Piro people of Peruvian Amazonia 
showed a rather different perspective on the debate on continuity/discontinuity in 
religious conversion. Gow noticed how little the Piro people talked about the 
conversion to evangelical Christianity in the late 1940s and 1950s while churches 
were described as the origin of their modern civil lives. The Piro people’s ‘forgetting’ 
of their conversion, Gow explains, was due to ‘their failure to use it as a very 
powerful conceptual tool for thinking about their past’ (Gow, 2006: 237). Whether it 
was the practice of shamanism or the conversion to Christianity, the Piro people took 
these actions as a means to ‘live well’ under their cosmology, and so once that goal of 
‘living well’ had been achieved, the conversion immediately ‘lost its historical 
purchase and was forgotten’ (Gow, 2006: 237). Religious conversion therefore 
became for them a ‘historical action’ rather than a ‘historical event’ (Gow, 2006). 
Meanwhile, in Yang’s (2009) study of the Taiwanese Bunun people’s conversion to 
Christianity, the people even claimed that the religious subject of their ‘old’ religion 
was ‘just the same’ as Christianity, and so they never experienced discontinuity. The 
various religious experiences of continuity/discontinuity are why Liana Chua (2012: 
522) advocates treating religious conversion as a temporal and relational simultaneous 
‘positioning’ of the people in a shared world, as this provides a bigger picture of not 
only the (dis)continuity of the past and the present, but also the changes of the ‘whole 
network of social, political, and moral relations’ (Chua, 2012: 522) during the 
religious transition, to disclose the various dimensions of the conversion.  
    Such an approach to religious conversion is especially useful when studying a 
group that was established by guidelines that are inseparable from their religious 
belief, such as the Atayal aborigines in this study. In light of that, in later chapters I 
shall demonstrate how the Atayal people in this study ‘positioned’ themselves 
between others before and after their conversion to Christianity, along with the 
changes in their perception of ‘sacredness’. By doing so, I hope to give a more 
comprehensive understanding of how converting to Christianity brought religious, 
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cultural and political changes to the Atayals’ lives while they claim to have been 
Christians all along – that is, how the discontinuity is disguised with continuity in the 
Atayal people’s case. 
1.2.3 The construction of ethnic identity 
As ‘identity’ involves the capacity for self-reflection and the awareness of self (Leary 
& Tangney, 2003:3), transferring to being Christian from being non-Christian is 
certainly a big leap of identity. The study of ethnicity is almost inseparable from the 
study of identity, since what makes an ethnic group identify ‘themselves’ as different 
from ‘others’ (Conrad P. Kottak, 1997) greatly overlaps with what forms the group’s 
ethnicity. They are, in fact, different aspects of the factors of ethnicity. In 
anthropology, the biggest debate regarding ethnicity is whether to treat it as a 
subjective recognition (emic) or an objective entity (etic), and whether it is an 
‘instrument’ that can be mobilised along with the change of circumstances, or a 
transcendental, ‘natural’ status of human civilisations. With the former being the 
approaches to the formation of a group, and the latter being the cause of a group’s 
identity, we have to note that sometimes those who are objectively considered the 
same group of people might show the instrumental features in terms of the 
discrepancy of identity, whilst subjectively different collectives could also have 
certain primordial links (Banks, 2005). This is why, by systematically reviewing the 
discourses of these theories, we could further analyse the transition of the recognition 
of the Atayal communities’ ethnicity in this study. 
    Subjectivism assumes that the formation of an ethnic group comes from the 
subjective presumption of the people. Fredrik Barth’s (1969, 1994, 2000) idea of the 
identity boundary, for example, considered ‘ascription’ as the key to the categories of 
ethnic groups, for ‘culture’ can only be recognised to describe certain traits of an 
ethnic group, and is not sufficient to link the ‘one-to-one relationship between ethnic 
units and cultural similarities and differences’ (Barth, 1969:14). This is why Barth 
saw the ethnic group as the ‘vessel’, and argued that what’s contained in the vessel 
(the cultural formation and contents) would change along with the contacts with 
different groups, as well as the transitions of the society and environment. An ethnic 
group, therefore, would continue its formation as long as the ethnic border was 
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maintained by the dichotomisation between the group members and outsiders (Barth, 
1969).  
    Compared to Barth, Abner Cohen (1969) took a more radical position on the 
notion of ethnicity. Taking ethnicity as the product of modernity and capitalism, 
Cohen first criticised Fredrik Barth’s objective presumption of the pre-existence of 
ethnic groups in his theory of the identity boundary. To him, ethnic groups as we 
know them today are in fact ‘political groupings’ of ‘informal interest groups’ formed 
out of the contacts and competitions with each other, as those traditionally isolated 
social unions such as tribes and villages have now all integrated into the structure of 
the nation-state (A. Cohen, 1969). Thus he argued that the production of, and the 
interactions between, ethnic groups should be taken from a materialistic aspect to 
analyse the political and economical relations not just within the group, but also with 
other groups (A. Cohen, 1969). Similar to Cohen’s stance of viewing ethnicity in 
terms of political and economical structure, another radical subjectivist notion of 
ethnicity is the application of rational choice theory by studies such as those of 
Michael Banton (1983) and Michael Hechter (1986). By using Banton’s (1983) study 
on Gypsies’ identity, Hechter (1986) argued that human behaviours are the outcomes 
of the interactions between individual preferences and structural constraints, and that 
individuals only cooperate when personal benefits are attainable, whilst group 
members only engage with collective actions when ‘they estimate that by doing so 
they will receive a net individual benefit’ (Hechter, 1986:271). On this basis, the 
consciousness of ethnicity is thus the result of an individual’s rational choice, which 
becomes the core of these subjectivist studies. 
    Objectivists, on the other hand, consider ethnicity as being formed by objective 
factors such as language (Fishman, 1972; Fought, 2006), kinship or the origin of 
culture (Malesevic, 2004). Of these objective factors, common ancestry has been 
argued by many anthropologists, including John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith 
(1996), to be the most decisive. Hutchinson and Smith concluded in their edited book 
Ethnicity that common ancestry was the myth of origin that would give the members 
of an ethnic group a ‘sense of fictive kinship’ (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996:7) to create 
the possible (and maybe fictive) connections of not only the memories of the past, but 
also the biological relations. This kind of imagination-based, ‘virtual’ biological bond, 
however, was challenged by Pierre Van den Berghe (1987), who thought ethnicity 
should be established on more solid biological conditions. Despite his controversial 
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racist point of view, Van den Berghe’s biological take on ethnicity also revealed the 
logical deficiency of the ‘cultural factors’ of ethnicity using an extreme case. He 
demonstrated the need for substantial biological evidence to support the ‘cultural’ 
factors with the example that the Japanese emperor could be deemed as ‘embodying 
the spirit of the origin of the (Japanese) ancestor’ (1987:16), whereas Queen Victoria 
could never claim to be the mother of India (Van den Berghe, 1987:62). By using that 
example, he argued that ethnic common ancestry is only valid when the conditions – 
cultural and biological – are satisfied. In other words, only when both cultural and 
biological factors share certain similarities, and marriages and kinships have been 
established in a group, can a common ancestry myth be recognised, and an ethnicity 
be formed, from these biological evidences (Van den Berghe, 1987). Van den 
Berghe’s notion on ethnicity reflected how ethnic objectivists criticised subjectivism’s 
inadequate psychological approach of self-ascription, social classification and 
strategic action without considering historical and social processes (Eriksen, 2002). 
However, in the meantime, his focus on biological evidence also exposed what Jack 
David Eller (2002) pointed out to be the danger of the objective cultural- and 
historical-oriented classification: that it needs a certain ‘context’ to make sense of.  
     The two opposite stances on ethnicity thus inevitably influenced the 
arguments regarding ethnic identity. One sees social identity as a natural ability (R. 
Jenkins, 1996), whilst the other treats it as shifting categories that would change along 
with different historical and social circumstances (Benedict Anderson, 1991) – the 
‘Mendelian Model’ and the ‘Lamarckian Model’ (Joycelyn Linnekin & Poyer, 1990). 
With the former approach, Edward Shils (1957) and Geertz’s (1963) primordialism 
has served as the early paradigm that sees the formation of ethnicity as coming out of 
the given, ‘ineffable’ ‘primordial attachment’, such as kin connection, particular 
religious community, or particular social practices. Geertz’s primordialism was 
supported by different scholars in different aspects: Harold R. Issacs (1975) 
considered ethnicity to be biologically inherited, Greely and McCready (1975) saw it 
to be deeply influenced by cultural ‘heritage’, whilst Steven Grosby (1994) and 
Walker Connor (1993) respectively reaffirmed the primordialist assumption with 
psychological and historical approaches. Primordialism’s view of the ethnic group as 
a transcendental status before individuals, and its emphasis on the intrinsic 
connections, however, was also criticised by instrumentalists for ignoring the factors 
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of social interactions and the economical and political backgrounds of the group 
(Banks, 2005). 
    In the same way that the subjectivists opposed the objectivist ‘primal assumption’ 
without taking social and historical contexts into account, instrumentalism 
emphasised the political and economical aspects in forming ethnic identity, taking 
ethnicity as the tool for people to win over social resources and exclude other 
competitors. Eller and Coughlan (1993:201) even called primordialism a ‘bankrupt 
concept’ in terms of its analysis and description of ethnicity. While the objectivist 
view is that there are observable cultural and identity differences between different 
ethnic groups, to instrumentalists such as De Vos (2006:11), these differences are in 
fact ‘subjectively symbolic or emblematic use’ of culture, ‘in order to differentiate 
themselves from others’. Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (2010:3) also argued 
that differences in perceptions of ethnicity are ‘the difference between the ethnicity 
claimed by the people themselves and that is attributed to them by others’, so that ‘[in] 
either case the perception of ethnicity will rest not upon some scientific sociological 
truth but on subjective interpretation’. In addition to the above, instrumentalist 
criticisms of primordialism include its danger of stereotyping, and its lack of ‘rigor, 
explanatory power, and predictive value of structural analyses of behaviour’ (Stack, 
1986:2). By bringing political, economical and historical aspects into ethnic theories, 
instrumentalism and subjectivism revealed the flexibility and fluidity of ethnic groups 
through changes in their circumstances, solved the difficulties in analysing the 
development of ethnicity in modern societies left by primordialists, and became the 
new paradigm of ethnic theories (Brass, 1991; Gurr & Harff, 2004; Wan & 
Vanderwerf, 2009).  
    Though no major scholar today would still apply classic primordialism, some still 
see primordial ties of ethnicity ‘as a product of culture, history, and/or foundational 
myths, symbols and memories’ that merge with both primordialism and 
instrumentalism (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009). Anthony Smith (1996; 1992) further 
argued that rather than being ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’, ethnicity is ‘reconstructed’ by 
historic experiences and symbolic cultural activities that shape people’s sense of 
belonging to the group, unless such symbolic experiences of the past are changed. 
This form of ethnicity construction – what Smith (2009) now calls ethno-symbolism – 
reflected the differences of ethnicity construction in the West and in the Pacific 
observed in Linnekin and Poyer’s book Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific 
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(1990). The Mendelian and Lamarkian models mentioned earlier are the two 
categories of ethnicity formation they observed with the Pacific peoples: the former, 
according to Linnekin and Poyer, is similar to the ‘Western’ idea of ethnicity, which 
is established on the person’s biological inheritable characteristics, whereas the latter, 
as the common view of ethnicity of the Pacific peoples, emphasises the interactions 
between individuals and surroundings, resulting in ‘consocial personhood’ (Lieber, 
1990:72). However, what we have to notice here is that even the so-called ‘inherited’ 
characteristics are part of the cultural identity developed by certain historical contexts. 
Linnekin and Poyer (1990) thus argued that the reference of ethnic identity does not 
have to be universal, but varies with social, historical and cultural contexts. The 
question we should ask about ethnicity, therefore, if I may alter the phrase a little, is 
‘under what conditions does (any kind of) ethnicity become the superordinate symbol 
of identification within a social system?’ (Howard & Howard, 1977: 165; Linnekin & 
Poyer, 1990: 11). 
    This question encouraged studies that not only discussed how different cultures 
construct and express their own cultural identities with different social practices (such 
as Astuti’s study on the Vezo people in 1995, but also explored how different 
identities of ethnicity, religion, gender and class are associated with or dissociated 
from people in relation to various social factors (such as Kipp (1993) and Thompson 
(2003)). Ethnicity, as the means to distinguish one group of people from others, 
should thus be understood as constructed and promoted under certain historical and 
social contexts, rather than in the form of congenital conditions. The question raised 
by Alan and Irwin Howard (1977) may be old, but it is still valid. At this point, the 
core of my study with the Atayal peoples should therefore be much clearer: I am 
investigating how a ‘religious’ group of people such as the Atayals understand their 
conversion to Christianity, and how that conversion changed their construction of 
identity, since their society was mostly based on religious practices. I will also 
analyse how that change of identity construction is ‘secularised’ along with their 
embracing of Christianity, for the ‘traditional’ construction of identity was in fact a 
series of sacred practices.  
1.2.4. Religious studies on Taiwanese Austronesian groups  
Before going on to analyse the data gathered in the field, it is necessary to give a 
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relevant historical context to better depict the background of this study. In this section 
I will introduce the studies of Taiwanese indigenous peoples, which help to delineate 
the construction of indigenous ethnic and cultural identities along with religious and 
social transitions. I will also give an overview of the studies of the Atayals, which 
provide a more detailed picture of the characteristics of the Atayal culture with regard 
to religion and identity. By presenting these previous researches, I hope to underline 
the uniqueness and complexity of religious conversions among the Taiwanese 
indigenous peoples, as well as to bring out the shortcomings in the past studies of 
religion and identity of the Atayals/indigenous groups in order to outline what this 
study is trying to achieve. 
    Systematic studies on the Austronesian peoples (also known as the ‘indigenous 
people’, 原住民) in Taiwan began at the beginning of the period of Japanese rule 
(1895–1945). 5  Out of political concern, the Japanese colonial government (the 
Taiwan Governor-General’s Office, 台湾総督府) started a series of anthropological 
researches on the indigenous peoples in Taiwan to have better control of them, in case 
these mountain-living ‘savages’ became threats to the Japanese regime (S. Huang, 
2012). Among all of the Japanese anthropologists during that time, Ino Kanori 
(1867–1925) was the first to systematically distinguish the ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups 
from the previous cursory classifications of the ‘wild savages’ (生番, indigenous 
people who had not submitted to the Qing government, usually living in the 
mountains) and the ‘tamed savages’ (熟番, those who had submitted to the Qing 
government, usually living in the plain area). He categorised the Austronesian peoples 
into eight different families according to similarities of language and customs 
(Blundell, 2000). His categorisation became the most vital reference not only for later 
studies, but sometimes even for the indigenous people themselves through the modern 
nation-state education system. The ethnic group ‘Atayal’ was thus one of these eight 
recognised Austronesian groups (S. Huang, 2012). In the early stage of the colonial 
rule, understanding the religion of these Austronesian people was crucial in making 
policies, as they had completely different lifestyles from the majority of Han people 
in Taiwan (C. Huang, 1999). In the official researches, the Japanese tended to refer to 
the Austronesian people’s customs, such as taboos, shamanism, fortune-telling 
practices and beheading actions, as ‘superstitions’; whereas those ideas of souls and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 After the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing government 
in China according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and became a colony of Japan for the next 50 years.  
	  	   26	  
ancestral worship that could fit into Japanese Shintoism were put under the category 
of their ‘religious belief’ (C. Huang, 1999). Separating these Taiwanese indigenous 
‘superstitions’ from ‘religion’ thus became a major paradigm during the Japanese rule 
(C. Huang, 1999; S. Huang, 2012).6 Nonetheless, academic studies took different 
approaches to avoid political ideologies being projected in the research. Being a 
Durkheimian, Furuno Kiyoto (2000[1945]) argued that those Austronesian 
‘superstitious’ rituals should be seen as part of the Taiwanese aboriginal peoples’ 
religious belief, and that their religious life should be understood in terms of their 
ideas of ‘religion’, myth, ritual practices and religious structure. With that approach, 
Kiyoto (2000[1945]) thus came to a different conclusion on the Taiwanese 
Austronesian religions to the official records, suggesting the animist nature in 
Taiwanese indigenous religions, as well as pointing out the inseparable connection 
between the religious and daily practices of the indigenous people by analysing how 
the customs of farming became the foundation of worshipping. Koizumi Magane 
(1984[1933]) also stated the importance of those practices being part of the 
Taiwanese Austronesian religious belief, since they were generated from the peoples’ 
‘lives and experiences’. In short, the two approaches of the Japanese anthropologists 
on the one hand reflected how the early researchers saw the concept of ‘religion’, and 
on the other established thick ethnographies that helped later scholars better 
understand the early lives of the Taiwanese aborigines (S. Huang, 2012). 
    With Japan’s defeat in the Second World War and the control of power in 
Taiwan transferring to the Chinese KMT government in 1945, the anthropological 
studies on the Austronesian peoples from then to 1965 mainly focused on the 
traditional social structures and their material cultures (S. Huang, 2012).7 This focus 
on the ‘traditional’ aspects instead of the wider social and economical situations of the 
aborigines had its political contexts, whilst few studies of Austronesian religious life 
were about reconstructing the origins, developments, concepts and practices of the 
religions (S. Huang, 2012).8 The categorisation of the aboriginal ethnic groups during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See, for example, Ino Kanori and Awano Dennojo’s Taiwan Banjin Jijo (Taiwan’s Aboriginal People, 
1900); the Official Report on Barbarians’ Customs (1996); and Yuzuru Okada’s collections of studies 
published in the Ethnographical Journal of South-East Asia, Oceania and Taiwan in1933. 
7 KMT is short for ‘Kuomintang’ (usually translated as the Chinese Nationalist Party), a political party 
that was officially formed in China in 1911. Founded by Song Jiao-ren and Sun Yat-sen, who was later 
recognised as the father of the Republic of China, the KMT was then defeated by the Chinese 
Communist Party during the civil war, and turned to Taiwan to continue its regime while claiming its 
orthodox authority over Mainland China. 
8 The representative studies during this period included, for example, Li Yi-yuan’s (1962) comparative 
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this time mostly followed the results published by Ino Kanori. Interestingly, the rapid 
spread of Christianity among the Taiwanese aboriginal communities did not gain 
much attention from the anthropologists at the time. Tang Mei-chun (1996[1957]) 
even considered such an ‘emerging religion’ as nothing but some ‘decorations’ to the 
traditional religious beliefs that would never replace the importance of the old religion. 
The few studies of the Taiwanese Austronesian conversion to Christianity (T. Chen, 
1951; Chiu, 1966; S. Chen, 1951) also focused only on the freedom-of-religion policy 
carried out by the KMT government (S. Huang, 2012). There were even fewer 
anthropological studies on the social impact of converting to Christianity on the 
aboriginal peoples in Taiwan. Although Song (1963) and Chen (1966), respectively, 
addressed how Christianity was introduced and how it had replaced the social 
functions of certain traditional religious practices, and the role religion had played 
during the cultural transitions, religious conversion did not become a real subject of 
Taiwanese Austronesian studies until the 1980s (S. Huang, 2012).  
    From 1963, Taiwan started to transform from an agricultural society into an 
industrial one (M. Cheng, 1974), and anthropological interests turned to the progress 
of its majority Han societies. Researches on the Taiwanese Austronesian societies 
were undertaken less frequently until the mid-1970s (Y. Huang, 1999), when the 
‘Taiwanisation’ movement affirmed the importance of local cultures. The ‘traditions’, 
such as the religious origins and developments of the Austronesian groups, were still 
popular topics from 1976 onwards, yet the social influences of religious transition 
were also being examined at the time. Religious rituals and concepts were employed 
to review not only the ethnic relations (I. Cheng, 1987), but also the social adaptation 
(M. Chen, 1973) of the Taiwanese Austronesian peoples (S. Huang, 2012). Seeing the 
close relationship between religion and society, the religious transitions of the 
aborigines thus became the focus of this period. With the mass conversion to 
Christianity amongst the Taiwanese Austronesian communities, research into their 
religious transitions started to investigate the cultural and social characteristics that 
could lead to such religious changes (P. Tang, 1996). Studies of the conversion to 
Christianity of the aborigines rapidly grew, and debates over whether such conversion 
was triggered by outer forces (Lu, 1988; Shi, 1976; Wu, 1986) or inner social and 
cultural structures (S. Huang, 1980; W. Huang, 1978) began to proliferate. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
research on the social and religious structures of Taiwanese Aborigines, Hsu Shih-chen’s (1956) 
summary of ancestral origins, and Ho Ting-jui’s (1960) study of tattooing customs. 
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though studies on the religious transitions of the Taiwanese Austronesian peoples 
were established, ‘it was exactly the focus of how each community adapted the 
modernisation through their society or culture that led to such studies, consciously or 
unconsciously, treating society and culture themselves as the tools of adaptation’ (C. 
Huang, 1999:70). 
    The emergence of Austronesian native anthropologists later in the 1990s broke 
the limits of the objectivism in the past studies, and brought new subjectivist aspects 
into the research on the Taiwanese aborigines that replenished the understandings of 
the societies (S. Huang, 2012; Y. Huang, 1999). The anthropological focus on the 
religious life of the Austronesian peoples in this phase still included the 
reconstruction of the traditional religious system, such as in the studies of Kubura 
(1991) and Tien (1992, 1997), whilst the issue of religious transition received even 
more attention and was examined from different perspectives. Taiwanese aboriginal 
peoples’ conversion to Christianity was linked to the political policies of both 
Japanese and KMT governments, and material aid from the churches (S. Lin, 1992), 
whilst the presumption of religion being an independent ideological system in the past 
studies was also reviewed (Y. Chiu, 1997). Meanwhile, the phenomenon of religious 
syncretism in the modern Austronesian groups that resulted from converting to 
Christianity was noted (Luo, 2000), and the transition of the relationships between the 
practice, forms and meanings of religious rituals and the aboriginal societies was also 
discussed (S. Huang, 2012). Wang Song-shan (1990; 1989) and Pan Ying-hai (1993) 
further analysed this increasingly evident cultural syncretism through the changes in 
the religious rituals, arguing that local culture is self-defined and redefined through 
adapting to the mainstream culture, thereby generating new community identities and 
self-consciousness.  
    Cultural and religious syncretism in Christian and modern nation-state contexts 
thus brought up the topics of the construction of ‘ethnicity’, ‘identity’ and ‘cultural 
categorisation’ of the modern Taiwanese Austronesian peoples (S. Huang, 2012). We 
first have to know that the Taiwanese Austronesian peoples’ collective conversion in 
the 1950s and 1960s is quite different from other cases in the world. Whether it was in 
African, American or Pacific societies, the success of converting to Christianity in the 
Global South usually had to do with the ‘white’ colonial power that engaged with 
political, economical or educational struggles (P. Jenkins, 2002). Converting to 
Christianity in those worlds – for example, Papua New Guinea – thus often became a 
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means to connect the ruled and the rulers (Robbins, 2009; P. J. Stewart & Strathern, 
2009; A. Strathern & Stewart, 2009). However, not only has Taiwan never been 
dominated by the ‘white power’, but Christianity is also more likely to be used by the 
Taiwanese Austronesian communities to distinguish themselves from the majority 
Han society (K. C. Huang, 2000; Stewart & Strathern, 2009). That might be the 
reason why, in terms of ethnic identity, most of the studies tended to focus on the 
impact in relation to social and political aspects rather than in terms of religious 
transition (Chin, 2012; S. Huang, 2005), as converting to Christianity in many cases 
seemed to be the answer to reunite the aboriginal groups’ self-definitions under the 
rapid changes of modernisation (I. C. Chen, 2011; Y. Huang, 1992; Tan, 2005). Even 
those studies addressing the issue of ethnic identity through the changes in the nature 
of religious rituals – for example, Chang Hui-tuan’s (1995) research on the Amis 
people’s harvest celebration (豐年祭) and Hsieh and Su’s (1998) discussion of the 
Thao New Year Ceremony – focused on the functions of these modern ritual practices, 
rather than on how the change of religiosity in the rituals influenced the Austronesian 
peoples’ concept of ‘self’. We can, therefore, note that these studies reflected the 
distinction of ‘religion’ from ‘the society’ or even ‘culture’, which basically set the 
boundaries of the understandings and possibilities of the Austronesian researches. 
Recent studies’ deconstruction of the past concepts of kinship, politics and religion 
may have compensated for the lack of native points of view in past researches, but 
this deconstruction served only to reconstruct those ideas by using different cultural 
categorisations, such as the concepts of person, time, space and the relationship 
between material and the body (S. Huang, 2012). The presupposition of the category 
of ‘religion’, therefore, led to the previous studies seeing the conversion to 
Christianity as a sort of ‘transformation’ of the ‘old religion’, and often overlooked 
the religious impact of the issues that were not categorised under ‘religion’. That is 
also why, when reviewing all those researches in Taiwanese Austronesian religious 
transitions, discussion of ‘secularisation’ is almost omitted from discussion of related 
social, political and religious topics. As well as reconsidering the modes of 
secularisation, therefore, throughout this study I will review the possible meaning of 
the ‘religious life’ of the Atayal cultures, and how that might influence the definition 
and practices of who they are. The next section will be a brief introduction to the key 
characteristics of the past researches on the topic of Atayal religious belief and 
identity. 
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1.2.5 On Atayal religious studies 
The tendencies in the research on the Austronesian peoples in Taiwan noted above are 
also applicable to the studies of the Atayals. Between the Japanese retreat from 
Taiwan in 1945 and 1975, the two most comprehensive religious researches on the 
Atayals were the Report of a Preliminary Ethnological Research in Juiyen Village (瑞
岩民族學調查) (H. Lin, 1950) and the Atayal in Nan-ao: An ethnological study (南澳
的泰雅人 :民族學田野調查與研究) (Y. Li, 1963). Being one of the earliest 
Austronesian studies after the KMT government took over Taiwan, the former was an 
attempt to prove the culturally inseparable relation with the Chinese in order to 
establish the legitimacy of the regime, rather than an attempt to understand the ethnic 
minorities’ social organisations or customs (Chao-ju Chen, 1995). The results of the 
‘research’, therefore, became something that is ‘static, historical critical, and even 
transcendental’ (Chao-ju Chen, 1995:7). Despite that, the Report still set the paradigm 
for Austronesian researches for the next 20 years in terms of the ‘patchwork’ study by 
a team of anthropologists. Later on, although Li Yi-yuan’s study of the Atayal people 
in Nan-ao in 1963 gave a more comprehensive introduction to their emigration history, 
customs, religious beliefs and myths, the ‘patchwork’ nature of the research was 
criticised for its lack of a systematic, holistic view of the culture (Q. Chen, 1986).  
    Li’s study (1963) also reflected the trend of kinship theories in anthropology in 
America at the time. Since the Japanese period, the Atayals’ social – and perhaps 
religious – unit/concept of ‘gaga’ (pronounced ηaηa) has been the biggest puzzle to 
researchers.9 Li’s study assumed that all the social relations in Atayal society were 
based on kinship, and gave these social relations ethical explanations (K. C. Huang, 
2000; S. Huang, 2012). During the industrialisation of Taiwanese society in the 1970s, 
the focus of Atayal studies turned to the functions of the traditional rituals and 
customs, and therefore highlighted the transitions of the traditional cultures in modern 
society. In dealing with Atayal societies, Chen Mau-thai (1973) argued that traditional 
Atayal people formed the kin-based ‘social units’ of gaga from their religious belief 
about their deceased ancestors, ‘utux’, and that the two concepts helped the Atayals to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Due to language variation among the Atayal people, gaga may be called gaya in different Atayal 
groups. 
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adapt to changes in circumstances.10 Ho Chin-shan (1986) then further discussed how 
the Atayal people practised their religious belief – including the gaga – in different 
social organisations along with their conversion to Christianity. In later studies it was 
further argued that the ‘social unit’ of the gaga was being replaced by the church, 
which ‘transformed’ Atayal social and religious systems to Christian contexts and 
became the new way of adapting to modern life (Y. Huang, 1999).  
    With such a functional approach to the core concepts of Atayal culture, the 
native cognitions were often ignored, and the dynamics between the body, society and 
religious beliefs of the Atayals were also rarely discussed. Wang Mei-hsia (1990, 
2003) thus drew on her own years of fieldwork to review the past understandings of 
the gaga and utux, and argued that the gaga is in fact a polysemic term that has 
different meanings in different contexts. She pointed out that the term gaga is 
extensively used to refer to social norms, ritual rules and prayers, taboos, personal 
features, daily practices and customs, and even ways of farming. Instead of being 
understood as merely the signifier for social or kinship units in the Atayal society, 
Wang (1990) further argued that gaga should be seen more as a ‘becoming’ 
mechanism of the Atayals’ understanding of history, society and religious belief (S. 
Huang, 2012; M. Wang, 1990, 2003). Wang’s analysis of the meaning of gaga gave a 
holistic view of how religion, economy, kinship and politics are defined around, and 
interact with, the concept of the gaga, and revealed the problem of applying 
traditional Han (or Western) cultural categorisation to Taiwanese Austronesian groups. 
Similar to Wang’s findings, the native Atayal researcher Yupas Watan (2005) argued 
that the belief in the ‘utux’ was practised through the gaga in every aspect of life, 
rather than being a religious system that was isolated from the society. These holistic 
studies of the Atayal cultural and religious concepts brought a new perspective to the 
discussions of the Atayal society. However, they were still conducted under the 
traditional anthropological cultural classifications that presumed a category of 
‘religion’ that is opposed to the sacred and secular worlds (Y. Watan, 2005). This 
study, therefore, aims to challenge such presuppositions of the idea of ‘religion’ in the 
Atayal, and even the Austronesian, studies in Taiwan. 
    Understanding the religious ideas and practices of the Atayals is important 
because religious belief, from the earliest myth of their ethnic origin to their recent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As in footnote 8, utux may also be called rutux or lyutux.  
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conversion to Christianity, has defined who the ‘Atayal people’ are (whether in 
subjective or objective classifications) and what kind of people they want to be. 
However, most of the studies analysing the ethnic identities of the Atayals have 
tended to focus on the political, historical or custom-related ‘cultural’ aspects of 
identity construction to discuss the classification of ‘ethnic groups’ (S.C. Hsieh, 1992; 
Ma, 2002; M. Wang, 2008; Zheng, 2005), rather than analysing the changes in the 
ways Atayal people defined themselves in relation to religion (which will be 
presented in Chapter Four in this thesis). Even in the few researches dealing with the 
changes in Atayal identity with the conversion to Christianity, such as that of K. C. 
Huang (2000), the theological implications were limited to social functions and 
structures, and lacked the explanation of the ‘production’ and ‘reproduction’ of the 
Atayals’ identities along with their religious transition. The missing discussions on 
the identity construction in the Atayal religious studies, in my opinion, results from 
the presupposition of the contradictory categorisations of ‘religion’ and ‘society’, the 
‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’. As modern theories of identity, being a subject of social 
science, are often established on rather secular – that is, political, social or 
psychological – ground, previous researchers also tended to understand the 
construction of identity based on these categories and overlooked how the religious 
belief of the Atayals played out in both the traditional and the modern Atayal societies. 
This is why in this area of Atayal studies, we find that the existing arguments relating 
to the ‘transition’ of modern Atayal identity are discussed only with reference to 
secular – that is, social, political and economical – matters, while the ‘production’ of 
identity in the traditional Atayal world is only considered from a religious viewpoint. 
Henceforth, from a micro perspective, this study is an attempt to examine the 
religious nature of the Atayal society through the eyes of ‘secularisation’, and how 
that changed the idea and the practice of the Atayal identity. From a macro 
perspective, by comparing the traditional and modern lives of the Atayal people I will 
contribute another model or concept of ‘secularisation’ to the discussions of religion 
in the modern world and the anthropology of Christianity, to serve as an alternative 
perspective for the wider study of religious conversion. 
1.3 Plan of thesis 
With the objective of exploring the relations between the sacred and the secular, and 
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between religious change and the identity of the Atayals, the discussion in this study 
will first address the Atayals’ idea of ‘the self’ (chapter three), and will then consider 
their concepts of ‘conversion’ (chapter five and six), of ‘cultural self’ (chapter seven) 
and their understandings of the ‘boundary of identity’ (chapter eight). In the next 
chapter (chapter two) I shall introduce the field site and the methodology used in this 
research.  
    The main arguments in this study are put forward in chapters three to eight. In 
chapters three and four, I review the core ideas of, and the relationship between, the 
‘gaga’ (the way of life) and ‘utux’ (spirit) of the Atayal people, and how, through the 
practice of the gaga, these ideas defined the Atayal society and the traditional 
consciousness of the Atayal ‘self’ – the Atayal person (tayan). The changes in the 
traditional performances of rituals in modern contexts are raised in chapter five, 
which leads to further discussion in chapter six on the Atayal people’s ‘conversion’ to 
Christianity and how the theological differences altered the traditional practices of 
being a tayan. By looking at the changes in the concept of ‘tayan’, chapter six also 
argues that the introduction of Christianity differentiated Atayal ‘society’ from 
‘religion’, and led to the ‘disenchantment’ with the traditional Atayal culture that 
caused the ‘secularisation’ of the society. Chapter seven then further analyses how 
this modern distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ resulted in the rupture of the 
Atayals’ past and present, and the loss of cultural identity, due to the Christianised 
cultural values and religious structure. In order to address the changes in the Atayal 
people’s identity, chapter eight examines in detail the impact of Christianity with 
reference to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of cultural and symbolic capital, and reveals 
how the (secularised) identity of the Atayal people is reproduced through the 
structural change in the group’s religious practices. The final concluding chapter 
(chapter nine) provides a full review of the findings in the study, and maps out the 
significance of them for wider studies in the anthropology of religion. 
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Chapter 2  
Methodology 
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Ethnography has been one of the most efficient methods of exploring cultural and 
social phenomena, as it enables the research participants to present their own ideas of 
the world, providing a qualitative approach to understand the nature of certain 
phenomena (P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). However, it is never easy for a 
novice anthropologist to understand how to ‘do’ the fieldwork, how to obtain others’ 
ideas concerning certain events and how to establish a rapport with the locals. As a 
highly independent form of work, the methods used in field research differ from one 
researcher to another, and they are often not explained accurately. E. E. 
Evans-Pritchard (1976) best addressed this issue in his book Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic among the Azande, before his first trip to Africa:  
I first sought advice from Westermarck. All I got from him was ‘don’t 
converse with an informant for more than twenty minutes because if you 
aren’t bored by that time he will be.’… I sought instruction from Haddon… 
[h]e told me that it was really all quite simple; one should always behave as a 
gentleman… [m]y teacher, Seligman, told me to take ten grains of quinine 
every night and to keep off women. The famous Egyptologist, Sir Flinders 
Petrie, just told me not to bother about drinking dirty water as one soon 
became immune to it. Finally, I asked Malinowski and was told not to be a 
bloody fool (Evans-Pritchard, 1976:240). 
Yet there are still principles we can grasp in the field. As anthropological field 
researches are in fact a process of studying the subjects’ thinking, emotions and 
actions rather than merely collecting data, doing fieldwork is always about 
empathetically understanding the meaning of different symbols in people’s daily 
lives (Moberg, 2013). In other words, field research is about more than the researcher 
‘being there’ in the field, then ‘being here’ to write; it is a process of moving back 
and forth between the awareness of the researcher’s ‘self’ and the awareness of the 
‘other’ that is being researched (Geertz, 1988). Such a way of working in the field – 
and therefore producing anthropological knowledge – can avoid the hegemony of 
scientific discourse from the etic point of view, as well as eschewing the unilateral 
description from the etic position (Conrad Phillip Kottak, 2010). Composing 
anthropological knowledge from field research is therefore to construct a multi-vocal 
narrative (Lett, 1987; V. Turner, 1967, 1974).  
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    To do this, field research has to go beyond merely investigating the current 
status of the subject, and has to link every moment of now to its own historical 
context (Kahn, 2011). Therefore the ‘field’ of the fieldwork should never be 
confined to one village, one place or one group of people; it is also in the history 
and in the texts. By moving back and forth between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, and 
by carefully studying the history of the past (which, in a way, is also the ‘other’ of 
the current), the ultimate goal of the work from the field is, as Clifford Geertz put 
it: ‘[t]he textual connection of the Being here and the Being there sides of 
anthropology, the imaginative construction of a common ground between the 
Written At and the Written About… [It] is the fons et origo of whatever power 
anthropology has to convince anyone of anything’ (Geertz, 1988:144). 
    This chapter outlines and explains how I chose the research and analytical 
methods for this thesis. Firstly I will introduce the site of the fieldwork, providing an 
outline of the composition of its community and history, as well as explaining why it 
was chosen to be the field site for this study. Secondly I shall give details of the 
methods I used during data collection in the field, and how they might have helped or 
limited my research in terms of understanding the relationship between the 
community’s conversion to Christianity and its change of identity. Following that, I 
will demonstrate how the methods I used in the field were connected to the theories 
and approaches I applied in analysing and producing the anthropological knowledge 
from the data collected. 
2.1 Constructing the field: Atayals in Bienjing village 
2.1.1 Selecting the field site 
My research was inspired by my interest in the modern Atayal people’s Christian faith 
and how it might or might not have changed their perception of their cultural tradition 
and values. Thanks to a family connection in the police department, I was quickly 
introduced to a few Atayal people who were able to show me their neighbourhoods in 
different areas of northern Taiwan.11 The first two sites were in Wulai – a mountain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Though, to be fair, such a connection between the indigenous groups and local police stations was 
an unfortunate legacy of the Japanese rule in the early twentieth century, as the Japanese used the 
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area near Taipei that is famous for its hot springs. Though both of the sites are located 
in the same region, they have rather polarised statuses: one enjoys a culture of 
commercialism due to its thriving (or over-developed) hot spring business, whilst the 
other is located in a much more closed and distant area and has very limited resources 
and facilities. As I was trying to find a community where I could observe the possible 
‘transformation’ of Atayal culture during the adaptation to modernity, I was 
introduced to Bienjing village in Miaoli County, where the economic structure is 
composed of a small-scale hot spring business and farming, encompassing three 
different Atayal communities (with two Atayal languages). 
    As a developing region, Bienjing village serves as a perfect site for me to see 
how the Atayal people cope with these different economic patterns, and how the 
church is involved in the different daily practices of the Atayals. The fact that there 
are three different communities in the village also gave me the idea to further examine 
the Atayals’ concept of ‘the self’ by looking at the relations between the three 
communities. After I decided to stay in the village, I was received by the head of the 
village (a position which is elected by the villagers) and lived in the small hot spring 
hostel run by him and his wife for over six months, from September 2011 to late 
March 2012.12 Instead of seeing what was happening ‘from the door of my hostel 
room’, I spent most of my time having conversations with people, and participating in 
most of the events and work, in churches, people’s houses, their orchards, or even by 
roads and campfires.13 In addition to the village head’s own social network, the local 
Atayal police officers also introduced me to chieftains, elderly people (who were born 
in the period of the Japanese rule) and Atayal culture workers in the neighbouring 
tribes and villages, and so my ‘field’ in fact covered five different villages in that area, 
though most of my work was conducted in Bienjing village. Working with the police 
officers did concern me at first out of fear that my relationship with them would make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
police to monitor and regulate the lives of the Atayals. The role of police stations in the indigenous 
areas today has been transformed into one of helper and protector of the people, but tensions between 
the Atayals and the police, and even between the Atayal native and Han police officers, still remain. 12	   My	  fieldwork	  ended	  earlier	  than	  I	  expected	  due	  to	  a	  severe	  injury	  to	  my	  right	  knee,	  but	  by	  the	  time	  I	  left,	  I	  had	  collected	  enough	  data	  for	  my	  research	  and	  had	  a	  preliminary	  framework	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  the	  thesis.	  Therefore,	  although	  this	  field	  trip	  was	  rather	  short,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  worthwhile.	  I	  also	  kept	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  participants	  afterwards	  when	  I	  was	  receiving	  treatment,	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  my	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  were	  fully	  answered.	  
13 As Evans-Pritchard (1940) wrote in his work about his fieldwork with the Nuer: ‘from the door of 
my tent I could see what was happening in camp or village and every moment was spent in Nuer 
company. Information was thus gathered in particles, each Nuer I met being used as a source of 
knowledge, and not, as it were, in chunks supplied by selected and trained informants’.  
	  	   38	  
people guarded towards me, but I soon found out that the Atayal native officers were 
well respected among the people, and they became a great help in terms of translating 
the Atayal language and being first-hand witnesses to the difficulties and problems 
the people are facing. 
2.1.2 The formation of Bienjing village 
Although the origins of the Austronesians and the early history of immigration remain 
unclear, the major migration of the Atayal people from central Taiwan is believed to 
have taken place three or four hundred years ago, as they expanded towards the north 
and east of Taiwan due to the shortage of food and the growth of the population, 
becoming the most widely distributed aboriginal ethnic group in Taiwan (R.-G. Li, 
1997). The migration is not only thought to mark the beginning of the Atayal people’s 
inhabitation of Miaoli (see figure 1), the focus of this study, but also resulted in the 
varied presentation of the Atayal language and culture (see figure 2) (Taian Township 
Office, 1994).  
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Figure 1, the administrative map of Taiwan. Miaoli, the county used in this study, is 
marked in yellow (movers-taiwan.com).14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 http://movers-taiwan.com/Miaoli-County/ (last accessed on 26 July 2012). 
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Figure 2, diagram of the pan-Atayal systems, adjusted from Ma Teng-yue’s (1998) 
chart of the Atayal groups. The content is the same as in Ma’s chart, but I rearranged 
the way it is presented .so that readers can search any column in relation to both 
cultural and linguistic classifications more easily. I also added the names of the tribes 
in Bienjing village (marked in green), to indicate which language families, regional 
groups and cultural systems they belong to (marked in red).15 In the column of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	   The	  Atayal	  ethnicity	  was	  originally	  classified	  to	  contain	  two	  sub-­‐groups	  of	  Atayal	  and	  Seediq,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  column	  ‘Ataya’	  appeared	  twice	  at	  the	  right	  of	  the	  diagram.	  However,	  Seediq,	  and	  the	  group	  that	  was	  once	  catgorised	  as	  its	  branch	  race,	  Truku,	  are	  now	  officially	  two	  independent	  aboriginal	  groups.	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‘Mayrinax’ (with a star sign), I added the term ‘Matuwal’, as the Narima people 
suggested.16 All the terms are in Atayal language. 
    The Atayal communities in Miaoli are distributed in the Taian Township, the 
only ‘indigenous mountain’ administrative district of Miaoli, which comprises one 
third of the land of the County (figure 3). The mountains and rivers in Taian divide 
the township into what the locals call the ‘front mountain’, which includes five 
villages, and the ‘back mountain’ area of another three villages. With better access to 
the town centre and the sources of hot springs, the villages in the ‘front mountain’ are 
usually better developed and have better facilities than those in the ‘back mountain’; 
the settlements in the front are also more dense than those in the back. Although they 
are divided into these administrative units, each ‘village’ in fact contains several 
‘tribes’, which form a total of seventeen Atayal communities in Taian. What we have 
to note about these ‘tribes’ (部落) is that they were not always formed voluntarily. 
The relocation policy during the Japanese period had forcefully broken up many 
original Atayal tribes and put together different small clans as one settlement. The 
‘tribes’ we see today, therefore, do not always conform to the Atayals’ definition of a 
‘tribe’, which refers to a group following the same gaga. Thus in this study I will also 
use the term ‘community’ to refer to all the clustered settlements that are called by 
themselves ‘tribes’ (部落), to avoid the misconception suggested by the term ‘tribe’ in 
English. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	   The ‘Mayrinax’ group in Ma’s (1998) classification, according to the Narima people, should be 
Matuwal. Hence I put both in figure 2 for future reference.	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Figure 3, the administrative map of Miaoli (mapsir.com).17  
    The Atayal people in Taian can be roughly categorised into five groups: Skaru’, 
Matuwal, Mepaynox, Cyubus and Ms’iya’.18  Bienjing village includes three of 
these – Skaru’, Narima/Matuwal and Cyubus – which cover the Segoleg and Tseole 
languages, and the Makanaji, Mapanox and Marenax cultural systems. In Bienjing 
village there are three Atayal tribes: Sawig (Skaru’), Valus (Cyubus) and Narima 
(Matuwal). The names of the tribes are actually the names of the places, and each 
tribe was formed by the union of different clans.19  
2.1.3 The three Atayal tribes in Bienjing village 
The locals claimed that a few hundred years ago, several clans of the Narima were 
moved to nearby mountain areas to make their living; however, from 1913, the 
Japanese colonial government asked them to return to their current location so that 
they could be managed more effectively. The Japanese management policy relating to 
the aborigines gave the Valus area of the Narima to the Masingaw clan from Hsinchu, 
with the consent of the Narima tumux (chieftain), around 1928.20 Later, in 1946, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 http://mapsir.com/684/ (last accessed on 26 July 2012). 
18 See figure 2 for the classification of the Atayal groups.  
19 The names of the tribes have been changed for anonymity. 
20 The Japanese colonial government’s ruling policy over the aborigines involved the use of military 
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another clan from Hsinchu came to the Narima territory and requested that part of the 
lands be given to them, beginning the formation of the Sawig tribe. Each of these 
clustered tribes retained much of their autonomy during the Japanese period and the 
first two years of the KMT rule, though they also needed to follow the public policies 
and were closely monitored by the Japanese. Sometimes the Japanese would also 
intervene in the elections of the chieftains to better suit their purposes, but that was 
not always the case. In 1947, the KMT government reformed the administrative areas 
in Miaoli that officially included the three tribes and reclassified them under the 
national administrative system as a ‘village’.  
    Today, there are about 670 Atayal residents in total in Bienjing village: 300 
Narima, 250 Valus and 120 Sawig. The Sawig tribe, where the village head and his 
hostel are located, has the lowest population of the three communities but is the most 
developed. Being the closest tribe to the hot spring spot, and to the oldest hot spring 
hotel, which has been the police’s facility since the Japanese period, the Sawig people 
have long learned how to use their geographical advantage to run small businesses 
around the site. Following the establishment of other big private hot spring hotels 
nearby in the 2000s, many of the Sawig people became employees of those hotels, 
and the tribe has also undergone some landscape work to better meet the needs of 
tourism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
force during the early period. The ruling principle only changed to pacification during the 1920s, when 
the government started to relocate several aboriginal tribes into a single clustered village. These 
relocation activities – which came at the same time as the establishment of a large number of police 
stations that were known as the ‘police stations for the savages’ (chuzaisho) by the Japanese – not only 
made controlling the aborigines more efficient and easier, but also changed the scattered living style of 
the aborigines into the communal style we see today (Y.-H. Lin, 2010). 
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Figure 4, painted walls and a designed mailbox at a Sawig house. 
 
    Orchards are the other major source of income in Sawig, and especially in Valus 
and Narima. The main crops of the orchards in the village are persimmons and citrus. 
Since the younger generations prefer to work either in the hotels or in cities, the 
farming populations are aged around forty-five to sixty. This difference also reflects 
the educational changes between the older and younger generations and demonstrates 
Taiwan’s transformation from an agricultural society into an industrial one. 
Meanwhile, as almost all of the children are Atayals, the local elementary school also 
started to include Atayal ‘culture classes’ in the syllabus a few years ago. These 
classes teach children mostly about the traditional living skills, material culture and 
Atayal language, but rarely touch on the subject of religious belief.  
    Currently, there is one Catholic church in Bienjing village, three Presbyterian 
churches (one in each tribe), and one Bethel church in Sawig.21 These churches serve 
not only as centres for religious practices, but also as gathering points for the 
promotion of government policies, discussions of public matters and many other 
kinds of events. My fieldwork thus started by visiting the churches and participating 
in church services and events. From there I began to immerse myself in the local 
people’s lives. 
2.2 Fieldwork methods 
During my fieldwork I used different approaches to compile the ethnography, in order 
to gain a much fuller picture of the transitions of religious ideas and practices, as well 
as the shift of the construction of identity. The following sections will be an 
assessment of the methods applied in the field. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This Bethel church belongs to the Taiwanese charismatic sect, ‘Chinese Taiwan Christian Kuang-Ye 
Association’ (社團法人中華台灣基督教曠野協會). 
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2.2.1 Participant observation 
Participant observation has been one of the most commonly applied field research 
methods in anthropology since Bronislaw Malinowski’s fieldwork in the Trobriand 
Islands in the early twentieth century. However, the term itself reveals this method’s 
biggest controversy: how can one ‘participate’ and ‘observe’ at the same time?  
    Since observation is the ‘fundamental base of all research methods in the social 
and behavioural science’ (Adler & Adler, 1994:389), John and Lyn Lofland (1984) 
saw ‘participation’ as being only one of the minimum requirements of doing 
fieldwork, and yet the only goal. Participation therefore becomes the human 
‘instrument’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), ‘the process in which an investigator 
establishes a many-sided and relatively long-term relationship with a human 
association in its natural setting for the purpose of developing a scientific 
understanding of that association’ (Lofland & Lofland, 1984:12). Raymond Gold 
(1969) identified four kinds of participant observation based on the degrees of 
participation and observation: 
1. Complete participant: by concealing their role as a researcher, the researcher lives 
like the natives and is immersed totally in the lives of his subjects. This disguising 
of the researcher’s identity, however, not only violates research ethics, but would 
also affect the validity of the research’s objectiveness. 
2. Observer-as-participant: the researcher participates fully with disclosure of his 
identity. 
3. Participant-as-observer: the researcher states his identity and participates in 
certain social events. 
4. Complete observer: the researcher only observes without participating. 
Similar to Gold, Michael Patton (1990) also classified participant observation into 
different types: ‘full participant observation’, ‘participant as observer’, ‘observer as 
participant’ and ‘full observer’. During my fieldwork, these types of participant 
observation were applied interchangeably in accordance with different situations and 
contexts (although from the very beginning I identified myself as a researcher). There 
were times when I drank home-brewed rice wine by the campfire and felt a special 
bond with the family who received me; but there were also times when I was 
forbidden from participating in certain activities (for females are not allowed to 
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participate in certain men’s activities) and instead had to record what I saw from a 
distance, with barriers.  
    During my participation and observation in the field, I always kept in mind some 
principles recommended by experienced anthropologists, such as Rafael J. Engel and 
Russell K. Schutt (2012) who suggested developing a plausible and honest 
explanation about oneself to the participants, maintaining the support of the 
participants, being unobtrusive and unassuming, and being a reflective listener. These 
principles often reminded me of my objective position as a researcher, especially 
when I was eager to prove my hypothesis at the beginning of the fieldwork, or when I 
felt that I was being looked down on for being a female researcher. I began to be more 
open-minded about the unexpected answers and reactions, as well as being more 
willing to analyse the contexts and factors of those rather uncomfortable situations. 
These experiences then became the key in helping me to disclose the perspectives of 
this study that I had not previously been aware of.  
    However, from collecting data to producing the meanings, analysis and 
anthropological knowledge, there is always the risk of the researcher’s subjective 
opinion being projected in the research, thereby influencing the reliability of the 
outcome (Bernard, 2002). That is why I used Pierre Bourdieu’s (2003) idea of 
‘participant objectivation’ to frame my own understanding of participant observation. 
Unlike the American anthropologists in the 1980s, who examined their own 
observations and their relations with the participants by ‘returning’ to the fields, 
Bourdieu pointed out that ‘participant objectivation’ is a means to explore ‘not the 
“lived experience” of the knowing subject but the social conditions of possibility – 
and therefore the effects and limits – of that experience and, more precisely, of the act 
of objectivation’ (Bourdieu, 2003:282). Thus it can properly enable the researcher to 
reflect on and recognise which social conditions framed the cognitive structure – the 
view of the world – of the research subjects, as well as of the researcher, in order to 
avoid biased interpretations in the study (Carrithers, 2005; Grbich, 2007). Through 
working in the field, I came to know more about not just my participants’ views of the 
world and their lives, but also how my view of the world was built and influenced. 
Such ‘objectivation’ of my role in this study and my own ideas of the world served as 
a vital perspective in examining and identifying the cultural categorisation in the 
Atayal society, and became the foundation of what I am exploring in my investigation 
of the ‘secularisation’ of the Atayals in this research. 
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2.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews have been an irreplaceable method of collecting information that could not 
be acquired by participation and observation, and of more comprehensively 
understanding the factors behind every action (Bernard, 2002). The interviews I 
undertook in the field were mostly informal conversations, unstructured chats and 
semi-structured talks (Bernard, 2002). These casual or formal conversations served 
not only as pathways to create ‘intimacy’ with the participants (Herzefeld, 2000), but 
also as an ‘essential feature of human experience’ (Liu, 2002:xii) that could help me 
to analyse how the participants construct their understanding of reality through their 
narratives. 
Ethnographic interviews were the most extensively used interview method in my 
fieldwork and took place wherever and whenever was suitable for the participants 
(Bernard, 2002). Sometimes I would visit their houses after they had finished work 
and sit with them for hours, and at other times these talks would begin when I bumped 
into a participant at dinner time in one of the two small delis. Compared to the formal 
interviews I undertook (that is, the interviews with recording devices), these places of 
conversation made the participants more relaxed and willing to open up to talk about 
their own opinions, and to ‘express themselves in their own terms, at their own pace’ 
(Bernard, 2002:209). In the formal interviews, many participants would tend to be 
more conservative when answering questions they did not know for certain, telling me 
to go to the ‘experts’ (who in this study were the priests) to obtain the ‘right answer’, 
even though those questions were simply trying to find out the participants’ own 
opinions on their cultural and religious changes. On the one hand this tendency can be 
seen as a sign of the loss of their cultural knowledge; but on the other, it also shows 
the possible limits of and inaccurate interpretations in the participants’ attitudes 
towards certain cultural and social phenomena. Therefore, when I noticed that the 
‘Hawthorne Effect’ was taking place for the participants – that is, that during the 
interviews they would try their best to be ‘politically correct’ and positive about their 
cultural identity after the conversion to Christianity (whilst advising me to see others 
for details on the religious and cultural changes) – I changed my strategy and used 
informal ethnographic interviews to investigate the participants’ general attitudes and 
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thoughts about certain events, and only used formal, structured interviews for the 
historical descriptions.22 
By contrasting the narratives in these interviews, I was able to come up with 
reliable ethnographic data to depict the Atayals’ ideas of the self, social relations and 
the world (Rapport, 2000). I also applied the oral history interview method to collect 
more comprehensive collective memories of the past social conditions and religious 
practices. This not only gave me a better idea of the factors involved in the Atayals’ 
social and personal identities, but also allowed the participants to recognise how 
different events and changes influenced their daily practices, as well as to further 
reflect on their personal experiences of the past (R. C. Smith, 2001). The oral history 
interviews then came up with some interesting results when applied to some more 
abstract concepts. For example, as ‘heroes’ embodied the cultural values and were 
usually the indicative figures for moral and social characteristics in myths and legends 
(Campbell, 1993; Hegel, 1991), I asked my participants about stories of heroic 
persons they had heard in the past (the definition of heroes and further discussions are 
given in chapter 5). Although the answers may have varied slightly from participant 
to participant, the trends and transitions of their cultural values were revealed through 
such recollections of the Atayals’ heroic history and the terms referring to heroic 
figures.23 However, as all the interviews were conducted in Mandarin, a language 
that the Atayals only started to use about sixty to seventy years ago (many of them are 
bilingual in Atayal language and Mandarin), the participants didn’t always find it easy 
to determine an Atayal term for what they wanted to say. Therefore, in addition to the 
dialectical differences between different communities, such translational difficulties 
represent another factor that led the participants to use different terms when referring 
to the Atayals’ heroes. Nonetheless, even with the risk of mistranslating – and 
therefore misreading – the hero concept and what it represents culturally, the 
consistency of the heroic descriptions from the participants seemed to minimise the 
possible deviations whilst analysing the change of cultural values and its relationship 
to their religious conversion. Consistency in the connotations was also my evaluation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Deriving from an experiment designed to enhance the workers’ efficiency in the Western Electric 
Company’s Hawthorne plant near Chicago from 1924 to 1933, the Hawthorne Effect in sociology 
refers to ‘the possibility that a subject in a research project may change his or her behavior in a positive 
manner simply as a result of being aware of being studied’ (William H. Jr. Swatos, 2007). 
23 To avoid misunderstanding, the phrase ‘heroic history’ here is used not in Marshall Sahlins’ (1985) 
sense of treating history as constructed by the heroic stories (as in his study of Fiji islanders), but to 
refer to the history of heroes. 
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standard while dealing with the construction of the cultural conceptions in different 
dialectical terms. 
2.2.3 Images 
As Jay Ruby (1996:1345) pointed out, ‘culture is manifested through visible symbols 
embedded in gestures, ceremonies, rituals, and artifacts situated in constructed and 
natural environments’. Visualising anthropology is not just doing ethnographic 
studies with fancy recording technologies or skills. It is another powerful way to 
embody the socially constructed cultural reality other than the textual, interpretive 
ethnographic script (Grimshaw, 2001; Ruby, 1996). In order to have a better 
understanding of the culture, religious shift and hero images among the Atayal people, 
I took pictures and videos – what Edward Hall (1959) referred to as the ‘silent 
language’ – to generate a first-hand ethnographic document without translation 
(Grimshaw and Ravetz, 2005; Heider, 1976; MacDougall, 1998). Photographs are 
also an efficient way to preserve the cultural traditions (Bank, 2001; Bateson and 
Mead, 1942; Edwards, 1992). What is understood here by ‘the silent language without 
translation’ is a way of communicating reflexively on the culture behind the camera. 
The pictures taken in this study therefore serve as a cultural discourse between those 
who are filmed and those who see the film, and lead to a further comprehension of the 
cultures of both the viewers and those being viewed (Hall, 1959; Ruby, 1996). 
    The images collected during my fieldwork were also used as an illustration of the 
representation of cultural and religious transition in addition to the textual description. 
Where applicable, I used a semiotic approach to analyse the images to demonstrate 
how social culture explains, or justifies, the social values and beliefs (Barthes & 
Lavers, 1972; S. Hall, 1997). As Geertz (1973:89) stated, culture is ‘an historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life’. The 
composition of the image, and the denotation and connotation of the symbols 
contained in the image, thus served as the focal point during the analytical stage, with 
further comparison to the social reality. 
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2.2.4 Historical literature analysis 
As anthropology originated from studying isolated small – and usually oral – societies 
(Evans-Pritchard, 1962), early anthropological studies were often criticised for 
ignoring the analytical importance of historical data, or even treating historical data as 
merely the ‘“background” to the ethnographic present rather than … an integral part 
of the anthropological analysis’ (Silverman, 1979:413). However, as I mentioned 
earlier, a ‘field’ should be constructed geographically as well as historically to 
comprehensively understand every event in its own context, and the historical 
approach has now been established as a vital method to expand and deepen the 
comparative work of anthropological studies (Cohn, 1987, 1996; Kahn, 2011; Sahlins, 
1981, 1985; Silverman, 1979).  
    Therefore, whilst in the field I also visited the local Township library many times 
to study the historical documents of the early Atayals left by the Japanese researchers 
in the early twentieth century, as well as the ‘history’ of Bienjing village and its 
neighbouring areas compiled by the local government. While the (translated) Japanese 
studies mostly focused on recording the customs and religious practices of the Atayals, 
the modern ‘records’ of the local history by the government, along with the 
commentaries on the impacts of different events, were rather partial and with strong 
subjective speculations from the authors. I also visited the local priests to have access 
to their missionary records. With these different documents and sometimes the 
controversial descriptions in them, I tried my best to determine their validity by using 
David Pitt’s (1972) old but practical principles of assessing: the social status, 
intelligence and language skills of the observers; the possible attitudes towards the 
people being observed; the content that was and was not written in the documents; the 
target audience; the writer’s motives; and narrative styles. In addition to the above 
principles, I often wrote down questions and thoughts developed from reading those 
historical documents and did a cross-examination with the participants to get a more 
objective – or at least more plausible from the emic perspective – reading of the past, 
and from there generated my further analysis (Robson, 1993; Sturtevant, 1966).24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In his article Anthropology, History, and Ethnohistory (1966), Sturtsvant gave the example of how 
the objectively ‘suspicious’ account of the Seminole leader Coacoochee (Wildcat) escaping from 
prison by using a medicinal root to reduce his weight to get through the bars actually sounded correct 
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2.2.5 Data storage 
Ethnographic data can ‘easily be miscoded, mislabelled, mislinked and mislaid 
without careful data management plans’ (Wolfe 1992:293, as quoted in Murphy & 
Armitage, 2009:232). Hence, all the data collected in the course of my fieldwork were 
recorded, coded and categorised through Nvivo (Bazeley, 2007; Edhlund, 2008). As 
the interviews were conducted in Mandarin, verbatim transcripts of the interviews 
were firstly produced in Chinese, and then translated into English. Although the task 
of translation was quite time consuming, which meant that sometimes I had to hire 
someone to do it for me, this bilingual transcription could guarantee the original 
reference during data analysis. 
2.3 Analytical methods 
From collecting data to generating solid cultural knowledge, ‘analysing’ is the 
unavoidable path to the end of the journey. Yet, without a clear purpose and method, 
one can easily get lost in the numerous analytical theories and approaches. William 
Miller and Benjamin Crabtree (1992) thus classified these different analytical 
approaches into four types by the categorisation style of the collected data: 
Quasi-Statistical Analysis, Template Analysis Style, Editing Analysis Style and 
Immersion/Crystallization Analysis Style. As to which method one should use, Miller 
and Crabtree (1992:24) suggested that it should depend on the methods and types of 
the collected data, the purpose and research questions of the study and its known 
knowledge, and the intended readers of the study. Seeing that this study interrogates 
the relationship between the Atayals’ religious practices/concepts and the transition of 
their identity, as well as how my participant observation in the field generated various 
types of data, I took the interpretive, flexible approach of the Editing Analysis Style 
to redefine the cultural/religious categorisations in the Atayal society, and then 
demonstrate the interrelations between the collected data (Miller & Crabtree, 1992).  
    That being said, my analysis did not always come after the data was collected, 
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to the Seminole people, since they believed in the magical effects of the root. The Seminole people’s 
belief in magic thus leaves their construction of history not in the true effect of that medicinal root, but 
in an emic explanation of the past. 
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influenced the direction of the next stage of data collection during the later period of 
the fieldwork. Since my field notes and interviews were usually organised right after 
they were taken, reflections and sometimes intuitive interpretations came with them 
and thus also became vital in structuring the questions and topics of the following 
conversations. Following T. F. Carney’s (1990) ‘Ladder of Analytical Abstraction’, 
this process was usually the main method for me to develop and test my propositions 
in constructing the early explanatory and conceptual frameworks for the issues I 
discovered (see figure 5 for Carney’s Ladder of Analytical Abstraction). Carney’s 
analytical ladder also provided guidance on how to organise and examine my 
understanding of the Atayals throughout the process of analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5, T. F. Carney’s (1990:128) Ladder of Analytical Abstraction.25  
2.3.1 Analytical framework 
As this study covers different issues of the Atayal society, from the religious 
conversion to the transition of cultural and ethnic identities, with the analysis I also 
employed different approaches to better reflect the nature of these aspects in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The picture is taken from the attachments to the journal article Understanding customer knowledge 
sharing in web-based discussion boards: An exploratory study (MKO Lee, 2006), which can be found 
at the following address: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/1720160304002.png (last 
accessed on 14 May 2014). 
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Atayal society. In the interviews I used narrative analysis to investigate the 
participants’ experiences of the past (Riessman, 1993). This allowed me not only to 
construct the Atayals’ memories of the past and their understanding of the world 
through ‘what’ they said in the interviews, but also to depict the interactions between 
the subject’s self, the other and the continuity/discontinuity of the past by ‘how’ they 
spoke – that is, the ‘emplotment’ – in the interviews and conversations (Polkinghorne, 
1988; Riessman, 1993). However, none of these constructions of (religious) identity 
would be solid enough without the support of historical, cognitive and practical 
evidence. That is why I also applied a cognitive approach and Bourdieu’s (1977) 
theory of practice to form the arguments in this study. Therefore, in the following 
sections I shall further elucidate the cognitive analytical framework I used to engage 
with the questions raised in the introduction chapter. 
Cognitive approach in anthropology  
In his article Culture, perception and cognition (2000), Tim Ingold challenged the 
ethnographical method in the anthropological traditions by pointing out the 
ontological gap between the researcher and the subject being researched – that is, the 
unpredictability and unobservability of the subjects’ perceptions. In the British social 
anthropology tradition, Ingold added, the Durkheimian research paradigm has always 
focused on the ‘social structure’ rather than ‘sensations’, for personal feelings and 
perceptions are believed to be socially constructed, while sensations are private and 
individual. The Durkheimian paradigm in British social anthropology, therefore, 
values public, collective ‘representations’ of society instead of psychological 
premises (Ingold, 2000). North American cultural anthropology since Franz Boas, on 
the other hand, pays much more attention to individuals, whilst its achievements and 
methods are ‘essentially psychological’ (Ingold, 2000:159). American cultural 
anthropology then developed into two schools in terms of the relations between 
culture and behaviours. One suggests that cultural mechanisms should be investigated 
from social and public domains (Geertz, 1973b, 1993b), whereas the other, led by 
scholars such as Ward Goodenough, argues that ‘cultural cognition can only take 
place by way of shared conceptual schemata lodged in the mind of individuals’ 
(Ingold, 2000). The latter also led to the rise of cognitive anthropology in the 1960s. 
However, the trend of treating cultural knowledge as imported by the mind rather than 
given in experience also risks ignoring the dynamics and interrelations between 
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individuals and society. In order to react to such a distinction of seeing the society as 
an objective ‘other’, Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1994) put forward his idea of ‘habitus’ 
and the theory of practice to re-engage human behaviours with culture, arguing that 
cultural knowledge itself is generated ‘in the course of people’s involvement with 
others in the practical business of life’ (Ingold, 2000:162).  
    Bourdieu’s theory of practice not only deeply influenced the anthropological 
studies of cognition, but has also been extensively applied to different researches of 
human society. Jean Lave (1988), for example, combined the idea of cognition with 
the practice theory, and saw schema and social activities as a process of interaction. 
Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1997) also developed their arguments on the 
practice theory. In A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning (Strauss & Quinn, 1997), 
they not only applied Bourdieu’s view of schema and practice to investigate the 
meanings of social activities and phenomena, but also introduced connectionism, the 
mechanism that connects mental status to contextual experience, to deal with the 
internalisation of experiences in shaping cultural meanings. This approach explained 
how cultural meanings could be changed or transformed by subjective interpretations, 
whilst the objective world could maintain stability (Strauss & Quinn, 1997), and 
thereby avoid the danger of complete idealism or social determinism in understanding 
cultural transitions. 
    As I pointed out in the first chapter, in many cases religious conversion has 
different meanings and is viewed differently by the people converted – as a ‘historical 
action’ by the Piro people (Gow, 2006), for instance, or as a way to access better 
health by the South Africans (Pauw, 1980). I tend to view religious conversion by 
following Liana Chua’s (2012) idea of ‘positioning’ in the networks of social, 
political and moral relations. This kind of positioning to a great extent echoes the 
recent cognitive views (such as connectionism) and Bourdieu’s practice theory of 
culture: that is, how individuals internalise the culture during social practices; and 
how culture, in the meantime, becomes the reference for social practices. Just as Juan 
Sebastián (1998) saw religious conversion as ‘not about our bodies, but about how we 
act toward others’ (as quoted from Gow, 2006: 238), such a cognitive approach 
inspired me to better connect the issue of religious transition with the change of 
identity through the interactions between the self – ethically, individually and 
culturally – and the other. Here, Chua’s ‘positioning’ echoes Bourdieu’s idea of 
‘participant objectivation’, which not only influenced how I view the interrelations 
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between the villagers’ identities and their conversion to Christianity, but also how I 
‘positioned’ my relations with the subject. I constantly introspected my role in the 
village not only as a researcher, but also as a Han person, a woman, and a 
non-believer to their God. In most instances I tried my best to be ‘one of them’, as an 
ideal, classic anthropologist should be, but at times I also felt strongly the 
unbridgeable chasm that lies permanently between the subject and the researcher, due 
to the fact that I was a Han person, a female researcher, and an outsider in the 
patriarchal, Christianised Atayal society. Such awareness, however, also made me 
more sensitive to, and able to see, how the politics, networks, cultural gaps and 
relationships operated between the tribes in the village, as well as between the tribes 
and their churches. It was interesting for me to observe how and when I was 
rejected/accepted, as I have mentioned earlier, after participating in certain events. 
This then drove me to embrace the idea of being both the emic and the etic researcher, 
and to discover how my position was actually ‘flowing’ from one to the other in 
different circumstances, due to the different mentalities of the villagers. 
    Cognitive analysis thus became a critical approach throughout this study. I not 
only used some concepts from psychoanalysis to analyse the social mentality of the 
Atayals, but also employed theories of ‘memory’ to examine the (dis)continuity of the 
cultural self through the relations between the religious transition and social practices, 
as well as the subjective conceptions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’, while dealing with 
the shift of identity and religious practices. Moreover, to further analyse the 
production and reproduction of the Atayals’ modern identity and its relation with 
religious transition, I applied Bourdieu’s (2000) reproduction theory to re-examine the 
interactions between the macro social structures and micro individual practices in the 
shaping of identity. These exercises might seem varied, but they all aimed to 
comprehensively present the dynamics between the religious transition, social 
practices and identity of the Atayal people.
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Chapter 3 
Gaga:  
The Foundation of the Atayal Self 
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3.1 The beginning of the journey  
Scenes of chopped timber in piles outside households are common in Bienjing village, 
one of the administrative districts in Miaoli where different Atayal communities 
reside. It is common and yet vital for any community – such as the Atayals – living in 
the mountains to use timber for cooking, building, lighting and setting warnings, as 
well as heating and drying huts. It had never occurred to me that such a common 
scene would be the key that sparks my understanding of their self-identity, especially 
when most of the Atayals now see it not as inspiring, imbued with cultural 
significance or possessing any sacredness, but as trivial as any other pile of wood. 
Then one day, one of the research participants, the daughter of a tumux (chieftain), 
described what it was like to be a child in a tumux’s family more than forty years ago: 
We were always sent to look for wood, not just any timber, but the certain kind 
that lasts much longer for burning. I don’t know what it is called, but I would 
know it when I see it. These timbers would be used for the fire set in front of the 
house, where the people would get together after their work in the fields; and as 
a gesture of respect, they would take showers before they came. People would 
come to my grandfather, sit around the fire and talk about all kinds of things as 
my brother would fill everyone’s cups with wine, but mostly they came to seek 
advice and blessings from him. My grandfather never replied with just words. 
He would sing his replies and blessings in certain ways, but sometimes I would 
not understand because the language was more difficult than the words used in 
day-to-day life. The fire had to be on all day, every day, and if it was raining we 
would take it inside to the house; I don’t quite know why we had to keep the 
fire all day, but it was part of our gaga. 
From timbers to gaga, I learned later that every matter in their life, regardless of how 
minor it seemed at first view, was significant. Such things represent the way of life 
inherited from their Atayal ancestors, passed on for centuries solely by oral means, 
and, more importantly, the way they build their identity. 
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3.2 The key of the ‘Atayalness’: gaga 
In the previous chapter I briefly introduced the idea that traditional Atayal culture was 
based on the two core ideas of ‘gaga’ and ‘utux’. ‘Gaga’, literally meaning in the 
Atayal language ‘the words left by the ancestors’, included all the social and personal 
aspects that formed the regulation of ethics, law, social culture and even personal 
behaviours, and had multiple meanings in different contexts (Dai, 2005; Li, 1964; M. 
Wang, 1990, 2003). On the other hand, ‘utux’, from the anthropological viewpoint, 
was the reference for all the ‘supernatural’ beings in Atayal culture. It was the spirit 
that protected and punished the Atayals from harm and sins and it was what they 
would become after their death (Lee, 1982).26 As the gaga was ‘the words left by the 
ancestors’ that defined the Atayal life, Atayal people believed that any violation of the 
gaga would be punished by the utux, whilst a tayan – which means a ‘man of 
Atayal’ – who followed ‘the right way to live’ would be rewarded, and become part 
of the utux after death. As the bearer of the Atayals’ religious belief, gaga performed 
a distinctive function, as Geertz (1973) sees it, of tying religious symbols to culture: it 
connected the world view with the way of living. For example, when seeing someone 
who was being rude to others or walking without the right posture, people would say 
this person ‘had no gaga’; judging a tumux or talking about the cultural authorities 
was also evaluated by how well one knew the gaga. In other words, gaga, in its 
broadest meaning, not only served as the guidance for the bodily ‘hexis’ (Bourdieu, 
1977) that regulated the Atayals’ body language, but also formed the ethos – ideals, 
values and way of living – of the Atayals that distinguished them from others. Gaga 
thus not only served as the origin of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) of the Atayals, but 
also shaped the Atayal ‘self’ – the locus of experience, including experience of their 
own someoneness (Harris, 1989). In the following sections I shall elaborate in detail 
how the gaga operated in Atayal society, and the way in which it constructed their 
self-conception. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Some explanations of the two ideas can also be found in the Atayal-English dictionary by Søren 
Egerod (1978). 
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3.2.1. Gaga and Atayal social organisation 
As I pointed out in the first chapter, the idea of the gaga in traditional Atayal society 
has been the biggest puzzle in the studies of the Atayal. However, early views that 
treated gaga as both the social units and the social norms (Chen, 1973; Li, 1964; Y. 
Huang, 1999) have recently been challenged and subverted. Led by the Atayal native 
researcher Heitaay-Payang (2002), recent anthropological studies of the Atayal are 
keen to see the idea of gaga as merely the reference for the system of Atayal customs, 
social and moral norms, and the view of the world, rather than referring to social 
organisation (Huang, 2000; Ma, 2002; M. Wang, 2003). Such changes in the 
understanding of gaga were not only influenced by the recent emergence of Atayal 
native researchers, but also resulted from improved knowledge of Atayal social 
structures. K. C. Huang (2000) first pointed out that the idea of gaga being the 
reference for social organisation was a misunderstanding of the relation between gaga 
and ‘niqan’. ‘Niqan’, originally meaning ‘the place for eating’, was the basic social 
unit – the earliest form of an Atayal ‘tribe’ – and referred to a group of people who, 
literally, ‘eat together’ (Heitaay-Payang, 2002; K.-C. Huang, 2000). Different 
researchers have had different views on the formation of the traditional niqan – for 
example, the Japanese anthropologists Kojima Yoshimichi (IOE Academia Sinica, 
1996) and Mori Ushinosuke (1996) saw it as a political or economic combination of a 
group of people, whilst the Taiwanese researcher Li Yih-yuan (1963) regarded it as 
based on kinship. Nonetheless, the function of such groups was the same as what 
were deemed to be social units of the gaga: in addition to ‘eating’, living and working 
together, every member of the same niqan would share the same gaga, meaning that 
when one member violated the gaga, the others would also have to take the 
punishment from the utux. That is, any sickness or misfortune, which was believed to 
have resulted from the punishment of the utux, must have come from the violation of 
gaga of the members in the same niqan. 
    Since niqan defined the Atayals’ foremost geographic and social boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘others’, and therefore formed the basic social unit of the Atayal 
society, it is vital to clarify the reference, formation and functions of such a group. 
Although the term niqan in today’s Bienjing village is usually deemed to refer to 
direct familial relatives (clan), which might explain why Li saw it as based on kinship, 
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some other participants were keen to agree with the Japanese anthropologists’ 
traditional definition of niqan. In this alternative understanding, niqan is described as 
a group that was formed by people who volunteered to be bound together (and 
therefore could leave the group at their will), and need not be related.27 Such a view 
of niqan was taken in K.-C. Huang’s (2000) study. In later paragraphs, in the 
discussion of the operation of the gaga, I will demonstrate how I am more inclined to 
take this definition of niqan as the Atayals’ pre-Christian self-identification, rather 
than treat it as being based on kinship. Apart from that, my interviews and past studies 
have confirmed few facts about niqan. A niqan was usually formed when there was a 
need for more land – it could have been due to a growth in the population, the 
worsening of production conditions, or simply a falling-out with members of the old 
niqan (Okada, 1959). An elected leader (mrhuw – after the Japanese period, the term 
used was tumux) would lead the volunteers in their search for cultivable lands where 
they could settle down. This new niqan therefore marked the separation of gaga from 
the original group. Although there could still be interaction between the old and the 
new niqan, such as sharing manpower or the spoils from hunting, the duties of labour 
and the religious contract – the duties of gaga – with the old niqan were dismissed 
(Heitaay-Payang, 2002; K.-C. Huang, 2000). As a new niqan would no longer share 
the labour and religious responsibilities of the old one, sometimes a new niqan would 
also be established to avoid the risk of sharing the religious punishment of the 
‘troubled’ members of an old niqan, and thus to maintain social order (K.-C. Huang, 
2000; Okada, 1959). Though they cannot be understood as evidence of niqan being 
formed out of mere political or material interests, these characteristics of the division 
and establishment of niqan show that in early Atayal society, blood ties were not the 
only factor in forming self-identification (K.-C. Huang, 2000).  
    The neighbouring niqan (two or more) would then form a ‘qalang’ – an alliance 
of self-defence and hunting based on the territorial adjacency, which became what we 
know as a ‘tribe’ (部落) today. To manage affairs between each niqan in the qalang 
and between other qalang, a chief leader would be chosen from all the mrhuw of the 
niqan, but his duties were limited to communications between these organisations. 
The internal affairs of each niqan would still be handled by their own mrhuw, and the 
religious ties (in the sense that members of the same gaga would share collateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Yet kinship could be a strong (and even unavoidable) driving force in volunteering. Meanwhile, 
marriages held within the niqan also often expanded the scope of kinship, which might have resulted in 
the term niqan being developed to refer to a clan family. 
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punishment from utux) would also remain within the niqan. However, the distinction 
between niqan and qalang has changed since the Japanese period primarily because 
of the relocation policy. Serving as a means to better control and reduce the threat 
from the allied armed forces, this ‘relocation policy’ not only broke up the alliances of 
niqan, but also damaged the order of the Atayal society by forcing the emigrating 
groups to merge into the ones that resided at the relocating lands. The new relocation 
area, meanwhile, was also usually marked by the Japanese government so that the 
police could easily monitor their daily activities. The original qalang, therefore, in 
many cases were either reduced or disassembled, and the scope of gaga (that 
religiously bound together a group of people) sometimes caused confusion amongst 
the new relocated groups (K.-C. Huang, 2000). The Valus ‘tribe’ in Bienjing village, 
for example, is the group of people resulted from the relocation policy: it was formed 
by one original niqan (that belonged to Narima) and three other immigrating niqan 
from Hsinchu ordered by the Japanese government. After years of marriage and 
interactions between these groups, the geographical boundaries of niqan have 
diminished, but the gaga still remain as the reference for the identity of the people of 
Narima, Sawig and Valus in terms of religious and tribal affiliation. The complicated 
usage of the term gaga, as we see here, has troubled many researchers even up until 
now and shall be addressed later. However, to the people who are living with it, gaga 
is never confusing, nor a ‘concept’: 
‘Only those who are not tayan need to know and understand what gaga is. 
We tayan live by it; we don’t learn it’ (Participant HBY, age 73). 
3.2.2 Gaga: the way of life, or a way of life? 
Similar to Michael Moerman’s research among the Lue people in Northern Thailand 
(Moerman, 1965), the Atayals’ use of the term tayan to refer to themselves is the 
‘emic category of ascription’ of the Atayals’ identity, as well as what marks their 
social boundary of self from others (Barth, 1969). Such titles not only serve as the 
identity of the Atayal people in the village, but also frame how they identify others 
who share the same (or at least similar) ideas of religion and customs. Gaga, therefore, 
could be said to provide the ‘common origins’ (Astuti, 1995b; Barth, 1956, 1969) of 
their ethnic identity. Instead of calling the belief in gaga and utux a ‘religion’, the 
Atayal people would say it meant ‘way of life’, whilst being a tayan was to follow 
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such ways and customs that had been passed down for centuries. A facial tattoo 
(ptasan, see figure 6), for example, was what proved women and men to be true 
persons of Atayal. The eyes of the utux were drawn on their face, not only to serve as 
a form of blessing, but also to watch over – symbolically or religiously – these 
followers of the gaga. For men, it was the symbol that marked the skills and 
braveness expected of manhood; for women, it signified the qualifications of weaving, 
farming and housekeeping of wifehood – as being a proper wife was seen as the 
ultimate destiny of every Atayal woman. Those who failed to acquire such skills 
would be denied tattooing, and sometimes would even be banished from the tribe, as 
it represented great shame not only to the family but to the whole community. Even 
those who suffered infections during tattooing would be taken as having done things 
that violated the gaga, resulting in punishment from the utux. It was believed by the 
people that only on the completion of this facial tattoo could a person become a real 
tayan (tayan balai) and be able to be recognised by the utux after death and be part of 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6, a drawing of the facial tattoo pattern for young men’s initiation from a 
Japanese official in 1902. (Source: Taiwan Historica) 
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    As the tattoos were situated on the most visible part of the human body, they 
became the symbol of the Atayal communities. It is worth noting that even though the 
patterns of the facial tattoo were basically the same, the early Atayal people would 
still be able to tell easily which communities others were from by the tattooing details 
(Ma, 2002). The facial tattoo thus symbolised three different social meanings: 
adulthood, religious blessing and cultural/ethnic identity. Only those who lived up to 
the gaga, and who possessed such a symbol of social approval, could hold the title of 
a tayan (Ma, 2002).28 However, the subtle differences of facial tattoos were usually 
missed by early anthropologists. Whether it was Ino Knori, who first saw the people 
with this kind of facial tattoo as one ‘ethnic group’ in the Japanese period, or 
academics such as Wei Hui-lin (1965) in the early stage of the KMT rule, the ‘Atayal’ 
were usually described (and recognised) as one single group of people who have this 
kind of facial tattoo. The modern education system, based on this ‘anthropological 
knowledge’, greatly influenced the conception of the Atayal ‘ethnic group’ in the 
Taiwanese society. Such social influence is thus often seen as the major factor that 
resulted in the Atayal people’s modern perception of their own ethnic identity (Ma, 
2002).  
    Indeed, if we look at how the villagers reacted towards the issue of the 
independence of those ‘supposedly’ Atayal sub-groups – the Seediq, for example – 
we can see how the social construction of ethnic identity operated. Due to their 
cultural similarity to the Atayals in terms of their religious system, origin myths and 
customs (including, and especially, the facial tattoos), the Seediq were first 
categorised under the Atayal family by the Japanese anthropologist Ino Kanori in the 
early twentieth century. This recognition continued for more than sixty years. Due to 
the language difference and the distance between living areas (the Seediqs live in the 
north east of Taiwan, whilst the majority of the ‘Atayals’ reside on the west side), the 
Seediq people started to advocate independence from the Atayal group in 2003, and 
were officially declared as an independent aboriginal ethnicity in 2008 (Ryo, 2011). 
Interestingly, when I raised this topic in Bienjing village, most participants would 
take it personally and more or less saw it as an insult to ‘the unity of the Atayals’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 One of the participants even told me that this facial tattoo served a similar purpose to the ‘ID Card’ 
during the Japanese rule, which was not only critical amongst the Atayal tribes in creating communal 
identity, but also vital for the Japanese government in monitoring the activities of the Atayal, as they 
were ‘notorious’ to the Japanese for being ‘rebellious’, whilst there are also a few of the villagers who 
believe the facial tattoo was forcibly imposed by the Japanese in order to distinguish the aborigines 
from the Japanese in the event of riots. 
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Many of the participants believed that the Seediqs should be called tayan instead of 
‘Seediq people’, since that would indicate that they have the same ancestors, the same 
origins, and the same ‘way of life’ – despite the fact that the Seediqs have never 
referred to themselves as ‘tayan’, but only as ‘seediq’.29 
    These conflicts of identity not only happen to those who consider themselves 
outside the bigger Atayal family, but also exist amongst the tribes who see themselves 
as tayan. The people of the Sawig and part of Valus are usually called the ‘kilhaku’ by 
the local aborigines – mostly the Narima people, who have resided in the area for 
more than a century. Literally, kilhaku means ‘leaf’.30 This name came about in the 
1920s, when the Japanese government teased these people, who were ‘so poor that 
they could only eat leaves’, and called them ‘the group of leaves’ (‘ki-ha’ in Japanese 
means the leaves of a tree), an expression which contained a sense of contempt for the 
kilhaku’s impoverishment and lack of ‘manners’. The term ‘kilhaku’ not only 
indicates the Narima people’s perception of those ‘immigrants’, but also suggests that 
the kilhaku ‘have less culture’, since ‘they needed to move from time to time’ and are 
different in every way, from language to personality – even though they all call 
themselves ‘tayan’ (person/people of Atayal). ‘They are different from us’ is the 
foremost impression of the two tribes of the Narima people. Such a perception shows 
the latent fracture of identity that has long existed in the Atayal culture, which 
considers each niqan as an independent ‘self’ from ‘the others’ that are constituted by 
the law of the ‘gaga’, the authority of the ‘tumux’ and the belief in ‘utux’. A similar 
idea of such niqan-based identification can also be found among the pre-Christian 
Seediq people:  
During the Saramao (the name of a qalang) Incident in 1913, a woman 
who married into Saramao from Taroko (another qalang) was attacked by 
the people of Taroko. She held her head with both hands and cried: “I am 
married here from Taroko, please don’t kill me.” Yet her head was still 
chopped off by the Taroko people. When a woman married to other niqan, 
she would no longer be related to her old niqan; though her own relatives 
might not kill her, she was nothing but an outsider to other members in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The issue of the Seediq being separated from the Atayal will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
30 Although most of the locals do not know why these people are called ‘kilhaku’, they would identify 
them by the language they use; one participant also suggested that ‘kilhaku’ means ‘relocater’ – 
indicating they have been relocated to the current place from somewhere else. 
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old niqan, and anyone could have her beheaded during a war (Kubura, 
1991:65).31 
    Such conflicts of identity thus further raise the issue of categorisation: not only 
the most influential categories of the Taiwanese aborigines set by Ino Kanori, but also 
the classical concepts of ethnicity that put ancestry and blood ties as the primary 
standards of kinship that greatly influenced today’s ideas about ethnic groups 
(Shimizu, 1991). As I pointed out in chapter one, recent research has revealed the 
multiple factors influencing the formation of ethnicity (and thereby ethnic identity) in 
different contexts (Joycelyn Linnekin & Poyer, 1990). Whether it was subjective 
‘ascription’ (Barth, 1969), groupings out of political or material interests (Banton, 
1983; A. Cohen, 1969; Hechter, 1986), or even more ‘objective’ factors such as 
language (Fishman, 1972; Fought, 2006), culture (Malesevic, 2004) and common 
ancestry (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996), these elements of ethnicity are more or less 
socially constructed (A. D. Smith, 2009), developed by certain historical contexts. 
The Mendelian and Lamarkian models of the ethnic identity of the Oceanic people, as 
Linnekin and Poyer point out in Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific (1990), 
serve as proof of how living places and behaviour are at least as important as 
biological parentage in becoming the member of a group (Linnekin & Poyer, 1990: 8). 
This is why, when trying to understand the discrepancy and consensus of identity of 
an ‘ethnic group’ like the Atayal, it is probably best to focus on their actions rather 
than genetic ties in order to see how gaga is understood and operated as ‘the way of 
life’ in both pre-Christian and modern times. This might serve as a better angle to 
analyse how the location of the tribes not only set out the geographical boundaries of 
groups, but also marked differences in behaviour, given that the development of 
different gaga within a group would lead to the development of different behaviour.  
3.2.3 The nature and formation of the gaga 
When speaking of whether and in what ways the gaga was different in earlier times, 
many of the elders in the village recalled their childhoods with their parents as 
‘nothing but making a living’. What they usually were not aware of, or did not 
mention while describing the life of the past, however, was that these living 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In Kojima Yoshimichi’s (1996) research of the Atayals, he also recorded that during wartimes, the 
Atayal people were forbidden to contact the relatives in the enemy niqan without permission. 
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experiences involved many religious practices, including praying rituals before 
sowing, looking for good signs from the behaviour of birds when hunting, and all 
sorts of taboos regulating almost every aspect of a tayan’s life. One of the villagers 
added: 
  When I was little, my friends and I would throw stones at chickens just for fun. 
One day, an elder saw us playing, and then we were chided by him for ‘being 
disrespectful to the land’ … I didn’t know why we couldn’t do that, but it is 
our gaga anyway; in the past, when an elder said things to you, you had to 
listen, this is tayan … these gaga do not mean religion, but sometimes, most of 
them are superstitions. 
    For this male villager, this memory serves as a lesson in ‘how we tayan should 
act’, even though he neither fully understands the reason why, nor recognises that it 
has anything to do with religion. However, what he meant by ‘superstitions’ still 
refers to something religious – something that a tayan should not do otherwise it will 
‘upset’ the Christian God. These complicated ideas and relationships between 
‘religion’, gaga and utux shall be clarified later. What is certain here is that the 
traditional construction of identity of the Atayal people was not only ‘religious’, but 
also contained what Sahlins (1985) called the ‘performative structures’ (as quoted in 
Linnekin & Poyer, 1990) that are embodied in the practices of gaga, rather than 
coming out of the biological ethnic paradigm.  
    However, gaga were not universally adopted by all Atayal tribes even though 
they did share some basic ideas. Many differences can be found in Bienjing village’s 
handling of these matters, but this was caused not only by the separation of living 
places of the people, but more importantly by the production of new gaga. A new 
gaga was usually drawn up when something bad happened to the tribe (such as 
disease or natural disaster) and all those rituals in the traditional gaga had been 
practised and did not seem to help. The tumux and the elders of the tribe would gather 
together to discuss a solution, and to see if such a solution was permitted from the 
signs of the utux’s will, the chief would go to a quiet place (usually on a mountaintop) 
to seek signs in which the solution was granted approval. The new gaga would 
become part of the traditions passed down by the tribe to the next generation, and this 
led to the diverse presentation of gaga amongst the Atayal people. In other words, 
gaga was not just a religious reference for living principles which was independent 
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from the transition of society, but a dynamic mechanism that changed along with the 
transformation of social norms and categories, to cooperate with, and adapt to, the 
influences of external or natural forces. With the separation of living places and the 
varying leadership provided by the tumux of each tribe in early times, the gaga could 
also differ from one tribe to another, and thus formed the various local identities 
amongst the Atayal groups. Therefore, since gaga was the reference for living 
principles, the conflicts between local identities might be said to have resulted from 
actions – or the guidelines for those actions – rather than differences in language, 
living places or ethnicity. In this way, gaga should be considered more as ‘a way of 
life’ rather than ‘the (universal) way of life’ for all Atayals. In the same way that 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977, 1989, 1994) sees the relationship between habitus and 
individuals, the interactive relationship between gaga and the actions of the Atayal 
people is thus socially constructed in certain contexts. 
    Before going into further discussions of Atayal identity, it is worth mentioning 
Rita Astuti’s studies of the Vezo in Madagascar in 1995: in the studies, Astuti (Astuti, 
1995a, 1995b) points out the insufficiency of the ethnic theories that anthropologists 
and sociologists have used to explain and examine the identity of a non-Western 
group such as the Vezo. With the Vezo people, the mode of identity is based not on 
the ties of ancestry, nor cultural similarities in groups, but on learning and practising 
their ways of life. This ‘way of life’ made the Vezos not ‘a kind of people’, but ‘the 
group of people’ who followed such a path of practice, which subverted the Western 
idea of ethnicity (Astuti, 1995b). The Vezo people, to borrow Linnekin and Poyer’s 
(1990) term, are an exact example of the ‘Lamarkian’ model of identity. However, 
these people of Vezo also view the deceased ones as having a different model of 
relatedness – they became ‘one kind of people’ (raza raiky) that are related to the 
‘kinds’ of their own descent groups (Astuti, 1995a, 2000). In other words, the 
deceased of the Vezo would have a ‘Mendelian’ model of identity rather than the 
Lamarkian one for the living. Such modes of identity in one group, Astuti (1995b: 
464-465) further stated, reflected how researchers should focus on the ‘ethnotheories’ 
of different cultures rather than fixing them into ‘ethnic theories’.  
    Astuti (1995a, 1995b, 2000) and Linnekin and Poyer’s (Joycelyn Linnekin & 
Poyer, 1990) researches provided the insight for investigating the Atayal people’s 
identity. The Vezo people’s construction of identity for the living explains how 
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traditional Atayals formed their identity according to a Lamarkian model – the 
practices of gaga. However, from the Bienjing villagers’ disputes with the Seediqs, 
we spotted how modern Atayals’ identity today has become an ethnic construction – 
that is, a Mendelian model – based only on blood ties or the ‘common origins’ (as the 
gaga is understood today) of the shared cultures or ancestors. As the traditional 
Atayal identity was framed, on a certain level, religiously, we can speculate that such 
a structural change in identification and in the construction of the self – the idea of the 
gaga – from a Lamarkian to a Mendelian one must have involved a certain religious 
transition. This is also why the conversion to Christianity of the Atayals would 
become critical since, as gaga was both the bearer of their religious belief and the 
origin of the habitus, such a transition not only means that they changed or modified 
their religious world, but also points to shifts in the classificatory and practical 
structures of the Atayal society.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I illustrated the significance of gaga to the Atayal people, as well as 
clarified the usage and meanings of the term gaga under different contexts in Atayal 
tradition. In being the ‘way of life’ of the Atayals, gaga first of all not only 
established the regulations of the Atayal life, but also served as the foundation of their 
world view, which was based on their religious belief in ‘utux’. In other words, being 
the ‘doctrines of life’, gaga constituted the habitus of the pre-Christian Atayals and 
regulated their social practices, whilst the content of it could also be modified through 
religious rituals when encountering changes of circumstances. This coping 
mechanism thus made gaga not one universal set of ‘the way of life’, but various 
‘ways of life’ that adapted to the changing environments of different groups in 
different areas. Meanwhile, gaga, as the reference that marked off the basic social 
unit – niqan – in the Atayal society, was also what defined the Atayals’ foremost 
sense of belonging. As I have demonstrated, although today’s Atayal ‘tribe’ was 
based on the idea of the traditional ‘qalang’, the alliances of niqan, the traditional 
division between ‘us’ and ‘others’, were actually established on the range of a 
‘niqan’ – a group of people who shared the same gaga and bore religious 
responsibility together. It was such significance of gaga that defined what a ‘person 
of Atayal’ – tayan – was. To be accepted as a tayan, an individual had to practise the 
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gaga so that he or she could be marked with the symbol of utux on the face. As the 
facial tattoos of different niqan would have different details, the tattoos not only 
revealed the cultural identity of the Atayal people, but also, in the same way that the 
gaga differed, indicated the ethno diversity even within what is known as ‘the Atayal 
group’ today.  
    In the modern Atayal society, however, we see how gaga is much more narrowly 
understood from the Atayal people’s reactions to the issue of the Seediq’s 
independence. In this case, we see not only how gaga is now deemed by the Atayals 
to be the ‘common origin’ for all the groups who share similar ideas in life, but also 
how such an understanding of the gaga limited the imagination and recognition of 
identity. The mode of identity resulting from this modern conceptualisation of the 
gaga, moreover, is no longer by the Lamarkian practices of life, but by the Mendelian 
inheritance of blood ties. Although, in today’s Bienjing village, we can still notice the 
influences of the Lamarkian model in the attitudes of people towards each other (such 
as the way the Narima see the kilhaku people of the Sawig and Valus), the fact that 
such attitudes would follow even with the people’s change of niqan indicates the 
dominance of the Mendelian model of the modern Atayals’ conceptualisation of 
identity. Since the traditional Lamarkian model of identity was based on the practices 
that served the purposes of religious belief, the transition in the identity of the modern 
Atayals to the Mendelian model thus indicates the ‘secularisation’ of the idea of the 
self, from following sacred practices to secular ties of origin. This forces us to ask: 
what kind of religious transition triggered this structural change of identity? To tackle 
this question step by step, in the next chapter I will investigate the idea of utux – the 
religious object of the pre-Christian Atayals – and how it is connected to the gaga that 
shaped both the world view and the sense of belonging in the traditional Atayal 
culture.
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Chapter 4 
Utux: 
The Sacred Nature of the Atayal
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In the last chapter I pointed out that the Atayals’ ethnic identity changed from a 
Lamarkian construction to a Mendelian one along with the transition of their 
understanding of the gaga. I have also introduced the religious nature of gaga, and 
described how it was the source of habitus, the reference of social units and the sacred 
guidance of life. Therefore, in order to understand how religious transition could 
influence the Atayal people’s social and cultural structures, and thereby the 
conceptualisation of the identity of the self, we should further investigate the relation 
between the Atayals’ religious views and gaga. In this chapter I try to present, and 
clarify, the idea of utux with regard to the concept of personhood and the religious 
beliefs in the traditional Atayal culture in order to analyse the relationship between 
the body, rituals and religious structure. In this way I hope to establish the Atayal 
people’s view of the sacred and secular worlds, and how such a view would affect 
their idea of who they are. 
    To understand the Atayals’ conversion to Christianity, we must first discuss the 
religious subject – utux – in the traditional Atayal culture. In order to understand the 
idea of utux in the Atayal tradition, it might be best to look first at the concept of a 
‘human’ in Atayal society. Generally a tayal (person) was believed to be formed of 
hei (flesh) and utux (spirit, or soul). Utux was also believed to be something that was 
only acquirable by humans, and that was immortal and stored in the eyes and body 
(K.-C. Huang, 2000), or some say in the blood (Y. Li, 1963). Human life was formed 
by the combination of hei and utux; sleep was the temporary departure of the utux, 
and death the permanent separation of the utux from the hei (K.-C. Huang, 2000). 
Such a relationship between the spirit and body in some early scholars’ eyes was 
recognised as the idea of ‘living’ and ‘dead’ utux. However, recent studies have 
offered evidence that the existence of utux is constant, and the only difference 
between ‘living’ and ‘dead’ utux is where it resides, not its status. That is, the utux 
resides in the body when a person is alive, and goes somewhere else when the person 
is dead (Y. Watan, 2005). The divergence in categorising the status of utux might be 
due to the perceptions in different Atayal groups, but either way, the belief that utux is 
immortal is common to all Atayal groups.32 The immortality of the utux was reflected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For example, the Gogan Sbtunux groups in Taoyuan believe the idea of utux can be divided into the 
‘utux mhuqil’ (the utux of the dead) and ‘utux tminun’ (the utux of the living); whilst the Klesan people 
in Ilan consider utux as the ‘spirits of the dead’, and rutux ‘the only existence in the universe’ (IOE 
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in the naming customs in the Atayal culture: they do not have surnames, but use the 
father’s name followed by a given name, and that given name may sometimes be the 
name of an elder who has just passed away. The idea of the immortality of the utux 
was not only revealed by the combination of the names of the deceased and newborns, 
which symbolically connected the ancestors to the living, but was also embodied in 
the belief that dreams were the visits of ancestors, as well as in the practice of burying 
a person with the tools they used in their daily work. This meant that the deceased one 
could still continue their ‘living’ in the world without the hei (K.-C. Huang, 2000). 
   Utux was viewed as a constant existence that resided only within or outside the 
hei; its status would not change when the human body perished. The power of utux, 
on the other hand, could only be revealed without the physical container of flesh. In 
human bodies, utux as the soul does not have particular power; whilst upon its 
‘permanent departure’ from the body, it becomes the supernatural beings that the 
Atayal people would either worship or fear. In the early systematic record of the 
concept of utux in Atayal culture, the Report on Barbarian’s Customs compiled in 
1915, the Japanese anthropologist Yoshimichi Kojima documented that the terms utux, 
rutux, otox and lutuk in the Atayal languages referred to the spirits of the deceased, 
and sometimes also to an invisible god (IOE Academia Sinica, 1996). Given the 
relationship between the utux and the hei outlined above, such multiple references 
seem to be understandable according to the cause or means of death in the Atayal 
culture. When an Atayal person was killed, committed suicide, accidentally or 
violently died, or died alone, his utux would become a yaqil utux, the evil spirit that 
causes all kinds of wicked occurrences. Those who died in their beds, on the other 
hand, would become the blaq utux – the ‘good spirits’ – and join the other ancestors 
to look after the Atayals (K.-C. Huang, 2000). Thus, it is comprehensible that the utux 
was seen as ‘the only religious subject’ of the Atayals (IOE Academia Sinica, 1996). 
Also, as people have different strengths, utux was said to be strong or weak, but not 
every utux had the power to influence people (Huang, 2000; IOE Academia Sinica, 
1996; Li, 1963; Watan, 2005).  
    It was believed that the yaqil utux were not able to cross the ‘hongu utux’, which 
is manifested through the rainbow. Translates as ‘the bridge of utux’, ‘hongu utux’ 	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refers to the bridge that link the worlds between living people and deceased ancestors, 
where the other side can only be reached by the ‘good souls’ (K.-C. Huang, 2000). 
One of the elders in the Bienjing village told me that in the past, people believed that 
whenever a rainbow appeared, someone must have passed away, and their utux was 
crossing that bridge to get to the other side – the side of the dead. There was also a 
story telling how each Atayal soul would have to cross the rainbow bridge. Under the 
bridge there was a giant crab (which was only visible to the deceased) guarding the 
gate to the world of utux, and those who failed to follow the gaga while they were 
alive would fall off the bridge and be eaten by the crab. Yaqil utux, however, were the 
spirits that would not even have the chance to reach the rainbow bridge due to the 
wrongful status of their death, and hence they were alone in death and left out of this 
world completely. Some of the villagers today still believe that these yaqil utux 
wander around the world of the living and that they sometimes cause trouble for 
people. The influence that the way in which a person dies has on the status of the 
‘spirit’ is similar to the Han culture. The spirits of these ‘bad deaths’ are what the Han 
people called ‘ghosts’ (鬼) (Shih, 2010), a term which the modern Mandarin-speaking 
Atayals would use to describe the idea of yaqil utux. Like the ‘ghosts’, yaqil utux are 
homeless and hungry, and would wander on earth to haunt the living for their needs 
(Shih, 2010). Therefore, when consuming food outside their houses or in the woods – 
or hunting in the case of this study – the Atayals would put a small share of their food, 
or simply spill some wine, on the ground. This would serve not only as a gesture of 
respect, but also as an offering for these wandering utux to prevent them from causing 
disturbances. These disturbances – such as illness, hiding animals from the hunters or 
frightening people – were not necessarily deadly, but they might require the mahuni 
(shaman) to fix them if they became serious. However, yaqil utux was never the 
centre of the Atayals’ religious belief. This was not only because the numbers of yaqil 
utux were relatively small, but because the evils brought by them were seen as 
nothing more than malicious tricks compared to those who decided the fate and death 
of the Atayals: the blaq utux (Y. Li, 1964) and the utux kayal (Huang, 2000; Watan, 
2005). 
    There is almost a consensus amongst Atayal studies scholars that the yaqil utux 
is of trifling importance in the traditional Atayal religious system; however, no such 
agreement has been reached with regard to the blaq utux, which is generally 
recognised as being the centre of Atayal religious belief. The classic, and the most 
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cited, research on the concept of utux is the work of the Taiwanese anthropologist Li 
Yih-Yuan, who proposed the Atayal utux as the only reference for all the supernatural 
beings, and suggested that the Atayals do not have hierarchies or ideas about the roles 
of supernatural beings, such as gods or ghosts, but only distinguish between ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ utux or spirits (Y. Li, 1963, 1964). According to Li, Utux could refer to 
both the entirety of the spirits of the deceased ancestors, and to invididual spirits. In 
other words, it could refer to both good and evil spirits, as well as to the utux which 
resides in an individual’s body. Meanwhile, as the Atayals believed that the world is 
watched over by utux, and that all the good souls would go and join utux after they 
passed the ‘rainbow bridge’, Li and his followers saw utux as the collective will of the 
good souls, which not only has the power to decide the Atayals’ destinies, but is also 
the origin of life and power (K.-C. Huang, 2000; Suzuki, 1992). This 
conceptualisation of the utux was criticised by some Atayal-native researchers and 
others for overlooking the context in Atayal language, which isolated the usage of the 
term from the sentence structure and resulted in the misinterpretation of the Atayal 
religious system. The criticism also includes how the studies, such as that of Li, 
misrecognised the blaq utux as the Atayals’ ultimate being, the utux kayal. Utux kayal 
is seen by the Atayal natives not only as predominating over the universe and having 
created the world, but also as the unique and highest religious subject that is different 
from the utux, which only has the power on the wellbeing of people (K.-C. Huang, 
2000; Y. Watan, 2005).33  
    These distinctions matter because they are not only critical in understanding the 
process of the religious transition in this study, but also key to grasping how the 
relationship between sacred and secular worlds shifted together with the religious 
construction of identity in Atayal traditions. Therefore, the following sections focus 
first on the relationships between humans, utux and utux kayal in Atayal society and 
religious rituals, and second on the religious structure in the Atayal culture before and 
after their embracing of Christianity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	   One	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  misrecognition	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  utux,	  utux	  kayal,	  and	  blaq	  utux	  in	  the	  previous	  Atayal	  studies	  is	  that	  the	  Han	  researchers	  tended	  to	  understand	  the	  Atayal	  culture	  and	  beliefs	  using	  the	  concepts	  of	  Han	  religions.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  are	  still	  similarities	  to	  be	  drawn	  between	  the	  Han	  and	  Atayal	  religious	  ideas	  for	  in	  both	  cultures,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  living	  and	  the	  deceased	  was	  a	  ‘contract’	  with	  reciprocal	  benefits.	  Utux,	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  spiritual	  beings	  that	  exist	  after	  people	  died,	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  similar	  to	  the	  Han	  concept	  of	  ancestors	  (祖先),	  yaqil	  utux	  to	  ghosts	  (鬼),	  and	  utux	  kayal	  to	  gods	  (神).	  Such	  comparisons	  between	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  two	  cultures	  were	  sometimes	  rejected	  by	  the	  Atayal	  participants,	  as	  they	  have	  been	  seeking	  to	  set	  themselves	  apart	  from	  the	  dominant	  Han	  society.	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4.1 The sacredness in the idea of utux 
The idea of utux – or, more precisely, what the signifier utux should be signifying in 
terms of a religious subject in the traditional Atayal culture – has long been the centre 
of debate when discussing the topic of Atayal tradition. Most Atayal studies (Huang, 
2000; Li, 1963; M. Wang, 1990, 2003) agree that for the living people utux refers to 
their soul, but how it should be understood as the existence of a religious subject still 
remains controversial. Based on the idea of utux coming from human souls, K. -C. 
Huang (2000) believed that utux referred to the souls of the deceased ones, and that 
the utux who successfully crossed the hongu utux to the utuxan (the world of death), 
though different from the yaqil utux, held the same religious status as those wicked 
spirits that would bring their curse or help to the living out of ‘personal needs’. 
Following the Durkheimian path, Huang (2000) thus argued that such a human 
character of the utux and yaqil utux should be categorised as the subject of the Atayals’ 
shamanism, since the practices regarding both utux and yaqil utux were mostly utility 
oriented and lacked moral pursuits. The only ‘sacred’ – meaning being respected, not 
‘feared’ as the Atayals felt with the yaqil utux – religious subject of the Atayals to 
Huang is the blaq utux, which is described as the ultimate reality, and the only 
possible source of morality and justice in Atayal society. According to Huang (2000), 
since the blaq utux is what the Atayals usually refer to when speaking of utux in a 
non-contextual circumstance, the utux in this sense should be written as Utux to 
distinguish it from the shamanic aspect of the term. Huang’s statement is seen as bold 
not only as he subverted the classic interpretation of the Atayal culture as having no 
distinction between god and ghosts, but because he further established the hierarchy 
of the religious system that marks off the division of the sacred, the supernatural and 
the secular worlds of the Atayals (S. Wang, 2001). Huang’s analysis is based 
primarily on the plural form of utux in Atayal language and his own field study and 
was intended to overturn the idea that utux referred both to all supernatural beings and 
to individual supernatural beings – an idea which had been prevalent amongst 
Taiwanese anthropologists since the 1960s. As to distinguishing between the roles of 
god, ancestors’ spirits and evil ghosts, Huang’s research and other studies opposed to 
Li’s are founded on events – maho and smyus – in which Atayals memorised and 
made offerings to their ancestors. In the following sections I shall elaborate on these 
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two ritual practices to further examine the essence of the idea of ‘utux’ and its 
relationships with Atayal people, and to clarify the nature of the traditional Atayal 
religious practices and how they defined the nature of Atayal identity. 
4.1.1 Maho: offering to utux 
Maho is also called pslkotas, ubong or smyus in different Atayal dialects.34 Though 
the name may vary, the meaning and process of this event are mostly the same: it was 
the biggest and the last religious event of the Atayals’ annual ritual cycle, and it was 
held after the crops were harvested to express gratitude to the utux for the abundance 
and peace over the last year, and to pray for another good one to come. The details of 
this event may be different in the Atayal tribes according to their own gaga. However, 
the point of this event in most Atayal tribes was to call the deceased ancestors back to 
enjoy the tribe’s offerings, which would usually be rice cakes, raw meat from hunting 
and rice wine that was made from the harvests of the year just before the event. It was 
believed that this would satisfy the utux and that they would therefore bring blessings 
to the Atayal people. A traditional maho of the Narima people in 1915 was 
documented thus: 
On the day before worshipping, wine, rice cakes and meat would 
have all been prepared in the households of the tribe, and the 
people would stop working on that afternoon. At the dawn of the 
worshipping day, each household of the tribe would put their wine 
in a bamboo tube, the rice in a bag, stick the meat, cakes and 
tobacco to offer to the spirits of the dead on the point of a bamboo, 
and take the bamboo to the house of the host to meet with others. 
Every one of them would wear new white clothes made from 
ramies, and they would go to a specific place on the outskirts 
(which would be different every year, and on that custom it is the 
same as with the savages in Da-Ke-Kan), yelling the names of the 
deceased family such as ‘yutas’, ‘yagi’, ‘mama’ and ‘yata’ as they 
stick the bamboos into the soil and pour the wine on it; then they 
would throw away the rice and go directly home without looking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Though the communities in this study refer to it differently, the term for this event in the official 
documents in Miaoli is maho, whilst in some groups of this study, the term ‘smyus’ means another 
religious ritual; and so this study takes ‘maho’ as the title for such an event. 
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back. Every household would have their own feasts and enjoy the 
day afterwards, with no need to work.35 
(IOE Academia Sinica, 1996: 391) 
The psani (taboo) of this event, for example in Huang’s study of the Atayals in 
Hsinchu (2000), involved a variety of prescriptions and proscriptions. The pslkotas 
place could not be revisited again within a year, or the people would be cursed or get 
ill. Offerings to the utux could not be too great, as in the utuxan, ‘the less (of the 
things from the world of the living) means the more’ – in other words, giving one bag 
of rice would be generous, while giving ten bags would be deemed to be stingy by the 
spirits, would offend the utux and might result in adversity to members of the niqan 
(clan). Finally, the place should be left without looking back, as otherwise the people 
would ‘see the ghost’.36  
4.1.2 Smyus: offerings for atonement 
Smyus is also called tambalay in some of the Atayal villages in Miaoli, where 
tambalay means ‘to subside’ (Y. Watan, 2005). For the Atayals, the utux’s 
punishment for violating the gaga would be manifested in three ways: a poor harvest, 
unsuccessful hunting and illness (M. Wang, 2008). Therefore, some of the most 
important religious rituals are related to the treatment of diseases (Li, 1963; M.  
Wang, 2008). The religious treatment of disease is called hmagup (Huang, 2000; IOE, 
1996; Watan, 2005), whilst smyus is the ultimate solution if such disease involves the 
anger of the utux. The timing for holding a smyus was usually related to the violation 
of psani, which resulted in illness or death in the community, and offerings needed to 
be made to subdue the anger of the utux. Unlike the maho, which was held by an 
elected host or the mrhuw/tumux of the tribe (who had to be male), smyus usually had 
to be conducted by the mahuni, a female who would give instructions for how to 
pacify the anger of the utux and to atone for one’s sin, according to the visions from 
the utux in dreams. In Yupas Watan’s study (2005), the traditional smyus of the 
Mesingaw group was recorded as:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The terms ‘yutas’, ‘yagi’, ‘mama’ and ‘yata’ are not names, but respectful titles for elderly 
people. 
36 The maho event in Huang’s field is called pslkotas, in which ‘ps’ is the progressive tense in the 
Atayal language, as well as having the meaning of ‘offering’; whilst ‘lkotas’ means ‘deceased 
ancestors’. The term pslkotas thus literally means ‘offer foods to the deceased ancestors’, according to 
Huang. 
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Smyus is mai yurak (to give offerings). When doing a smyus, the 
offerer would bring the offerings outside in order to talk to the 
utux. For example, when a shaman is performing the sorcery 
(hmagup), she will tell the visions in the dream to the family of 
the patient; if she saw a chicken or a pig in her dream, the 
patient’s family has to make the offering with a chicken or a 
pig … the will of the lyutux (utux) is told to the shaman by the 
visions in dreams, to tell how the patient should atone for his sin 
with the offering of a chicken, or other things (required by the 
utux) … So, put simply, smyus is a ritual performed for the patient 
to the lyutux (Y. Watan, 2005). 
 
In Huang’s view, maho presents the same relationship between the human and the 
utux (the ancestors) as with the yaqil utux: firstly, that both of them are ‘negotiable’ 
by offering food, and might bring adversity if they fail to satisfy the utux; and, 
secondly, that the ritual of offering foods to the utux in maho does not originate from 
‘sacred respect’, but is undertaken out of ‘fear’ of the spirits of the dead in the same 
way that they fear the yaqil utux (K. C. Huang, 2000).  
 This typically structuralist stance makes Huang see the Atayals’ relationships 
with both the utux and yaqil utux as ones that require an exchange of favours, which, 
according to Huang’s quotation of Paul Tillich (2001), is in essence a performance of 
humanity that would not be ‘sacred’ and ‘separated’ enough to be the object of faith. 
To Huang (2000), such negotiability of utux not only meant the impossibility of 
establishing the absolute ground of morality, but also denied the possibility of the 
deceased ancestors being the ‘sacred object’ of Atayals’ religious belief. Utux, as 
argued by Huang, should thus be seen as the subject of magic rather than religious 
belief. 
    Despite the fact that the phenomenological aspect of terms such as ‘faith’, ‘belief’ 
and ‘religion’ is still being debated in Huang’s and other Atayal studies, these terms 
are used to refer to the spiritual construction that is based on the confrontation 
between the ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ spaces in one culture. Such a statement of the 
essence of faith – which is usually seen as the core of religion, the ‘sacred’ being that 
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is independent from the ‘profane’ – comes both from the Durkheimian (1961) 
tradition and Christian experience. Durkheim (1961) distinguished the category of 
sacredness from magic as serving the group rather than individuals. So, we should 
bear in mind that, since gaga provided the reference of morality and social stability in 
the Atayal society, the rituals subjected to utux that came with the violation of the 
gaga would be voided – theoretically – if utux was not the arbitrator of gaga. We 
should also note that the smyus, which was held to atone for the ‘sin’ of violating 
gaga, has a meaning similar to what Mary Douglas (1984) understood as a major 
function of religious ritual: to purify polluted social orders. As sickness was regarded 
by the Atayals as a result of violating gaga, such illness also symbolised, in Douglas’ 
(1984:44) terms, the ‘dirt’ (defined as ‘matter out of place’) in the established social 
orders. Smyus, therefore, instead of being seen as a way of ‘bribing’ the utux to 
restore health, was more of a sacred action to restore the ‘polluted’ social 
environment by atoning for one’s sins. Meanwhile, since gaga, as a whole guiding 
system of life, had never been seen as containing two different domains of ‘religion’ 
and ‘magic’ (just as Durkheim (1961) acknowledged that not all cultures distinguish 
these two categories), such a boundary between the ‘sacred’, ‘magic’ and the ‘profane’ 
in the previous studies has therefore to be reviewed by a careful investigation of the 
relationship between utux and the Atayal people. 
4.2 The relationship between the Atayal people and 
utux 
The primary relationship between the Atayals and utux may be revealed by the 
method of burial in the Atayal tradition. In Bienjing village, when a person died, the 
family of the deceased would put the body into a squat position and bury it in a hole 
dug under/next to the person’s own bed, and cover it with wood or stone planks.37 
The squat position symbolised that the deceased could still ‘watch over’ the family, as 
lying down would block their view; and if the bed of the deceased fell down 
afterwards, that meant the deceased one had already passed the hongu utux to the 
utuxan and become utux, and the rest of the family needed to find a new place to live, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 To confirm a person’s death, the Bienjing villagers would put the body in a bag and make sure the 
bag was not moving due to struggles. The person could then officially be pronounced dead. 
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as the house would become the living space for the deceased in another world. Such a 
custom explains why Atayals had to be much more careful in showing respect to utux 
when out in the woods, as they might step into some other utux’s territory left years 
ago without knowing it. For Atayals, burying the dead in the house was a gesture 
meant to continue the bond between the living and the dead before the latter left for 
the world of the spirits. Offerings would still be made daily as if the person were still 
alive. Such a bond would carry on even after the dead person had already arrived at 
utuxan, when offerings could only be delivered to the world of spirits through rituals 
such as maho or other daily religious practices, including ‘bazi’ – the practice of 
spilling food or wine on the ground as offerings for the utux before every meal. 
    This bond between utux and the Atayal people was a relationship beyond the 
simple boundary of the sacred and profane and could be as sacred as in the rituals of 
offering making, and as ‘down to earth’ (as ‘profane’ in Durkheim’s terms) as in other 
circumstances. In Wang’s study (2008), when illness or bad luck lingered after the 
atonement ritual (called smyus in this study but with a variety of names depending on 
the Atayal dialect), utux would sometimes be blamed or threatened using the words of 
the mahuni, such as: ‘if you do not make him recover from sickness, I will slash you 
just as slashing a reed’ (M. Wang, 2008: 5). By these offering-making rituals and the 
Atayals’ attitude towards utux, M. Wang (2008: 6) concludes that the relationship 
between the Atayals and utux was a ‘contract’ with mutual benefits. This was 
indicated by the prayers recited in maho from her field of study in Miaoli:  
Our ancestors made a contract with you (Lyutux), and today we 
present you with the harvest. Please bless our people to have an 
abundant year with no sickness, and we wish to share our 
joyfulness with you again at the same time next year.  
This ‘contract’ was regulated in the articles of gaga, whereby practising the rituals 
and living principles of gaga could not only construct the relationship between utux 
and the Atayal people, but also distinguish the identity of the tribe members (M. 
Wang, 2008). Thus, when someone broke the conditions in the contract (gaga), utux 
would have the right to inflict the punishment; and when adversity happened even 
though the gaga had been properly followed and practised, the Atayal people would 
also vent their discontent by cursing utux for the fact that the relationship between 
utux and the Atayals was complementary (M. Wang, 2008) rather than one of 
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opposition, such as that between the sacred and profane. However, although the 
participants in this study were not aware of such threatening action being allowed and 
saw it as disrespectful to utux, they also stated that utux was ‘the spirit that follows the 
people and protects the people, and it is neither ghost nor god’. They held that the 
relationship between them and utux was ‘just like families’, in which ‘parents (utux) 
and children (Atayals) would have expectations of each other’. If any of them broke 
the trust of the other, things could always be mended, as, ‘after all, they were our 
ancestors’. Of course, there are also many participants who could not explain what the 
relationship between utux and the Atayals was (or is) like; to them, ‘utux is utux’ – it 
was the protector, the punisher, the origin of gaga, and it could be scary, sacred or as 
benevolent as their own family.  
    Meanwhile, as there is a spatial distinction between ‘the living’ and ‘the spirits’ 
marked by the ‘hongu utux’, the world of the living for the Atayals was never 
independent from the world of the spirits. The blessing or punishment of utux were 
revealed through a good harvest or through individuals suffering from all kinds of 
illness, and rituals were held either to appreciate the patronage or to pacify the anger 
of utux. With these forms of the utux’s judgement on the Atayals’ way of life, the 
visits of the utux in dreams, and practices to avoid the tricks from yaqil utux, the 
existence of utux would be better interpreted as living ‘along’ with the Atayals rather 
than ascending to a status beyond them, even though it seizes people’s respect and 
achieves a certain level of ‘sacredness’. Through the ritual practices, not only could 
Atayals substantially and spiritually benefit from showing respect and offering foods 
to the utux, but the authority of utux would also be confirmed, by which the bond 
between the gaga, utux and the Atayals’ society could be strengthened. Thus, the 
relationship between the Atayals and utux is not one of opposition between the 
‘sacred’ and ‘profane’; it is a closely intertwined relationship that regulated the 
Atayals’ life through the dialectics between the gaga and utux.  
 As well as the utux that was closely integrated with the Atayals’ daily lives, there 
was also a religious existence that dominated the Atayal people’s idea of cosmology – 
utux kayal. The existence of utux kayal has been a controversial and abstract, though 
rarely discussed, idea that possesses an obscure status in the life of the Atayals. When 
Huang (2000) uses the term utux kayal he means the subject of the religious ritual 
maho – the only being that has the power to bring blessings and punishment to people. 
He further suggests that when the Atayals spoke of ‘utux’, what they meant was this 
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‘utux kayal’ rather than the spirits of the deceased ancestors. Yet in Yupas Watan’s 
research (2005: 26), it is described as ‘the invisible, unexplainable, infinite 
supernatural mighty power that is evident in every Atayal’s mind’. Here, the meaning 
of utux kayal before the Atayals’ conversion to Christianity is almost impossible for 
the participants to explain without recourse to Christian concepts such as ‘God’, 
‘Father’ or ‘Lord’. However, one thing we can be certain of is that to the Atayals, utux 
kayal has always referred to a ‘greater power’ than utux, to the ‘almighty’, the ‘origin 
of the universe’. However, while they ‘just know this for sure’, they could not 
accurately point out what the utux kayal actually does in their life. As YH – the son of 
a tumux – states, ‘it was seldom being brought up in our life in my grandfather’s time’. 
Utux kayal has always been a distant and respectful – or purely sacred – idea to the 
Atayals. Watan (2005) also specifies that utux kayal was the factor the Atayals 
referred to when they failed to understand why things such as natural phenomena, 
death or serious illness happened. They would say it was the utux kayal’s idea and 
must be purposeful. However, the utux kayal – this ‘ultimate reality’ of the Atayals – 
was somewhat detached from their daily lives. It was their final explanation for all the 
unanswerable questions, the absolute truth and essence of every being, and in some 
Atayal native clergies’ eyes, it was what the ancestors taught of ‘tminu utux’ – 
literally ‘the spirit of weaving’, meaning the one who ‘weaved’ all Atayals’ lives. But 
unlike utux, which was closely tied up to every aspect of life, there was never any 
form of religious worship towards utux kayal: 
 
No, we did not worship utux kayal … why? I heard that it was 
because they (the ancestors) did not know what utux kayal really 
was; they knew there was this great power, but they did not know 
its name, or how to worship it. But anyway, our parents, and their 
parents before them, all told us that utux kayal has always been 
there. Although they seldom mentioned it, they knew it was there 
and respected it from the bottom of their hearts. Then when the 
church came, they told us the name of it, so now we call it Christ 
or God, or Father, but it means the same power that created 
everything in the world. 
(Participant SF) 
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    In Watan’s study (2005), a few participants stated that they would bring the 
problems to utux kayal when their tumux or tribal councils could not reconcile the 
conflicts between individuals or groups, an impasse often resulting in a duel to the 
death between the two parties. The one survivor would then be on the side of justice 
by the judgement of utux kayal. Nevertheless, contrary to that observation by Watan, 
the elderly participants in Bienjing village support the idea that utux was the object of 
such an act, and that utux kayal served as more of a symbolic than a substantial 
reference in seeking the driven cause of beings, even though the existence of utux 
kayal was never merely metaphysical. There is the possibility of the meanings and 
roles of utux and utux kayal being lost, or confused, in the past or during the 
theological translation to Christianity. However, on the other hand, unlike the 
‘ultimate reality’ being the subject of worship in other religions for its mysterious and 
unspeakable character, the absence of worshipping activities to utux kayal was 
precisely due to the Atayals’ intellectual insufficiency in grasping the possible forms 
of religious service. The lack of rituals or any other form of ‘returning to the sacred’ – 
as Durkheim (1961: page number?) put it – thus provides evidence of how 
unimportant utux kayal was not only in the Atayal people’s daily lives, but also in 
their religious experiences.  
 Therefore, even though utux kayal was actually the key idea of the Atayals’ 
construction of the world – the great power that was believed to ‘weave’ the lives of 
each Atayal from the day they arrived in the world until the day they left – what this 
weave looked like still relied on the blessings from utux by practising gaga. As Watan 
states in his study, ‘the goodness and badness of luck or fate was depending on the 
environmental conditions and (ly)utux’s blessings’ (2005: 32), when this tminu utux 
‘put the wisdom of gaga into Atayals’ minds along with its weaving of Atayals’ lives’ 
(2005: 42), and the society would only be peaceful and harmonious by strictly 
following gaga. Therefore, the practice of gaga – that is, the daily practices – was in 
fact the practice of the sacred wisdom bestowed by utux kayal, and overseen by utux. 
The life of a tayan, we could further say, was the life of sacred practices. 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I started by looking at the concept of the ‘person’ in Atayal culture in 
order to make clear the primary connection between utux and the Atayal people, and 
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raised the main dispute in the Atayal studies over the role and functions of utux 
through the two indicative rituals: maho and smyus. The reason why it is crucial to 
establish the status of utux in the Atayals’ religious system is that it involves not only 
the later theological and cosmological translation of their conversion to Christianity, 
but also the nature of gaga – and thereby the nature of the Atayal identity. The ‘nature 
of gaga’ refers to the problem of whether we should divide the traditional life of the 
Atayals into ‘religious’ (sacred) and ‘secular’ (profane) domains. Drawing on both 
my own ethnography and previous studies, I then analysed the concepts of utux kayal, 
utux and yaqil utux in the Atayal religious practices to clarify the relationships 
between these supernatural entities and the Atayal people. I also argued that utux 
kayal, though believed to be the origin of the world, functioned merely as the final 
answer of the Atayal people’s cosmology without possessing actual religious power 
on people, since there were no rituals to interact with or experience the sacredness of 
its being. In other words, utux kayal was a cosmological concept rather than a 
religious subject in the pre-Christian Atayal society. This does not mean that utux 
kayal did not possess a religious status in the pre-Christian Aatayal culture, nor the 
traditional Atayal cosmology lacked religious elements. On the contrary, the religious 
might of the utux kayal was revealed through the existence of the world itself, 
indicating the sacred nature of the Atayal’s cosmology. The functions of sacred 
religious ritual, such as bringing about the collective conscience and collective 
identity (Collins, 2004a, 2004b; E Durkheim, 1961) and restoring and purifying the 
(polluted) social orders (Douglas, 1984; V. Turner, 1967), were embodied through the 
rites subjected to utux. From ‘bazi’ in daily life to maho each year, these rituals of 
gaga not only confirmed and reproduced the Atayal people’s world view (which was 
created by the utux kayal), but also indicated the sacredness of utux in Atayal society, 
since gaga was the ‘sacred contract’ between utux and the Atayal people. The 
sacredness of utux, I argue, did not mean that the utux belonged to a ‘sacred world’ 
that was independent from a ‘secular’ one. On the contrary, as living in the world was 
to practise the gaga made with the utux, and every action a tayan made would involve 
the status of the utux, the Atayal people’s early life should be seen as one of religious 
practices. Or further, since there were only good deeds (following the gaga) and bad 
deeds (breaking the gaga) that formed the order of the traditional Atayal world, we 
might even say that the pre-Christian Atayal world was characteristically ethical and 
thus inherently sacred. Meanwhile, the construction of the identity of a tayan, in 
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addition to the distinguishing of the niqan, was also based on the religious practices of 
gaga.   
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Chapter 5 
In the Changing World: 
Challenges to the Atayal traditions 
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In the last two chapters I introduced the ideas of utux and gaga in the traditional 
Atayal society and showed how they were central to Atayal culture. From the 
categorisation of groups to the practice of being a tayan, what we have seen is not just 
how the dynamic relation between utux and gaga regulated the Atayals’ life, but, 
more importantly, how their identity was shaped by the nature of their religious 
practice. Constructed by the unique relationship between the tayan, utux, utux kayal 
and gaga, the traditional world of the Atayal was one in which both secular and 
sacred domains were integrated, where each earthly action was part of the sacred 
contract with utux, each earthly matter was a sign from utux and each person was a 
container of utux. In this chapter, I will investigate the changes that led to the current, 
modern development of Atayals’ notions of self-identification from political, 
economic and religious perspectives. As such, changes involve the transition not just 
of the religious elements in the gaga, but also of the foundation of morality – the 
order of things – in the traditional Atayal world. Later in the chapter I will analyse the 
different factors involved in the Bienjing villagers’ conversion to Christianity, and 
how they reflected the transition of their idea of the self.  
    As religious conversion usually involves different levels of social and cultural 
change (Jean Comaroff, 1985; van Binsbergen & Schoffeleers, 1985), it has been 
suggested that religious conversion should be treated as a process, rather than as a 
single transformative event (Rambo, 1993). Under such circumstances, conversion is 
therefore a ‘recreated’ worldview (Stromberg, 1990) that could reflect the transition 
of the political environment (Kipp, 1993), social structures (Robbins, 2004) and even 
ethnic boundaries (Shepherd, 1996). These aspects of the process of conversion have 
not only influenced the interpretation of religious life in the modern world, but have 
also revealed the elements influencing the conceptualisation of the converters’ 
identities. As I stated at the end of the last chapter, the traditional Atayal world could 
be said to be an ‘ethical world’ with religious practices, since in the traditional gaga a 
distinction was made only between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deeds and there were no other 
categorisations. This chapter is an examination of this view by means of an analysis 
of the reasons for the villagers’ conversion to Christianity. By the end of this chapter, 
I hope not only to unravel the changes in the Atayal view of the world, but also to 
enable the readers to have a better understanding of the idea of ‘secularisation’ as it is 
used in the following chapters.  
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5.1 The first challenge: Japanese modernity and 
Shintoism 
The first challenge to the traditional relationship between utux, utux kayal and the 
Atayals came when the Japanese took control of Taiwan. Following their declaration 
of sovereignty in 1895, the Japanese had to suppress a number of riots across the land, 
so their intervention in the aborigines’ culture and customs was not seriously 
implemented until the 1900s (Fujii, 2001). This stage of work was to ‘educate’ and 
‘civilise’ the aborigines, mostly the children, not only to be able to speak Japanese, 
but also to understand, and therefore implement, the Japanese work on 
‘modernisation’, including ways of farming and animal husbandry (instead of hunting) 
and all kinds of modern infrastructures (Fujii, 2001). Young men were also forced to 
log and carry trees for the Japanese and were given only small payments to ‘buy’ their 
living materials. Atayal customs, such as facial tattoos and funeral traditions, started 
to be officially prohibited. Those who still tattooed their faces would be given an 
unaffordable fine or labour punishment, and might be forced to remove the tattoo by a 
medical operation (B. Watan, 2005). Many young Atayals accepted Japanese rule, or 
saw these changes as beneficial as a means of fitting into the bigger society; others 
chose to follow the Japanese order for other reasons. Some Atayals, however, chose 
to hide and kept practising their traditions in deeper mountain areas that the Japanese 
forces could not reach, as well as trying their best to preserve their pride in being a 
tayan in the most traditional sense. 
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Figure 7, an elder with traditional dress who had his face tattooed during the Japanese 
period in Miaoli. 
    There is not enough evidence to show how much the religious beliefs of the 
Atayals were altered due to such changes in their customs and economic practices, 
and how the Atayals’ identity was affected by the prohibition of the physical 
identification of facial tattooing. However, the aboriginal policy of the Japanese in the 
late 1930s could be said to be one of the most influential factors in the presentation of 
today’s Atayal cultures in Taiwan. From the late 1930s to the end of Japanese 
sovereignty in 1945, the Japanese government implemented a series of ‘Japanisation’ 
(kōminka) movements across Taiwan. The aim of this strategy was to destroy local 
identities so that Taiwanese people would identify themselves as Japanese, and also 
so that the Japanese could obtain more resources and materials from Taiwan to 
support their war across Asia (Fujii, 2001). The methods used to implement the 
Japanisation policy included the popularisation of Japanese language and ways of 
living, and the allocation of extra rations during wartime for those who adopted 
Japanese names. The most fundamental change, however, was the compelling 
introduction of Shintoism, the national religion of Japan at that time, to Taiwanese 
society (Fujii, 2001).  
 In the Taiwanese Han society, the conversion to Shintoism consisted of 
transforming traditional temples into Shinto shrines and burning down the Han deities 
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and ancestral tablets. The Japanese believed that such actions would establish faith in 
the Emperor of Japan and thus strengthen Taiwan’s support of war (Chou, 2003; Tsai, 
1991, 2007). As the Atayals never had religious institutions which would be similar to 
those of the Han and the Japanese people, the method of converting them to 
Shintoism began with the banning of ‘superstitious’ customs – the customs that failed 
to fit in with the cosmology of Shintoism, such as facial tattooing and home burials. 
Meanwhile, those who chose to convert to Shintoism would be given ‘rewards’ – 
meaning that the position of Atayal people vis-à-vis their Japanese rulers would 
improve considerably following their conversion. The Japanese considered the 
practice of home burials to be a ‘hygienic concern’, and the Atayals and other 
aborigines with similar customs were required instead to bury their dead in cemeteries 
that were planned by the Japanese near each aboriginal community (Chou, 2003; IOE 
Academia Sinica, 1996; Tsai, 1991). The earliest instance of Atayals following the 
Japanese practice of outdoor funerals was the Mstranan people in Northern Taiwan in 
1918. By 1933, only 7% of Atayals still practised traditional indoor funerals and 
burial (Ishimura, 2010: 30).  
 In Miaoli, according to the participant whose family had been in the business of 
funerals for two generations, Atayal burials in the Japanese marked cemetery, at first, 
still put the body in the squat position. Later, some started to follow the Japanese and 
Han people’s ritual of laying the body face up, and used thin planks as a simple coffin. 
During my fieldwork, some said that the reason for using wooden planks in the first 
place was simply a ‘copy’ of the way the Han and Japanese did it, but some also 
stated that it was meant to give the corpse a ‘shelter’ to stay in, in the same way that 
the body was buried under the roof in the old tradition. It wasn’t until the late 1940s, 
when some converted Atayal Christians started to have Catholic funerals with names 
written on a simple cross as a tombstone, that the funerals began to be more 
complicated due to the frequent contact with the Han people. Most of the Atayals now 
follow the churches to which they have converted in the way that they hold their 
funeral ceremonies. 
 The impact of common cemeteries introduced by the Japanese is revealed 
through the experience of the Mstranan people (Ishimura, 2010): 
… under the influences of their (Mstranan) superstitions, they 
tended to see entering the cemetery as a taboo, and therefore 
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refused to clean the cemetery. In order to teach them the idea of 
ancestral worship, (we) taught them that the cemetery is where the 
dead can live peacefully, and thus they have to keep it clean; 
when making offerings to the ancestors in this cemetery, they 
would feel happy and bring blessings for generations … This year 
(we) advised them to hold obon macri38 … After that, the 
aboriginal people said they have always been afraid of the souls of 
the dead, as sickness and bad things were all caused by these dead 
souls … that’s why they would rather not pass by the cemetery … 
But now, they have started to worship (the ancestors) with respect 
and love out of fear. 
(From the Japanese police newspaper Taiwan Police Times (台灣警察時報), No.117, 
March issue, 1927; translated by Ishimura, 2010) 
 
The Atayals used to see the place of burial as a space for the spirits of the dead, which 
should not be entered in order to avoid offending utux. However, when asked how 
such a religious-related change of custom affected the Atayals’ view towards utux, 
most of the older participants gave quite similar answers: 
 
… they (the ancestors) were scared (of the cemetery and the 
spirits around) and felt burying the bodies outside would violate 
the relation with utux, but then they would go worshipping to 
avoid utux’s anger … it’s all the same no matter where you bury 
the body. As long as you respect them (utux), they will bless 
you. 
(Participant SSK) 
 
This proves that the bond between the Atayal people and utux did not seem to change 
because they had to compromise on their funeral customs. For one thing, the 
traditional taboo was to fear and respect utux, whose anger, it was believed, could be 
pacified through offerings, even under its Japanese name of obon macri. For another, 
though the spirit of ancestral worship of this Japanese obon macri is different from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Obon macri is Japanese, and is a series of offering activities to ‘welcome’ and ‘send off’ the ‘ghosts’ 
of ancestors; in Japan it usually lasts for days. 
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the Atayals’ idea of utux worshipping, it still fits the Atayals’ logic of life and death, 
and thus could be easily accepted as part of the culture.  
 The ‘obon macri’ is also what the Atayals nowadays refer to as ‘obon’ and 
‘ubong’. In Yupas Watan’s study (2005), the establishment of common cemeteries 
and ubong altered, or invented, a lot of Atayal communities’ traditions of such 
ancestral worship. Today, in many Atayal communities, ubong is actually the 
Japanese name for maho, which was changed under Japanese instructions in order to 
cope with the responses from the Atayals regarding the common cemetery. In some 
other Atayal tribes, there may also have been both ‘ubong’ and maho-like practices, 
the former only acting as an ancestral memorial ceremony that never existed before 
the Japanese period. This is also why the place for maho today is mostly in the 
common cemetery and not some place distant from tribes, as was the case 
traditionally – including in Bienjing village. 
5.1.1 In between Japanisation and Christianisation 
In today’s Bienjing village, the ancestral worshipping activity is called maho, ubong 
or pslkotas according to the Atayal dialect in each tribe. The younger generations 
(those under the age of 40), who are used to speaking Mandarin rather than their 
mother languages, now usually call it ‘zhulingji’ (祖靈祭 ), literally meaning 
‘worshipping festival of the ancestors’ souls’. Its literal meaning almost defines the 
term zhulingji’s connotation to the modern Atayals today. It is a one-day activity of 
thanking utux for a good harvest by making offerings in the cemetery, and apart from 
the offering-making processes, it is more like a festive activity. The zhulingji of the 
Sawig tribe in 2011 was held a week before I entered the field. Luckily, one of the 
participants provided a copy of the project proposal of the activity, which was used to 
apply for funds from the government, in which it states the whole process of the 
activity, as follows: 
1. 04:00: Gathering (males have to gather an hour before dawn, and head to the 
cemetery led by the elder of each clan, with offerings such as a small piece 
of fresh meat, a small piece of preserved meat, a few crops and wine). 
2. 04:45: Worshipping (the host leads the elders of all clans to say prayers, to 
call the ancestors’ spirits to come back and enjoy the good harvest). 
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3. 05:00: Calling the spirits of the ancestors (about dawn, taking turns to shout 
loudly to the ancestors’ spirits, from the host to the elders, and ask them to 
come back and share our offerings, taking care of the offspring). 
4. 05:05: Prayers (by the host, and others repeat). 
5. 05:10: Make offering (the elders lead their men in making the offerings). 
6. 05:13: Finish and return home. 
7. 10:00: Dance performance (by the dance group of the tribe). 
 
Figure 8 (left) and 9 (right), the dance group formed by the women in Sawig 
performing a Japanese dance (left) and a traditional Atayal dance (right) at Zhulingji. 
Provided by Tseng De-Hua. 
 
Figure 10 (left), hanging the offering of hunted birds.  
Figure 11 (right), saying prayers led by the host (in white at the front). Provided by 
Tseng De-Hua. 
    The process of zhulingji was not much different from the maho or ubong in the 
Atayal tradition; however, its religious significance has shifted to more of a cultural 
level rather than a belief, and the meaning of utux to the modern Atayals also appears 
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to vary from the traditional sense. Describing the nature of zhulingji as more cultural 
than religious does not mean that it no longer contains belief in the religiousness or 
spirituality of utux, but indicates the degradation of sacredness and the cultural 
symbolisation of utux. This is due to the fact that, although the reason for holding 
zhulingji is perceived naturally by the participants to be part of the gaga, the idea of 
utux to them now usually refers to ‘spirits’, ‘ghosts’ or merely ‘souls’ that are 
different from utux kayal – the modern Atayal interpretation of the Christian God – 
and do not ‘watch over the world’ as the Atayals used to believe. This recognition 
towards the content of utux still carries the belief that the spirits of the dead might 
cause certain effects over the Atayal people who have disobeyed certain gaga. For 
example, most Atayal people believe that women should not touch the hunting guns 
or be in the hunting teams as it would, as a result of breaking the gaga, ‘bring bad 
luck’, and modern Atayals still follow what they might call ‘superstitious’ customs 
before they go hunting. The word ‘hunting’ can never be mentioned on the day of 
hunting, and simple offering-making rituals are made by putting cigarettes or wine at 
the gateway to the mountain, as otherwise utux might feel offended by their intrusion 
and cause accidents during hunting. Nonetheless, the sacredness of utux is being 
reduced in the conception of modern Atayals. For example, the symbol of utux – the 
diamond-shaped patterns (see below) – no longer possess the religious meaning of 
‘the eyes of utux’, and the cultural – or religious – significance of the pattern, which 
was tattooed on the Atayals’ faces as the signature of both Atayal identity and the 
blessing of utux, has also been lost, as almost half of the villagers do not know what 
these patterns mean.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 In Bienjing village, the knowledge of the pattern has almost vanished in the age group of 30 to 70, 
which can be said to be the first generations after the KMT government took over the reign of Taiwan. 
Those under 30 usually have a better understanding of this knowledge, as the policy of aboriginal 
children’s education was modified in 1998 as a result of the cultural revitalisation movement of the 
aborigines in the late 1980s. 
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Figure 12, the diamond-shaped pattern in the Sawig tribe. This pattern used to be 
believed to be the ‘utux’s eye’ that was tattooed on the Atayals’ faces to ‘watch over’ 
the people, but now only functions as one of the cultural symbols to decorate the tribe 
or their own commodities to mark their ‘Atayalness’. 
    The idea of utux kayal experienced its first challenge with the Japanese 
authorities’ attempts to replace the Atayal people’s utux kayal with the Japanese 
Amaterasu-ōmikami, the kamisama. After years under the Japanese rule, the term 
kamisama was than appropritaed in the Atayal language to refer to the ultimate reality, 
instead of utux kayal. Such usage is especially pervasive amongst the elder villagers, 
as most of their childhoods were spent under the Japanese rule during the process of 
Japanisation:  
Participant YK: When I was a child, they (the Japanese) came 
and took the plate of kamisama to our house. They told us to 
worship it, and said it was our utux kayal. 
Participant SF: The Japanese told us to worship the plate of 
Amaterasu-ōmikami. It means ‘the god in the sky’ in Japanese, 
and some people would say it was like our utux kayal; but that 
was the Japanese’s God, (because) their gaga was different from 
ours. 
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Many elders could not tell me whether ‘kamisama’ means ‘utux’ or ‘utux kayal’, like 
the participant HK: 
Kamisama means God, the church says it is Jesus … I don’t 
know that much, but they (kamisama, utux and utux kayal) are 
all the same … it tells us not to do bad things, like stealing or 
lying … I don’t know what the difference is. They are just 
different names, but mean the same. 
    In terms of the effects of Japanisation on religious matters, the Atayals seemed 
not to change too much with regard to the structure of religious practice and how this 
structure functioned in their way of life. It is true that the means of Atayal identity 
construction – the facial tattoo – was deeply damaged due to the Japanese policies, 
and that some critical rituals, such as the setting of common symmetry and obon 
macri, became syncretised with the Japanese interventions in traditional customs. 
However, most of the participants also suggest that the form of their ‘practices of life’ 
under these changes generally remained the same, and was still similar to that of their 
ancestors in the old times. They indicated that even with the altered details, through 
the practice of rituals gaga was still the way the Atayals framed their identities 
‘ethnically’ and culturally. 
5.2 The second challenge: the coming of Christianity 
The second – and possibly the most critical – challenge to the Atayals’ relations with 
utux and utux kayal came with the arrival of Christianity in the late 1940s. Although 
the history of Christian missionaries in Taiwan could be dated back as early as the 
seventeenth century, and the first Presbyterian Church had been established in 1865, 
the early missionary work was mostly targeted on the Han Taiwanese and the 
indigenous people of the plain area (the ‘tamed savages’) rather than those living in 
the mountains.40 The exclusion of the ‘mountainous’ indigenous groups (the ‘wild 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Taiwan was first exposed to European power and culture during the Age of Discovery, when the 
Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) took over part of the lands in 
southern Taiwan (today’s Tainan) as their colony to operate trading business in East Asia in 1624. To 
strengthen the ruling power, the missionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church who came along with the 
company started their missionary work within the colonial territory – mostly with the ‘Plain Indigenous’ 
people and the relatively few Han immigrants from China. As Taiwan, as an island, was still an 
unclaimed territory, the Spaniards also took part of northern Taiwan (today’s Keelung) two years after 
the Dutch, to compete with the growing power of the East India Company. The Dominican Order of 
Spain established churches on the lands to provide services for the Spaniards, as well as to carry out 
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savages’) from the early missionary work was partly due to the difficulty of getting 
there and the risk of being beheaded when entering the ‘untamed’ territories (W. 
Campbell, 1915). During the Japanese period, it was because of the segregation policy 
of the ‘wild savages’ – as a means to better control the aboriginal societies and 
maintain the promotion of Shintoism – which kept the Christian missionaries from 
contacting the aboriginal groups (Fujii, 2001). However, in the late 1940s both 
Catholic missionaries associated with the KMT government and those of the 
Taiwanese Presbyterian Church were granted permission to proceed with their 
missionary activities in the indigenous areas. The Atayals of Bienjing village were not 
strangers to other belief systems, such as Japanese Shintoism or the belief system 
(also known as the Taiwanese folk religion) of the Hakka Han people, whom they 
would sometimes trade with in Dahu just a few miles away.41 However, these 
religious contacts did not compromise the Atayals’ faith in their way of life and how 
it related to their religious belief, not even with the Japanese religious intervention 
policy; and that, therefore, makes their later group conversion to Christianity worthy 
of interest.  
5.2.1 The arrival of Christianity in Bienjing village 
The first preacher to come to Bienjing village, in November 1947, was a Han 
Taiwanese from the Presbyterian Church. Chen Lan-Qi (陳蘭奇) came from the 
church based in Gongguan, Maioli. He began his missionary work in Wen-Shuei 
elementary school, mainly by teaching gospel songs and explaining their meaning 
(The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, n.d.). The missionary efforts, however, were not 
recognised by the villagers at the time. The failure of Chen’s missionary work was not 
only due to his Han identity – which made him an outsider to the Atayals – but also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
missionary work with the indigenous people in the neighbourhood. In 1642, Dutch troops drove the 
Spanish out of Taiwan. In 1662, the Dutch East India Company was forced to leave Taiwan after being 
defeated by the Chinese Ming loyalist Koxinga (Zheng Cheng-gong). Though Christian beliefs faded 
quickly in the wake of Koxinga’s rule over Taiwan, the influence of the Dutch missionary work was 
far-reaching; in some tribes of the plain indigenous people, there were even stories of how, once upon a 
time, they had ‘red-haired distant relatives’. 
41 Taiwanese folk religion is a syncretic belief originating from the southern provinces of China and 
combined with different ideas from Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and shamanism. The early 
immigrants from China brought their traditional religions, but the function and connotation of the 
deities and rituals were adapted to the local Taiwanese context along with the different needs and 
legends during the development of their cultivation (J. W. Liu, 1983; Wu, Yung-Mong and Hsieh, 
2005). 
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because he represented a radical religious mindset that was incongruent with the 
traditions and customs of the Atayals, as he claimed that believing in utux instead of 
in Jesus was an evil act. A few months later, in February 1948, the family of Liu 
Guang-Nan were the first to be baptised, marking the start of religious conversion in 
the village. The Liu family moved to the city several years ago. However, according 
to the participant Gaisang – one of the early villagers who converted to the Church – 
Liu was, at that time, seen as ‘a bit weird’ (his ‘abnormal’ actions probably symptoms 
of a psychological disorder) even before his conversion, which discredited the belief 
itself. Nonetheless, it still encouraged 18 of the villagers to be baptised when the first 
Presbyterian Church of the village – Dabilas (the name of the place) Church – was 
founded in Valus in May 1949 (The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, n.d.). It is worth 
noting that these 18 converts were members of the same few families who chose to 
follow the decision to convert made by the man of the house: in the Atayal culture, 
the members of each family had to follow the decision of one male leader, and any 
refusal to do so would be seen as a challenge to authority. This relation between the 
family and its male leader also applied to that between a qalang and the tumux, which 
became the key to passing the values on to successive generations. The power 
structure behind such a pattern of conversion helps to explain why, even though most 
of the men responsible for making their families convert to the Christian faith have 
either died or moved away, Christianity remains the dominant faith within these 
families (and the village) today. Nonetheless, the participant Gaisang, one of the 18 
early disciples, made the following statement on his conversion: 
I thought what they (the preachers) said made every sense … they 
told us not to steal, not to lie, and to be a good man, so I 
believed … we didn’t have beliefs before, only the words left 
from the ancestors, and what they said was just like the words of 
the ancestors. 
This kind of ‘sameness’ between the traditional Atayal belief and Christianity was 
also observed by Shu-yuan Yang (2009) in the Taiwanese Bunun aboriginal group’s 
conversion to Christianity. It indicates that the conversion to Christianity, as Yang 
(2009) pointed out, was rather a reconfirmation of the Atayal people being moral 
persons, instead of coming from the systematic rationalisation of their religious belief 
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(Bellah, 1964; Geertz, 1973a; Weber, 1993).42 The emphasis on the ethical continuity 
between the traditional religious world and Christianity during the conversion was 
also seen amongst the Atayals who converted to Catholicism later. 
    In 1949, as well as the Presbyterian Dabilas Church being established, many 
Catholic priests came to Taiwan with the KMT government. Due to the defeat of the 
KMT (Kuo-Min Party) by the Chinese Communist Party during the civil war, 
Catholic priests were expelled from China and chose to continue their missionary 
activities in Taiwan, especially the indigenous areas. Initially these Catholic 
missionaries distributed material aid provided by the U.S. Catholic Relief Service. 
Such aid not only helped the people in Taiwan with their supply of materials, such as 
flour and dried milk, but also attracted many to become actively involved in church 
activities in Bienjing village – in the early years, Catholicism was even nicknamed 
‘the religion of flour’ in the village. In 1955, a Catholic priest from Maryknoll church 
came to the village with another Atayal missionary, Lin Jin-shuei, as the translator to 
conduct missionary work and distribute material aid.43 Although most of the villagers 
still saw Christianity as a foreign product, the Presbyterian Church’s previous efforts 
meant that the villagers were no longer strangers to Catholicism. The Catholic priest’s 
attitude towards the traditional Atayal culture, however, was rather different from the 
Presbyterian one. Unlike the Presbyterian Church’s missionary approach, the Catholic 
Church was quite open to the Atayal traditions – as participant HSF put it, they ‘never 
speak ill of the past Atayal traditions, not like the Presbyterian ones’. This openness 
of the Catholic Church is not new in the history of conversion across the world. As 
Fenella Cannell (2006) and Pamela Stewart (2009) have pointed out, out of the 
experiences of syncretising Christian and other European religious rituals, the 
Catholic Church has developed the ‘encompassment theory’ (P. J. Stewart & 
Strathern, 2009) to adapt to different religious and cultural structures, as long as ‘the 
presence of a transcendent deity … is acknowledged’ by the converters. The Catholic 
Church’s open attitude, along with the material advantages they provided, soon 
attracted HSF of Narima – who was considered a young, intelligent Atayal man who 
had finished his study in the Japanese school – to be the first Atayal Catholic in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The idea of ‘rationalisation’ in relation to the conversion to Christianity derives from Weber’s 
distinction between traditional religion and world religion, where the latter is seen as possessing a 
higher level of rationalisation. 
43 Maryknoll encompasses three organisations from the States that are part of the Roman Catholic 
Church and undertake overseas missionary activity. 
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village and its neighbouring Atayal communities. HSF gave his reason for being a 
Catholic as: 
He (the preacher) told me many things, the history and doctrines 
of Catholicism; the history of Catholicism can be traced back to 
thousands of years ago, and so could ours. They say the world 
was created by a God in the sky, and so did ours. I found them 
(Catholic creeds) just like what we Atayals practised, especially 
the Ten Commandments – they fit what our ancestors have told us 
for a long time. 
With this belief and the material aid from the Catholic Church, HSF turned to the 
tumux of different tribes in the front mountain area to share his excitement at finding 
this combination of abundant material life and a religion that fits the philosophy of the 
Atayals. ‘Especially butter,’ HSF added, ‘when I brought butter to the elders in the 
village and fried it with vegetables, they were all very surprised that you can taste 
beef in the vegetables, and I told them it was from the Church.’ At that time, the 
villagers had just gone through the chaos of the transfer of ruling powers, when all 
activities were temporarily left in a state of ‘anarchy’, and thus the material support 
attracted many of the Atayals, including some of the Presbyterian Atayal Christians, 
to go to the Catholic church and participate in missionary activities. Once the material 
aid had got the attention of the villagers, HSF went to the houses of local elites, such 
as tumux, elders, former Atayal police officers and those who were deemed ‘heroic’ 
as they had survived the Second World War, to persuade them to believe in 
Catholicism, for he knew that once these leading figures had agreed, the rest of the 
villagers would follow. This approach of convincing the ‘leading figures’ in the 
village showed how the power structure of the Atayals influenced their ‘way of life’. 
HSF’s personal testimony soon became his missionary statement to the local elites. 
His efforts to convince those elites to convert to Christianity were revealed to me later 
through a casual conversation with a group of both Catholic and Presbyterian 
villagers, when the participant SYK – the current tumux in Valus, whose father was 
first a Catholic then a Presbyterian church member – told me that his father believed 
that joining the church (whether Catholic or Presbyterian) ‘protects and passes down’ 
Atayal traditions. Everyone else agreed with him, and they were convinced that their 
‘cultural traditions’ – gaga – would be even less distinguishable under a modern 
society that ‘is dominated by the government and economy’ without the churches, and 
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that is why ‘we aboriginal people all believe in Christianity’. 
5.2.2 The social factors of conversion 
The account above has to be reviewed in greater detail and in its wider social context. 
Constituted by the three tribes of Narima, Valus and Sawig, Bienjing village was not 
a unified administrative system before the KMT government took over Taiwan (Taian 
Township Office, 1994). Although from 1895 to 1945 the people in this ‘village’ had 
to follow the Japanese law, which was enforced by the Japanese police, the 
administrative system was still based on each tribe, the tumux would still have the 
power to run their own business and manage their people, and the necessity of 
contacting the Han people was primarily economic (S.-H. Wang, 2003). By 1950, the 
Bienjing area was named an administrative ‘village’, which not only officially took 
away the autonomy of each tribe and replaced it with different levels of administrative 
heads, but also meant that they could no longer be as self-reliant and detached from 
the Han – which had become the majority in the new ‘nation-state’. They were not 
required to be members of a certain ‘race’ as the Japanese required them to be, and 
they could not only be tayan and follow the gaga as they always had; they had to be 
‘citizens’ – which was never taught in the gaga – of the nation, above all the other 
ethnic or tribal identities. On the other hand, in the 1950s, the villagers were facing a 
rather critical economic situation, as their traditional crops (such as corns, taros and 
bamboo shoots) were not competitive enough in the market, and those harvests could 
only be used to meet their survival needs rather than making money to conduct 
commercial consumptions. One other factor that influenced the villagers’ social 
conditions was the coal mine on the other side of the village, across the valley. Before 
the mine was flooded and abandoned due to Typhoon Gloria in 1963, the modern 
entertainment facilities, such as cinemas and pool tables, had made it the busiest place 
around the village. However, since these facilities required quite a significant sum of 
money to access, they became a symbol of discrimination to the villagers. Many of 
the villagers were teased by the Han coal workers, who would say something like 
‘aboriginal people are just too poor to have rice, and can only afford sweet potatoes’ 
(participant JWS). Meanwhile, due to the need for transportation from the coal mine 
to the city centre, the increasing communications between the village and downtown 
Dahu also led the villagers not only to know a lot more about the social lives of the 
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Han Chinese, but also to be excluded from them. 
    These factors led to a change in status relations between the Han society and the 
Bienjing Atayal. The villagers became not only an objectively marginalised group in 
Taiwanese society, but also a subjectively marginalised group in the nation-state, as 
they became aware of themselves as the ‘minority’. Thus the villagers recalled their 
lives at that time as those ‘rough days’ of ‘being poor’ when they were often ‘mocked 
by the Hakka people’. Some stole or felt dejected because they were having ‘hard 
times’, which was a reflection of the economical/social gap being recognised by the 
villagers, of the conflict of identities that was being felt by these increasingly 
marginalised Atayals. In the history of religious conversion, such social problems 
usually created the background, or the conditions, for people to seek help from a new 
religion or religious groups. For example, in his study of the Mexican Indians 
converting to Protestantism from the folk Catholicism, Turner (1978) noticed how 
poverty, caused by the Mexican government’s land policy and the social 
discrimination against the Tzeltal community, became the trigger of their conversion. 
Quentin Gausset’s (1999) research on the Wawa and Kwanja peoples’ choices of 
religious conversion in the Republic of Cameroon also suggested the importance of 
social problems. In Cameroon, Gausset (1999) argued, as the traditional way of life of 
the Wawa and Kwanja peoples was challenged by the development of modernisation, 
the Wawa people’s choice of Islam and the Kwanja people’s choice of Christianity 
was not motivated by material gain, since they did not obtain any resources by 
converting, but rather was driven by the need to escape ‘the traditional “state of 
ignorance” and higher social status that connected to these new religions’. Cornelia 
Kammerer’s (1998) study of the Akha highlanders in Burma and Thailand also 
showed a strong connection between religious conversion and social conditions, 
which was similar to the Atayals’ cultural and social backgrounds. Just like the gaga 
to the Atayal culture, the Akha people’s Zah was the core concept that regulated the 
Akha social norms, identity and moral standards (Kammerer, 1998). However, the 
social transitions that came with the development of modernity – the change of 
economical patterns and the subsequent inability to purchase ritual requirements, as 
well as the change in knowledge patterns from a familial to a national system – 
resulted in the loss of the Zah traditions amongst the younger generations and created 
the need for new religious rituals to cope with the new lifestyles. Although, in 
Kammerer’s (1998) study, one of the main reasons for the Akha people’s conversion 
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to Christianity was the preservation of the forms of the essential religious rituals of 
Zah that kept the Akha identity, these social conditions still reflected the push and 
pull forces being played out in the act of conversion, especially among the socially 
marginalised groups (Hawwa, 2000).  
    The push and pull forces, however, are not just social, but also psychological. 
The idea of the self to many scholars is constructed by both one’s subjective 
awareness and the perceived social attitude (Heelas, 1981), and both subjective and 
objective awareness are in a dialectic interactive relation (Cooley, 1998; Mead, 1934b; 
Shaffer, 2005; Yeung & Martin, 2003). Jacques Lacan, in his mirror theory of the 
‘self’ (1977), exemplified this argument with the formation of the ego of infants: as 
infants (those up to 18 months old) are not able to walk or stand on their own, they 
usually require other people’s help to see themselves in a mirror. Infants at this stage 
cannot recognise and distinguish themselves from others in the mirror as they have 
never ‘seen’ themselves before, and they have to be helped to understand that the 
figure that moves simultaneously with them in the mirror is actually the 
‘looking-glass self’ (Cooley, 1998). Nonetheless, this image of the self of infants is 
the self out of ‘imagination’; infants ‘see’ themselves in a place where they are not 
actually ‘there’, thus making this idea of a ‘complete self’, paradoxically, established 
on misrecognising ‘the other’ as ‘the self’ (Lacan, 1977, 1978). In other words, the 
construction of the self is a process that always corresponds with the ‘gaze’ from 
outside our bodies, and therefore such recognition of our selves is always alienated, 
objectified and misrecognised (Lacan, 1977). This ‘gaze of the Other’ on a greater 
level, Lacan further stated, could be said to be the objectified knowledge or culture of 
our selves through which the image of ourselves becomes ‘visible’, and could be used 
as the reference of our identity (such as the knowledge of ethnicity in the national 
education, as I stated above). In Lacan’s theory, because every subject’s awareness of 
his own being always corresponds with the gaze of ‘the Other’, how we ‘see’ 
ourselves – that is, how we choose a particular objectified image over others – is 
dependent on ‘the field of the Other’ (Lacan, 1978:84). The way in which we perceive 
ourselves is critically determined by the social and historical conditions. The push and 
pull forces are not, therefore, the absolute social forces that would necessarily 
transform the pre-Christian lifestyles into modernity.44 Rather, they only become the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For example, an Atayal community in Smagus, Hsinchu, exists in Taiwan with a Kibbutz-like 
lifestyle. Though Smagus also engages in and encourages tourism to increase its income, the whole 
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forces when the subject ‘encounters’ the imagined gaze – that is, as I suggested earlier, 
when the Atayals became ‘aware’ of their marginalised social status. 
    The conversion to Catholicism at a time of desperation, instead of to the 
Presbyterian Church beforehand, also took place under such conditions. On the one 
hand, the Atayals’ awareness of losing their identity in being marginalised – 
geographically, economically and culturally – from the Han-dominated nation-state 
pushed them to seek cultural, emotional and financial support from the religious 
group. On the other, the Catholic Church also provided material aid and a sense of 
connection and belonging to the greater, ‘social’ group of Christians. This sense of 
belonging connects not only all the Atayals in Taiwanese society, but also the whole 
Christian-aborigine community in Taiwan, and even ‘Christendom’ across the world. 
To the villagers, Christianity offered an alternative way to reconcile the social, 
economical and identification conflicts between the Atayals and the Han society – the 
synonym of the nation-state. In other words, the villagers’ first group conversion to 
the Catholic Church instead of the Presbyterian one, from the social perspective, was 
possibly due to the fact that the social conditions favoured their ‘revivalist application 
to new historical circumstances’ (Hefner, 1993: 18). These circumstances are not only 
‘historical’, but also social and psychological, involving the subjective consistency 
between the inner/individual and outer/social identities. 
5.2.3 The moral demand of conversion 
To pursue consistency in identity through conversion, as Hefner (1993:17) put it, 
‘need not reformulate one’s understanding of the ultimate conditions of existence, but 
it always involves commitment to a new kind of moral authority and a new or 
reconceptualised social identity’. In this case, the reconceptualisation of the church 
provided the moral authority, and their social identity can be revealed through the 
ways in which older villagers understand Christianity:  
Sachiko (age 71): We did not believe in anything before 
(Christianity), we were just making a living, and following what 
our ancestors have told us about how to live … and then we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
community still runs on a self-sufficient system and has its own administrative structure.  
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believe in the church, what they taught us about not to lie and not 
to steal is just like our gaga, they are the same. 
Hanako (age 73): No, we did not have faith (religion) before 
(Christianity), but the principles of our gaga and the churches are 
the same. The churches just taught us how to worship, that is all. 
    Such cognitions of the Christian Atayals’ current belief in Christianity are the 
most common ones amongst the villagers. Meanwhile, most of the villagers described 
Christianity as ‘the same’ as the ‘way of life’ they have been taught for centuries, and 
stated that the churches are only there to tell them ‘how to worship’. Their knowledge 
of Christianity is almost limited to the ethical aspects that fit their codes of conduct. 
For most of the villagers (even those who go to church regularly), the only difference 
between the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches is that ‘they have different ways of 
doing worship’. However, what ‘worship’ actually means to the villagers, in the 
context of the current faith in Christianity, is rather mundane. For Presbyterian 
members, ‘worshipping’ means going to church, singing gospel songs (in the Atayal 
language) and listening to the priest explaining how to live their life righteously, 
whereas for Catholic villagers, ‘worshipping’ refers to the ceremonies the Father 
holds every Sunday (even though they may not understand the reasons for holding 
such ceremonies), and listening to the Father telling stories with moral meanings 
about life. Many of the older villagers – who are the most regular churchgoers – are 
even found to be observing and following what others do in the service. When asked 
about such ‘following’ behaviour in the services, one of them responded with: ‘I 
never understood the ceremony, but I know the priest is here to teach us the 
regulations of life.’ Therefore, although the villagers do not always remember the 
stories in the Bible or understand when they should close their eyes and say ‘Amen’, 
they still see church as the place to teach and ‘pass down’ the connotations of gaga, 
the ‘way of life’ that connects them to the church.  
    The only exception to this understanding is the Bethel Church, located in Sawig, 
which is part of the Pentecostalism that values the use of spiritual gifts. Bethel Church 
was founded by a previous Presbyterian member in Sawig a few years ago, who 
claimed that he had a command from Jesus to establish the church, and brought along 
his family – who are the only members of the church now – from the Presbyterian 
church. Most of the Sawig people view the church sceptically, as they have never 
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experienced these kinds of ‘spiritual gifts’ and can’t explain them with reference to 
any of their previous religious experiences. Some even described it as having ‘no 
other aims but to take money from its people’. Others said the church ‘was based on 
imagination’ and disapproved of miraculous statements. The suspicion towards the 
Christian spiritual experience, and the lack of theological knowledge of the church, 
however, also provided evidence of the villagers’ conversion not being based on the 
‘spiritual support’ of Christianity.45 Instead, from participant HSF’s testimony of how 
the Ten Commandments was key to his conversion, to Sachiko and Hanako’s view of 
Christianity as being ‘the same’ as the ‘principles’ of life and the moral guidance in 
the old gaga, as well as the researches of the Atayal historians, we see not only how 
the Atayal people perceived the gaga as a whole system of ethics (rather than sacred 
and profane as discussed in previous chapters), but also how the Ten Commandments’ 
‘universality’ and ‘foundational priority’ (H. Smith, 1991: 288) connected the 
traditional Atayal world to the Christian one. 
    The fact that ethical connection was the main reason for the villagers’ 
conversion to Christianity can also be recognised when we see how the Presbyterian 
Church reacted to the growing number of followers in the Catholic Church. By the 
late 1950s, the Catholic Church had already baptised more than 200 people – a third 
of Bienjing villagers.46 This number of people indicated the success of the Catholic 
Church’s missionary policy compared to that of the Presbyterian Church. Although 
the current priest in the Dabilas church admits that their present ‘aboriginal theology’ 
is the result of years of working on the balance between the ‘culture’ and the ‘faith’, 
the church only started to revise their theological interpretation – that is, 
acknowledging that utux kayal was, in fact, in the Atayals’ knowledge, the Christian 
God – after the Catholic Church ‘stole away’ (as one of the participants put it) the 
hearts of the villagers. During this period, the Presbyterian priests gave up the 
previous approach of claiming the traditional Atayal belief as ‘false’, and instead 
focused on how the moral values are actually ‘the same’ as Christianity: 
ZG: They (the Presbyterian Church) started to use our (Catholic) 
missionary methods after they saw we had got so many people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 ‘Spiritual support’ here is defined as the ‘support perceived in the context of an individual’s 
relationship with God, focusing on perceptions and experiences of God’s personal love, presence, 
constancy, guidance, and availability for the self’ (Maton, 1989).  
46 The population of the village at the time was about 700 people (source: The Bienjing Police 
Station). 
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believing in the church … Before that, they used to say that our 
rituals were deals with devils, and it was only after then they decided 
to do what we had been doing all along, saying that our traditions 
share the same spirit as Christianity … and then people started to 
believe them as well. 
From this, we can see that the later success of the Presbyterian Church in Bienjing 
village was achieved by claiming that Atayal traditions share ‘the same spirit’ as 
Christianity. By ‘the same spirit’, another participant gave a more accurate definition: 
ZDC: ‘the same’ means that the standard of conduct as a tayan in 
the gaga is the same as what is written in the Bible. 
By believing that the gaga and Christianity are, essentially, ethically ‘the same’, the 
villagers could retain their tayan identity by practising their gaga in church as well as 
receiving resources to help them better adapt to modern lifestyles – in which they 
found themselves being marginalised.   
5.2.4 The symbolic construction of conversion  
The conversion to Christian belief in Bienjing village was a relatively peaceful and 
quick process. It did not encounter any real resistance except for the ‘observation 
period’ – as it was called by Gaisang – during the early stage of the Presbyterian 
mission. Whether the villagers belong to the Catholic or Presbyterian Church, they 
now usually describe their attitude towards their Christian belief as ‘how to live life in 
a good way’. Behind this general description, they would usually add a comment such 
as ‘the aboriginal tribes which converted to Christianity usually have a better life than 
those which did not’ (participant JWS). This kind of statement normally comes with 
the impression of Christianity – not just Catholicism during the early years – as being 
representative of the successful and ‘advanced’ modern society, able to provide 
substantial forms of support. These churches were not only able to provide all kinds 
of resources that fit the different needs of the locals (such as day-care centres for both 
kids and elders, or small trips for church members), but the ability to mobilise the 
church members also made the churches the channels of social resources, making 
churches the ‘replacement community’ (Devalle, 1992) of the Atayals. For example, 
whenever new government policy or welfare initiatives, promotions, or other 
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spontaneous communal activities were held in the village, these churches would serve 
not only as the venue, but also as the information distributor for these gatherings. The 
‘good way’ of life, in addition to the ethical values that have been passed down in the 
gaga for generations, thus also refers to certain imaginary economic promises that 
reflect the villagers’ impressions of Christianity. In many cases, ‘going to church’ 
becomes the connection with resources (be they people or materials), and the 
‘churchgoers’ would usually be the first to be informed of news, which might enable 
them to obtain more resources and thereby gain better socio-economic status. This is 
the substantial form of what ‘better’ means to the participants, which also 
strengthened the connection between these economic upper classes in the village and 
their churches, as well as reinforcing their belief in such a ‘way of life’. 
    Instead of assuming that such a connection between church and the ‘better life’ 
(substantial advantage) reflects the understanding of the villagers towards Christianity, 
it is, in Lacanian terms, rather a ‘fantasy screen’ (Nusselder, 2013) of the villagers 
reflected in Christianity. As I illustrated earlier, how we ‘see’ ourselves is the 
projection of the ‘imagined gaze’, which is constructed through imaging how ‘people’ 
see us in ‘the field of the Other’. The subject, however, is usually ‘unaware of’ this 
‘awareness’ – just as the Atayal participant could not be aware that the ‘poor’ days in 
the past were based on the value of others. To explain the mechanism of the unaware 
awareness of the imagined gaze, Lacan (1978) proposed the idea of the ‘screen’ – 
which ‘protects us from, yet forces an encounter with’ (Marks, 2009) the desires and 
trauma during the engagement of others. In the case of the Atayals, these were the 
desire for a ‘better life’ and the trauma of being looked down upon by the major Han 
society. The screen, therefore, is the ‘locus of mediation’ (Lacan, 1978: 107) not only 
in establishing the authority of the other that enables us to ‘look’ at ourselves from a 
certain perspective (the field), but also to mirror the representation of ourselves so 
that we could see how the other is seeing us (see figure 13).  
 
 
 
Figure 13, The relation of the gaze, the screen and the subject. (From The four 
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis: The seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI. 
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1978: 106) 
    Through this ‘imagined’ Christianity, the defects in the villagers’ reality – such 
as the conflicts of identity and the depression of being socially and economically 
marginalised – could be smoothly and consistently dispelled. As Stewart and 
Strathern (2009) suggest, the combination of the material and spiritual fields in the 
native religions of pre-Christian societies would also affect how the converts viewed 
the idea of religion in the modern context and also influence their expectations of 
whether the religion to which they were converting could meet both their ethical and 
material needs. In this view, the Christianity of the Atayals becomes the fantasmatic 
supplement that hides those defects of reality, the ideological supplement to keep their 
day-to-day world unharmed from the conflicts in reality.. Such fantasy does not 
construct itself only out of social conditions, but ‘consists of the order of images and 
that of meaning’ (Nusselder, 2013: 2), in which it is ‘more than a mirror-image or 
reflection of the real: it is also a (symbolic) construction of it’ (Nusselder, 2013: 2). 
This perception/imagination of Christianity, which in signifying the religion shares 
the ethics of the gaga (and is approximately equivalent to the understanding of the 
gaga of the villagers), thus also involves a series of symbolic constructions that 
transfer the Atayals’ recognition of the world from the gaga to the church. 
    The very first symbolic reconstruction of the Atayals’ belief system lies in 
epistemological, ontological and cosmological translation, which is also the ultimate 
matter of conversion in every culture (Robert W. Hefner, 1993b). A majority of my 
research participants described the time before the coming of Christianity as a time 
when they ‘did not believe in any religion, but just wanted to make a living’, as is 
taught in the gaga. As HSF commented, when he first heard about the ‘principles’ of 
Catholicism he found them ‘just like our beliefs, especially the Ten Commandments’. 
He went on to explain that there was a close fit with an idea in the gaga that made 
him believe that Christianity and the Atayals’ world view were ‘the same’: ‘there is a 
god above in the sky, who created all the beings in the world’. A Presbyterian Church 
pastor later also used an example from the Bible to explain their missionary approach, 
and how the Atayal people accepted it: 
Men of Athens, I perceive in all things you are very religious; for 
as I was passing through and considering the objects of your 
worship, I even found an altar with this inscription: TO THE 
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UNKNOWN GOD. Therefore, the One whom you worship without 
knowing, Him I proclaim to you. God, who made the world and 
everything in it, since He is Lord of heaven and earth, does not 
dwell in temples made with hands. Nor is He worshipped with 
men’s hands, as though He needed anything, since He gives to all 
life, breath, and all things (Acts 17:22 – 25). 
The practice resulting from an appreciation of this section of the Bible in Bienjing 
village was to give the utux kayal – the unknown God in the sky whom the 
Atayals believed created the world – a name: Jesus/God the Father. To the 
Bienjing villagers, utux kayal has always been an abstract idea, which exists 
without physical or even spiritual form. ‘It’ created the world, nature, and gave 
life – even the ‘afterlife’ of utux – to every being on the planet, as well as 
implanting wisdom in the ancestors’ minds to establish the right ‘way of life’. The 
gaga that outlined prohibited acts, such as ‘do not steal’, ‘do not commit adultery’ 
and ‘do not covet others’ belongings’, and even the idea that ‘the mighty power of 
the sky will give rewards to those who follow gaga and punish those who have 
contempt for the rules that have been made’, had been valued as the core aspects 
in the lives of tayan. When these core values and the idea of utux kayal were 
reflected (and highlighted by the missionaries, especially in HSF’s experience) in 
the Ten Commandments, a shared ‘identity’ between the Christian God and utux 
kayal thus became plausible, since these were the most crucial principles shared 
by both belief systems.  
    The other vital translation – or transformation – that Christianised the 
traditional Atayal belief was the re-formation of the idea of hongu utux (the bridge 
to the ancestors):  
Sachiko: We used to say that when people passed away, their 
souls would be judged at the rainbow (which is the embodiment 
of the bridge to the ancestors). If they were good persons – ‘good 
persons’ meaning that they lived the right way of life, no stealing, 
no lying – then they could pass over the bridge to the other side of 
the ancestors. If they were not good while alive, then their souls 
would fall off the bridge, and be eaten by a big monster … but 
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then we knew that rainbows are not the bridges our ancestors 
thought. When the church came, they said that there is heaven and 
hell, where the good and bad people would be, then we knew that 
saying that the rainbow is the bridge to the ancestors is a 
superstition. 
HSF: When I was running around different villages to tell them 
about Catholicism, many people would ask me questions … such 
as heaven, I told them it is like our ancestors said about the bridge 
of the rainbow: people who had done good deeds would go to 
heaven, and those who had not would go to hell … only the 
rainbow has nothing to do with people’s death – if you were in 
school then you would know, it is just a natural phenomenon like 
rain or the sun … I told them there are places like heaven for 
people to go after death, just like what our ancestors have 
believed, but the belief about the rainbow was only our 
imagination. So they knew that Catholicism, (as) a religion that is 
believed by hundreds of thousands of people around the world 
and has been there for thousands of years, is just like what our 
ancestors have believed all the time. 
With the ethical connection being confirmed, and the view of life being 
transformed in Christianity, it was thus reasonable for the villagers to believe that 
Christianity actually stood for their ancient belief. Christianity was thus confirmed 
as a more ‘truthful’ version of the Atayals’ belief, and their doubts about certain 
ideas could be perfectly explained as imaginative human add-ons (superstitions). 
These reinterpretations of the Atayal belief system justified the renaming of utux 
kayal as the Christian God. Consequently, this utux kayal, now with the look of 
the Lord, would have to be known and worshipped in a Christian way. 
    The modern names of utux kayal – Jesus, God the Father and Lord – solved 
the problem of the Atayals not knowing the name of or understanding how to 
worship this ultimate reality. With the names given to this high God, and the 
people (missionaries) who had the knowledge of how to ‘respect and please’ this 
utux kayal, the Atayals came to know its method of worship: going to church on 
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Sunday. However, as the early missionary approach was to attract people to come 
to church without much need of Christian knowledge, and the process of this 
worship of utux kayal was always held and led by the clergies, most of the early 
Christian villagers were never required to learn the Christian doctrines or show 
how much they understood. Such a religious environment made the participants 
see ‘going to church on Sunday’ as worshipping utux kayal itself. Whether it was 
the gospel singing in the Presbyterian church, or the Mass that ‘has been practised 
for thousands of years’ in the Catholic Church, what the churchgoers had to do to 
conduct this worship was simply to ‘be in the church’ and do whatever the priests 
asked them to do. That is why, in the case of a marriage between two families 
from different churches, for example, the wife would see no problem in following 
the husband’s church in terms of belief, as ‘going to church’ itself had become the 
form of worshipping utux kayal.  
    However, when the Christian God became utux kayal – the ultimate reality of 
the Atayal belief – and the whole belief system of the Atayal tradition was 
transformed and fitted into Christianity, the core ideas of the utux and gaga in the 
Atayal culture were also being reconceptualised, since, as Roger Lohmann (2003) 
put it, ‘religious conversion involves discontinuing or severing with certain 
supernatural beings in favor of others’. The ‘others’ here is exactly utux kayal, the 
Christian God. By taking Christianity as a ‘better’ version – materially – of the 
Atayal belief, the gaga – the religious vocabulary that had previously been 
assumed to be left by the ancestors (utux) – was then believed to be actually from 
the Christian God with the proof of the Bible. Following that, utux cannot be the 
subject who punishes and rewards the people; it can only be the God of 
Christianity that has the power to do so. This fundamental Christian theology, 
therefore, marked the very first rupture not just of the relationship between the 
Atayals and utux, but also of the sacred status of utux, as we saw earlier in the 
zhulingji. 
 5.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter I began by looking at the very first ‘modern’ implications of the 
Japanese period for the Atayal people. These included subsuming the aboriginal 
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peoples into the ‘national system’ by forcibly teaching Japanese language, changing 
the labour value from usable to exchangeable (for instance, the Atayal people started 
to ‘buy’ daily materials by cutting down woods for the Japanese government), the 
introduction of the ‘modern’ Shinto belief, and, of course, the planning of residential 
settlements. Many of the Atayal traditions were also banned or altered during this 
time, which influenced the forms of certain rituals thereafter. However, Shintoism 
was never taken seriously, even with the help of other political strategies, and the 
elderly villagers also claimed that life in the Japanese period did not change much 
from the time before, and, for the most part, the relationship between utux (though 
sometimes it is also called ‘kamisama’ in Japanese) and the Atayal remained the same. 
Utux was still present in every person’s body, as well as alongside the Atayal people 
to watch over their lives. Generally speaking, the practice and meaning of gaga in 
Atayals’ daily lives operated in the traditional way.  
    The substantial change in the relationship between utux and the Atayal people 
happened through the conversion to Christianity. With the lifting of the missionary 
ban after the KMT government took over Taiwan, the Presbyterian and Catholic 
Churches began to expand their missions into this land of the pagans. The early years 
of the Presbyterian mission did not amount to much as, on the one hand, the villagers 
failed to understand the fundamental doctrines, whilst on the other there was no 
reason for the villagers to change their lifestyles, which had allegedly lasted for 
thousands of years. However, following their increased contact with the Han people 
in the ensuing years, the Atayal people’s self-image began to change as they realised 
the marginal social and economical status they occupied in the society. In this context, 
the coming of Catholicism – along with the material aid it could provide – started to 
gain interest from the villagers, whilst the missionaries’ emphasis on the similar moral 
ground between the Atayal traditions and Christianity gradually gained the trust of the 
people. Not long after the Catholic Church attracted more than two hundred villagers 
to convert in the late 1950s, the Presbyterian Church adjusted their missionary 
approach so that they also focused on ethical similarities, and the Bienjing villagers 
started to go to their churches as well.  
    However, we should note that since this ‘conversion’ to Christianity would not in 
itself bring any actual benefit to the villagers – as everyone would receive the same 
materials whether they converted or not – the Bienjing Atayals’ conversion to 
Christianity was rather a symbolic action. To the villagers, converting to Christianity 
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not only meant that they could gain a ‘better’ socio-economic status in the modern 
society, but was also a reconfirmation of being ‘moral persons’. In the later 
paragraphs I also demonstrated how this symbolic action of conversion required the 
reconstruction of the symbolic system in the Atayal view of the world. During this 
reconstruction, the once unnamed utux kayal was known as the Christian God and the 
gaga became the Bible, while the utux, which was deprived of its divinity and of its 
sense of connecting these ideas to the Atayal people, suffered the most fundamental 
change in meaning. We do not yet have a picture of how utux kayal took over the 
divine role of utux, and how utux became the ‘souls’ of the deceased – instead of the 
traditional ancestor-god – in the modern zhulingji. These matters will be investigated 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
The Beginning of the Secular  
in the Atayal World 
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In the last chapter I focused on the Bienjing Atayals’ conversion to Christianity and 
how that changed the religious structure – and thereby the sacred order of the world – 
in the traditional Atayal culture. The conversion to Christianity changed the 
relationship between utux, utux kayal and the Atayal people, and this chapter will 
discuss the transition of the meanings and practices of gaga under Christian 
influences, as well as the development of the relationship between utux kayal, utux 
and the Atayals. Most of all, I will demonstrate how the conversion to Christianity 
resulted in a radical change in the concept of the self, as well as creating the 
‘secularisation’ of the once sacred Atayal world. 
    As I pointed out at the beginning of this thesis, the idea of ‘secularisation’ has 
been challenged by different studies from different perspectives. From the classic 
notion of the decline of religion along with the ‘rationalisation’ in the modern world 
(E Durkheim, 1961; Weber, 1946), and the decreasing need for religious guidance 
over daily matters (Finke, 1992; Hadden, 1987; Stark, 2000), to the retreat of religion 
from public into personal spheres (Casanova, 1994), the various religious activities 
and conditions not only made the secularisation debate even more intense, but also 
cancelled its universality of indicating the relationship between modernity and 
religious phenomena. Despite the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ (Davie, 2002; 
Eisenstadt, 2000) and Peter Berger’s (2012) notion of ‘plurality’ being proposed to 
solve the linear view of history in the previous discussions of secularisation by 
suggesting that modernisation in different cultural and social contexts would result in 
different religious transitions, the arguments on secularisation still failed to reach an 
agreement.  
    In the debate on the ‘secularisation’ or ‘sacralisation’ of the modern world, 
meanwhile, N. J. Demerath (2007) argued that these two phenomena, instead of being 
in opposed binary positions, were rather in a dialectical relationship. By that, 
Demerath means that not only can the two concepts not be perceived and understood 
without one another, but each phenomenon is also the counteraction of the other 
(Demerath, 2007). Similarly, Terry Eagleton (2014) in his book Culture and the 
Death of God also talked about the swing of religious and secular powers in the 
modern world. But rather than treating the two concepts as being in an opposite or 
dialectic relationship, Eagleton saw the sacred experience of religion, to put it briefly, 
as having shifted to the belief in ‘culture’. The argument of secularisation, therefore, 
is treated flexibly by Eagleton, for he looks not at the ‘religious phenomenon’ itself, 
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but rather at the ‘religious-like experiences’ that created the sense of sacredness. 
Although such a ‘shift’ of sacredness from religion to culture did not happen among 
the Atayal people, the idea of the shift of sacred experiences will be applied in this 
study to analyse the ‘secularisation’ of the Atayal world.  
6.1 The Christianised gaga and rituals 
As stated in chapter three, gaga has been used to refer not only to the customs and the 
set of cultural characters, but also to the ‘religious’ origin that framed the social 
identities in different Atayal tribes. Therefore, how gaga is represented in Christianity 
would also have influenced the formation of the villagers’ social identities. As gaga 
was the ‘way of life’, it could vary in different tribes in the same way that rituals with 
the same purpose and function would be held differently in various Atayal groups. 
Although the scope of the gaga between a niqan and a qalang changed under the 
settlement policy in the Japanese period, in Bienjing village referring to gaga as a 
way of identifying one’s social identity before the conversion to Christianity would 
still have been consistent with the scope of one’s ‘tribe’ (qalang). Meanwhile, as gaga 
in each tribe determined how rituals should be held and how life should be lived, it 
also shaped the knowledge of the world, as well as constructing the differences 
between the self/we and others in the minds of tribe members.  
    Taking Bienjing village as an example, if you had said ‘isu ga magal su gaga na 
nanu’ (what kind of gaga do you take) to someone 50 years ago, he or she might not 
have been able to understand it, but could only have told you that ‘gaga’ includes a 
lot of things, and that different qalang would have different gaga.47 However, when 
the villagers embraced Christianity, the traditional gaga – which was inherited 
entirely through oral language – not only became dubious, because it contained many 
‘superstitions’ (such as rainbows being the bridge between the worlds of life and 
death), but was also no longer the right way to live one’s life. The Bible – the book 
with the ‘real’ gaga that had been passed down for centuries – became the creditable 
source of the ‘way of life’. ‘Gaga’ was thus transformed into something that was not 
only ‘protected’ by the church, but was also of the church – it was ‘embodied’ and 
‘emplaced’ in the Bible (A. J. Strathern & Stewart, 1998). The Christianised gaga 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The structure of the sentence would be: isu    ga   magal    su   gaga  na   nanu 
                                  (you)  (be)  (take)  (which) (gaga) (what) (kind) 
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therefore would be adopted not by the cultural/ethnic group itself (although more or 
less every newly established church would first have to adopt the local customs), but 
by the sects of different churches. This means that in terms of social identities, gaga 
no longer generated a distinction by identifying the cultural/ethnic group to which one 
belonged, but only revealed one’s religious affiliation. In fact, today’s ‘isu ga magal 
su gaga na nanu’ in Bienjing village has been understood as ‘which church are you in’ 
rather than the literal ‘what kind of gaga do you take’ by the villagers. Gaga, in this 
sense, although retaining its function of guiding the villagers’ lifestyles and religious 
belief, has disengaged from the ‘tribal’ aspect, since people from different Atayal 
communities could be in the same church. This social identity of being ‘in the same 
church’ is not only limited to the physical place of the church, but, more importantly, 
also refers to the religious sect of the church. In terms of social identities, gaga in 
modern Bienjing village is more of a signifier of religion than of different ‘ways of 
life’, whilst church becomes what it signified; it no longer involves the category of 
tribal or ethnic culture, but merely represents the Christian sectoral culture.  
    In balancing this similar-yet-new Christianised gaga of the church with the local 
rituals that had been practised for decades, the Atayals’ relation with utux also had to 
be adjusted. Being baptised by the church not only signified the Atayal villagers’ 
agreement to become Christians and symbolised the ‘contract’ they had made with 
God to follow the gaga that was written in the Bible, but also admitted the authority 
of the various clergies in religious matters. The clergies owned the knowledge of the 
gaga and therefore had the authority to tell the villagers what was the right ‘way to 
live’. This religious symbol of being ‘baptised’, as Raymond Firth (1975) put it, 
involves a necessary process of transformation – the recreation of the new ‘self’ that 
includes the ‘new’ understanding of the person, nature and the sacred. This transition 
is not only a ‘transformation’, but also a ‘transubstantiation’ of the self, which 
influences how the individual sees himself socially (Firth, 1975). The next section 
investigates this transformation and transubstantiation of the self in the process of the 
Bienjing Atayals’ religious transition. 
6.1.1 Reconceptualising utux: from divinity to humanity 
During early missionary work, the offerings villagers made in rituals were described 
as ‘making a contract with the devil’ by Presbyterian clergy (participant YM), and 
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those who held such a belief in utux were considered sinful. Such statements led some 
of the villagers to feel hostile towards the church. However, the Catholic missionaries 
took a different approach in reinterpreting the meaning of those rituals: the object of 
the rituals was utux kayal, and the offerings were merely symbolic – a part of the 
Atayals’ material culture. 
Participant YHP (age 43, former Catholic, now considers himself 
as spiritual): What we took of utux was just like the God of the 
church, only we didn’t know that what we thought of as utux was 
actually utux kayal … utux is just the souls of our ancestors, not 
God. 
Participant HSF: The Catholic Church let us keep our cultural 
traditions, so we still have our gaga in worshipping ancestors. 
Like zhulingji, this is our gaga, our tradition. Some say that is 
wrong, that Christians should not worship like that, but it’s not 
wrong; whom we say prayers to is God, we pray to God to look 
over us, look over the souls of our ancestors in heaven, and thank 
him for the past good year … the food (offerings) is just symbolic, 
because they (utux) would not really come and eat it … but it is 
our culture, our tradition, and it is just our way to memorialise the 
families that have passed away. 
When the Bible became the creditable source of the gaga, and the authority of the 
clergies in the church had been established, replacing the role of utux with utux kayal 
(the Christian God) in the ‘contract’ of the rituals became both necessary and 
reasonable. It not only maintained the monotheism in Christianity, and gave this once 
‘unknown god’ a clear image, but also reconciled the conflicts between the Christian 
belief and the inseparable part of the Atayal traditions. Under this theological 
interpretation of the Atayal rituals, a few of the Catholic priests in the early 
missionary years even actively took part in these rituals to better strengthen the 
Christian belief and the villagers’ lives. The priests, for example, would lead the 
villagers in saying prayers to ‘utux kayal’ before the Sunday lunch in the church after 
the Mass, to replace the food offering to ‘utux’ in traditional Atayal customs. They 
would also encourage the villagers to seek religious support from utux kayal for those 
who were sick, instead of holding smyus to make atonement with utux. 
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   However, even with these replacements of utux kayal in different rituals, and the 
idea that Christianity actually equalled the religious object that the Atayals had 
always believed in, the villagers’ relation with utux kayal could never be the same as, 
or even similar to, how they used to be with utux. Utux was connected with the 
Atayals through the practice of gaga in every aspect of life, and was the spiritual 
existence that walked among the Atayals, as well as interacting with the Atayals 
through different signs. Everything from the actions of birds to the visit of utux in 
dreams was utux communicating directly to every member of the gaga, and thereby 
the Atayals could make their moves accordingly. Yet with Christianity, the 
communication between the villagers and ‘the object of the rituals’ became rather 
unilateral. They pray to God before a meal to thank him for the food, not to share 
whatever they are having with utux as if they were still a family. They retain some of 
the ‘superstitions’ before hunting, but no longer require the signs from the birds to tell 
them whether utux sees it as a good day for hunting. When sick, the villagers still go 
to the clergy for religious ‘treatment’, but they’re not given any specific instructions 
to ‘reconcile’ with God as the mahuni once were – they can only ‘hope’ to get better 
by the priests’ supposedly powerful prayers.  
    Meanwhile, although the ‘way of life’ is recorded in the Bible, most of the elder 
villagers did not have sufficient ability in reading. The Bible was first translated into 
Japanese, and then into a Romanised version of the Atayal language, both requiring 
considerable expertise in the written language. The difficulty of obtaining knowledge 
of the ‘new’ gaga from the Bible not only made the clergies own the power of 
‘passing down’ the gaga, but also enabled the priests to ‘own’ God. This is why, 
when speaking of the gaga they look to in order to live now, most of the participants 
suggested that I talk to the priests, as ‘they are the ones who know about the gaga and 
utux kayal’, and most of the villagers ‘just follow what the priests ask’. This lack of 
knowledge of their ‘way of life’ amongst the villagers (especially the elders) was not 
caused solely by the villagers’ inability in reading, but also by the different ways of 
learning gaga. In the Atayal tradition, gaga was picked up through different practices 
in different living experiences, as each place would have its certain way to follow in 
order not to violate the utux. For the elder villagers, the modern way of teaching the 
gaga in the church has always been a life-detached form of learning, and they often 
find that the priests ‘talk too much to remember what [they] said’. Such a paradigm 
shift in religious knowledge (and thereby in the guiding principles of life) reflects a 
	  	   121	  
significant change in the relation between the Atayals and the religious object from 
one shared by everyone and infiltrating every detail of life, to one owned by the few, 
and distant from the secular world. 
    The changes in how gaga is learned and recognised not only reveal the transition 
of the connection between utux (kayal) and the Atayals, but also indicate the 
detachment of sacredness from daily lives and its repositioning in the physical 
existence of the church. However, what the detachment of the religious object from 
the Atayals’ daily lives leads us to consider are the social conditions that created the 
environment for this separation. In traditional Atayal society, most of the gaga was 
based on the mode of people’s livelihoods, which consisted mainly of farming and 
hunting activities. Yet in today’s Bienjing village, more than half of the working 
population now make their livelihood either working in local hotels or running small 
businesses, which require none of the gaga. Whether it is the traditional kind that was 
passed down by oral stories and practices, or the modern kind that is written in the 
Bible, religious knowledge, in most cases, is of very limited use in these work places. 
Even for those who still farm, the gaga would not always be adaptable, as it was 
based on the solar terms of traditional crops such as millet and ramie and not on the 
economic ones they are now compelled to produce due to market forces. The 
difficulty of applying the old gaga of traditional crops to modern ones is due to the 
fact that gaga was always a case-wise principle, in which each crop had different 
farming gaga to follow. Thus, for the villagers, crops other than the traditional ones 
are not guided by the concerns of gaga. As cash crops have replaced the traditional 
ones, the whole set of ‘traditions’ following those crops – which used to play a critical 
part in the Atayals’ pre-Christian lives – have also gradually been forgotten. Despite 
becoming less important due to the changes in social conditions, the gaga of the 
villagers before Christianity was still the idea of truth, the reference for the source of 
life and the consciousness of the religious power itself. Gaga was, in Mircea Eliade’s 
(1959: 21) words, the agent of the manifestation of the sacred. Nonetheless, the 
church’s authority in the gaga, its way of ‘teaching’ the gaga and its specific form of 
worshipping the creator of the gaga – utux kayal – still consolidated the divorcement 
of sacredness from secularity in the Atayal villagers’ daily lives.  
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6.1.2 Reconceptualising gaga: from sacred practice to the doctrines of the 
sacred 
To Eliade (1959), the essence of a religion is its ‘archetype’, which lies in the 
cosmogony of any culture, and is the sacred place where the God(s) lives. The space 
where humans live, unlike the cosmos of the God(s), is a space of chaos and dynamics 
that has to be symbolically ‘created’ in accordance with how the God(s) created the 
cosmos, so that we can feel oriented and meaningful and enjoy a sense of order in our 
life (Eliade, 1959). To repeat the ‘archetype birth of the cosmos’ (Eliade, 1971), and 
to imitate the cosmogony, such a recreation of the cosmos has to be based on a 
‘centre’, which opens up the connection between ‘heaven and earth’ that allows us to 
have a grasp of the patterns of the sacred orders (Eliade, 1959). This ‘centre’, in other 
words, is the sacred space. The sacred space is not necessarily fixed in ‘one place’ but 
is built through the mark of ‘hierophany’ – be it an object, an event or even rituals 
that create a ‘break’ between the profane and the sacred worlds – that interrupts the 
profane temporality. Through the centre created in sacred space, the archetype of the 
cosmogony – the original model of the world at the time of the God(s) (in illo 
tempore) – could therefore be represented and experienced by ‘religious men’, 
allowing them to relive the sacred values oriented by the God(s) from the chaotic, 
profane world (Eliade, 1959). This representation, however, is not universally visible. 
It can only be seen and revealed to the eyes of the religious men that a ‘sacred object’ 
might only be an ordinary (and profane) matter to the non-believers, and a ‘sacred 
space’ might as well just be a field of wilderness to the heathens (Eliade, 1959). To a 
religious man, the object of hierophany (that is, the sacred) could be any existence of 
this profane world, retaining its part of the profane order until its sacredness is 
manifested. Only at the time of this ‘revelation’ would its sacred value of hierophany 
be distinguished from other secular beings (Eliade, 1959). 
    With Eliade’s notion of understanding one religion through the experience of 
‘the sacred’, we can grasp how gaga, as the religious agent of the sacred experience 
that provides hierophanic character to Atayal life, is delivering different experiences 
of the sacred before and after the villagers’ conversion to Christianity. The villagers 
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agree that their current belief in Christianity is due to the gaga (more precisely, the 
ethics of the gaga) that they have always followed being accepted as ‘the same’ as 
Christian ideology. However, the cosmos from which the power of gaga derives is 
essentially different. One is created by utux kayal and occupied by utux, whilst the 
other is owned solely by the Christian God – the utux kayal – and is without utux. 
While the religious translation made the Christian God of utux kayal possible, the 
archetypes of traditional Atayal belief and Christianity are primarily different from 
each other. As mentioned above, due to pressure from the church, many of the Atayal 
customs are increasingly considered ‘superstitions’ that should be abandoned for 
religious reasons – for example, the sign of birds from utux before going hunting. 
However, even for those daily rituals which have been successfully transformed into 
Christian(ised) ones, the villagers still might not be able to pick up the ‘new’ customs 
when they have gotten used to the old ones (for instance, most of the villagers do not 
pray before eating at home, even though the offerings made to utux before meals have 
been replaced – at least in the eyes of Atayal clergy – by prayers). These customs, 
therefore, have not ‘transformed’ into other formations for the majority of the 
villagers, but remain mere memories of the old, superstitious culture. This difference 
in the religious archetype not only marks the fracture of the Atayals’ culture in 
‘recreating’ their world, but also heralds the change in the villagers’ experiences of 
‘the sacred’ – and thus the profane. 
    Gaga, as the ‘way of life’ that regulates all human life and forms the knowledge 
of the world for the Atayals, is without doubt the religious reference that, in Eliade’s 
sense, recreates the order of the cosmos and provides the sense of sacredness – even 
the ‘taboos’ in the Atayal culture should also be considered as sacred experiences, 
since they actually meant ‘the defiling of the sacred’ (Eliade, 1971). The ‘sacred 
space’ for traditional Atayals was, therefore, the world, or life, itself. The sacred 
space of the traditional Atayals was dynamic and could be repeatedly created and 
multiplied every time the gaga was practised in relation with the utux. The sacred 
space could be wherever – and whenever – the zhulingji and smyus were held, food 
was put on the ground to share with the utux, tweeting birds carried the messages of 
the utux, or even when a rainbow appeared. Each time these gaga were practised, a 
‘break’ could be created, and the ‘centre’ could hence be built for the Atayals to 
reaffirm that the orders they ‘recreated’ in this chaotic world were just as of the world 
of the utux: 
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CCL (age 41): When the elders were practising the rituals they 
had before (Christianity), they were really religious and saw it as 
really sacred … it means that they practised with deep respect to 
the utux, and believed that what they did and thought would all be 
seen by the utux. They had all kinds of rituals, big or small, pretty 
much everything would have its gaga to follow, otherwise they 
would violate the taboo. 
HSF: The people in the old times believed that the world of the 
utux was just like ours. They (the utux) have to eat and go hunting 
like we do, but the idea was slightly different from ours; such as ‘a 
little’ (of substance) of our world means ‘a lot’ to them … some 
say that our dog is their boar, but I never heard my father tell me 
that, and I don’t know what their dog would be (in our world) … 
but anyway, we can eat boars, but dogs in our culture are not 
allowed to be eaten, that would be the same in both the worlds. 
    However, the gaga in the Christian archetype does not serve the same sense of 
sacredness as it did before. Many of the traditional gaga that would probably still 
work in the modern economic lifestyle – say, for example, the sign of the birds before 
going hunting – were seen as superstitions and were being abandoned by the church, 
which cut off the ‘traditional’ sacred experiences from life to a large extent. Even 
with the utux kayal (Christian God) being the subject of sacredness, and the fact that 
some of the gaga in the daily lives could still be practised in a different form (mostly 
prayers, such as saying prayers before meals instead of ‘sharing’ food with the 
religious object), the ‘break’ could not be created, as the performers did not see this 
kind of praying as sacred (though it might have ‘power’) and ‘interactive’ as in the 
traditional gaga: 
HJ (age 45, Catholic): Praying is … personal, I wouldn’t say it’s 
sacred. It of course would have ‘power’ if you are religious 
enough, which means that if you have followed the way of life 
that would please the God, then he might answer your prayer 
when you need help … The prayers we say in daily life are also a 
way to please God, to let him know that you didn’t forget him … 
You don’t require anything from him, just thank him for the 
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steady life you have now … well it’s actually not a big deal if you 
don’t pray often in your life, a lot of people don’t, they only pray 
in church. It’s not like in the old times, when if you didn’t do 
certain things, you were violating the taboo – that was superstition; 
no, it is just a personal act of Christians. 
JZ (age 53, Presbyterian): Praying is praying … it is what you 
have to do in the church, I rarely do that in daily life … I don’t 
really know what it is for, maybe a way of worship? But it doesn’t 
mean that you can talk to him, maybe only those who have been 
to the Theological College can, like the priest, but I never feel I 
can talk to him.48 
    A significant ‘break’ for the villagers now, however, is that prayers are more 
often said in church. The meaning of a church to the villagers, in addition to being a 
place where people go ‘worshipping’ on Sunday mornings (and which only opens 
during that time), is that it is a place of religious authority – the place of gaga and of 
the priests who teach gaga (the priests in both the Catholic and Presbyterian churches 
all live in a separate room in the church). The church, therefore, is not only the centre 
of religious authority, but also the ‘centre’ – in Eliade’s sense – that is different from 
other homogeneous (profane) space in the village: 
ZFY (age 57, Presbyterian): I used to drink a lot with others, so I 
didn’t go to the church … because church is a sacred place, and I 
knew drinking is bad, I’d feel guilty there. 
SYS (age 38, Presbyterian): I haven’t been to the church for 
years … I used to go there when I was a kid, but then I got into 
the bad habit of drinking and stopped going … I think to many of 
us, church is a very sacred existence, so if I know I’m not doing 
good as what they (the church) expect us to be, I would feel 
ashamed and guilty in the church, a bit afraid of … I don’t know, 
maybe God. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The Taiwan Theological College was established in 1872 in Taipei by the Canadian Presbyterian 
missionary George Leslie Mackay to train professional clergies, and now every priest of the 
Presbyterian Church has to graduate from the institute. 
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YHP: When I was a kid, I lived in the (Catholic) church for a 
while. That was for studying before the examination of high 
school entries … it was because the church gave a sense of 
sacredness that’s different from other places; I felt like there’s 
always a pair of invisible eyes watching every one of your moves, 
and that gives you pressure, so you would think that you have to 
study really hard. 
    This sense of ‘the sacred’ in the contemporary village, unlike that which was 
shared amongst the villagers whenever the gaga was applied to life events, not only 
becomes ‘of the church’ (and mainly takes place ‘only’ in the church), just like the 
gaga, but also marks the separation of the two spheres of life: the religious and the 
profane. Whilst – as I have pointed out earlier – being a ‘tayan’ in the traditional 
Atayal society was a way to follow the sacred practices of gaga, here we should also 
ask: how does such a division of the world influence the conception of a tayan? How 
does this change of spiritual perspective, as Eliade (1960: 244) put it, ‘take effect as a 
profound regeneration’ of the Atayal people’s ‘intimate being’? 
    The traditional idea of a ‘tayan’ was one of religion and culture. It was religious 
in that it involved the practices regulated by its religious founder utux; it was also 
cultural and social insofar as it represented the values of Atayals in practising the 
customs in one’s community, gaga. The life of a tayan in the time when utux was in 
charge of religious matters was based on an intimate relationship with utux. However, 
as the Christianised gaga now only function as a ‘moral guide’ in most of the Atayals’ 
profane lives, tayan in the modern Bienjing village is yet to be split into the ‘religious’ 
and the ‘profane’.  
    As gaga, as the identification of social communities, shifted from tribes to the 
sphere of churches, one of the primary identities of the villagers became the affiliation 
with the churches, in addition to their blood ties. The affiliation with the churches, 
meanwhile, usually depends on the family leader’s religious preference, rather than on 
personal choice. For most of the Presbyterian families, the newborns would usually be 
taken to the church to be baptised, whereas in the Catholic Church, where one has 
first to be a catechumen before being baptised, children are still identified as 
Catholics. The impact on their religious identity might not be revealed immediately, 
but is evident as time passes. For example, participant ZYC described how, during the 
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Chinese New Year holidays, other villagers like her find religious consolation in the 
city:49 
… living on your own in the city too long, you would feel 
homesick, and when you are low or having bad times, it would be 
even harder … my colleague in my working place used to take me 
to some temples she usually visited to pray for good luck, but I 
didn’t feel they were places for me. Besides, I’ve been baptised 
and I shouldn’t do that. Then I went to the church (in the city) … 
I rarely went to the church when I was a kid in the village … but 
(now) when I am in the church, I feel it is more like home, more 
suitable for we Atayal people. 
    Many of the villagers who work in the city and who were probably not familiar 
with the church during their childhoods also made similar statements, saying that they 
are more ‘used to the atmosphere of churches’ (participant CY) and feel like they 
‘should go to the church as it is a family tradition’ (participant CGJ). Or, to them, 
‘Christianity is the religion for the Atayals’ as ‘it is the same as our traditions’ 
(participant GX). To these participants, the term ‘Atayal’ has always connected to 
Christianity in terms of religion, whether Catholicism, Presbyterian or another faith 
group. For these young people, being Atayals simply implies that one is also Christian. 
Thus, for these Atayals, Christianity is a part of their ‘tradition’, and being a tayan, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, means being a Christian. Such a change in the 
young people’s ideas about their identity and traditions, as Borut Telban (2009) put it, 
was exactly because when the old rituals and practices were abandoned through the 
new understanding of the world, the new religious practices generated along with that 
new world would further confirm that new understanding. In Bourdieu’s words, as 
Telban (2009:155) further stated, these young people embodied ‘a particular habitus 
and acquir(ed) relevant cultural capital’. However, this new understanding is also 
problematic. Since being a Christian to these young Atayals does not necessarily 
involve baptism or actual religious practices other than going to church (as a family 
tradition), the ‘Atayals as Christians’ identity is essentially secularly inherited. It 
suggests an identity that is not only self-ascribable but also ‘inheritable’, and which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Although the Atayals do not generally celebrate Chinese New Year, many families and the young 
Atayals who live in the city come back to the village for the holiday, since it is the longest national 
holiday in Taiwan. 
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runs in the bloodline. 
6.2 Case study: Hekou village 
The conflicts of the aforementioned Atayal identity can also be seen between the 
Christian and non-Christian Atayals. Despite the domination of Christianity over the 
Bienjing villagers and even the Taiwanese aboriginal groups in general, there were 
also Atayal people who chose different religious beliefs – for example, the Taiwanese 
folk religion – in their Christianised community. Although the few Atayals who 
turned to the Taiwanese folk religion had already moved out of Bienjing village, we 
might still see how the difference in religion (between Christianity and 
non-Christianity) affected the identity of Atayals through another example in Hekou 
village, which is ten minutes’ drive away from Bienjing village and which I visited 
many times.50  
    Participant YLH’s father was a tumux in Hekou village who converted to 
Catholicism in the 1950s. Despite being the daughter of a tumux, YLH did not follow 
her father’s decision to become a Catholic, and instead became a Buddhist after she 
married. Not long after her divorce, YLH returned to the village with her son and 
joined the local aboriginal-dance troop. Although she has been back in the village for 
years, she still feels marginalised and feels that she does not fit in. This feeling of 
disengagement is especially obvious when she is unable to take part in almost all the 
biggest (religious) events in the village, such as zhulingji and Christmas, which 
involve the whole community. In fact, though all of the participants in both Hekou 
and Bienjing villages stated that religion is a personal and free choice to everyone, 
they still see examples such as YLH as being ‘more like Han people’ because of their 
religious choices. YLH considers herself a tayan, since she had always, as a child, 
participated in every ‘tradition’, whether it was Christian or not. She saw her religious 
belief as merely a ‘philosophical guide’ of life that helped her to get through different 
difficulties and that was not contrary to the ‘principles’ (by which she meant the 
ethical aspects of the gaga) of being a tayan. The villagers still call her a tayan, 
although they find it hard to recognise YLH as ‘one of us’, like other Christian 
villagers who inherited ‘the traditions’. Similar example can also be seen on a wealthy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 ‘Hekou’ here is also a fictious name. 
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participant, who chose to follow and promote the traditional gaga (wherever possible) 
in daily practices instead of being a Christian. Such endeavour in restoring the 
traditions, however, did not gain the approval of the villagers. On contrary, some of 
the villagers even commented her as ‘the tayan walking on the wrong path’, who 
‘shares the Atayal blood yet failed to see the “true” idea of being a tayan.’ 
   The split in the religious and secular identities in tayan is therefore revealed. As 
the secular life does not involve the practice of gaga, one can be a tayan as long as the 
individual shares Atayal blood. However, an individual still needs to have a common 
religious identity – Christianity – if they are to acquire the more traditional, social 
sense of a tayan and be completely accepted in the modern Atayal community, which, 
following the years of missionary work, has become a ‘translocal community of 
coreligionists’ (Keane, 2007: 114) that largely eliminated the boundaries set by the 
gaga in the traditional societies. Such a split in the idea of a tayan not only shows 
how religious status affects a person’s social relationships in the Atayal society, but 
also reflects how the connection between the religious object and gaga intricately 
operates on the Atayals’ identity. Similar to the studies of how the tribal societies in 
Southeast Asia kept their own identity, distinct from the mainstream culture, by 
converting to Christianity (Robert W. Hefner, 1993b; Kammerer, 1998; Keyes, 1993; 
Kipp, 1995; Tapp, 1989; Tooker, 1989; Yang, 2009), the Bienjing Atayals also see 
Christianity as ‘their’ religion that distinguished them from the Taiwanese Han 
people. 
6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I started by analysing the changes in the connotations of gaga and 
utux after the conversion to Christianity. In the early stage of the Atayals’ conversion 
to Christianity, the priests at the time were devoted to ‘Christianising’ the traditional 
Atayal customs by replacing the places of utux with utux kayal in the rituals, making 
the role of utux in these rituals not only return to the ‘human’ status of souls, but also 
merely a ‘cultural symbol’, in order to reconcile the theological differences between 
Christianity and the Atayal traditions. However, even with these efforts to bridge the 
traditional and Christian cosmologies, the Christianised God–man relationship is far 
less interactive than it used to be, whilst many other customs were also considered 
superstitions by this new gaga. This also indicates that, although Christianity shares 
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similar views to the traditional Atayal culture on the cause of the world and morality, 
the scope of divinity is rather distinct.  
    The differences between Christianity and the traditional Atayal culture in 
relation to the idea of the sacred can be seen from different perspectives. On the one 
hand, as the modern Christian belief became the instrument to eradicate the 
‘superstitions’ in the traditional Atayal culture, the old, orally transmitted gaga 
became questionable, and the Bible’s written, tested words thus became the orthodox 
source of the gaga. Meanwhile, the villagers’ inability to read and write also resulted 
in the churches holding the authority of knowledge in the Bible, and the term gaga 
thus gradually became the byword for ‘church’. However, since the old gaga – the 
sacred contract with utux – was practised in every detail of life, and every action was 
an experience of the sacred in order to honour that contract, the ossification of the 
content of that sacred contract in the Bible led to the loss of its original coping 
mechanism to the change of environment, and shifted the practice (including 
worshipping rituals) and learning of those sacred words from life itself to the church. 
Later, as different churches have different ways of worshipping, each sect thus has its 
own ‘gaga’, and gaga also became the reference for ‘religion’ that signified, for the 
first time in Atayal history, the domain of ‘the secular’.  
    On the other hand, the source of Atayal identity also appeared to experience 
changes in its sacred character. As the scope of gaga, in terms of the way it 
functioned to identify social groups, shifted from being tribe centred to being church 
centred, the identification mode of the Atayals became sector oriented. In other words, 
the sacred distinction between the ‘we-group’ and the ‘they-group’ shifted from the 
invisible bond of gaga – and the geo-relationship deriving from it – to a sense of 
belonging both to the physical church and to the religious sect. In addition, the 
tradition of baptising newborns in the Protestant Church also caused the once lifelong 
sacred practice of ‘being a tayan’ to be changed to being ‘born as a tayan’, which 
subverted the process not just of the identification of the Atayal self, but also of the 
‘sacred identification’ of the self. Although the Catholic Church does not share such a 
custom, the Christian environment in the village also drives the younger family 
members to see themselves as Christians even without baptism. Here, it was exactly 
such ‘privatisation’ of Christian belief that led to the duality of the term tayan: it can 
be sacred as a baptised Christian, or be secular as an ‘inherited’ Christian. However, 
since inheritance implies a bloodline without actually practising the gaga, the term 
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tayan, which was originally sacred, became a term with both secular and sacred 
associations. This mode of identification of a tayan is then extended to the whole 
Atayal community, where one can be a tayan by bloodline, but only a Christian tayan 
can be recognised as a social person of the Atayal.  
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Chapter 7  
Tayan: The Schizophrenic Self 
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If identity is the ‘self’ constructed by the interactions between individuals and society 
(Blumer, 1986; Cooley, 1998; Jacobs, 2006; Mead, 1934b, 1992), any change in the 
conceptualisation of the ‘individual self’ would, therefore, involve the transition of 
the social, cultural self. That is to say, if analysing how the religious structure affects 
Atayal identity gives the possible answer to who is tayan in both the pre-Christian 
and modern contexts, as I have done in the previous discussions, then the exploration 
of the cultural self of the Atayals in this chapter will help to identify what is tayan in 
the transition/reinvention of their ‘traditions’. Such clarification matters, as it is not 
the signifier itself that reveals an individual’s belonging, but the culture it contains 
that expresses who we really are (Huntington, 2005, 2011). 
    In the previous chapters, I have demonstrated, drawing on ethnography, what a 
‘person of Atayal’ means to Bienjing villagers in both the pre-Christian and modern 
Atayal societies, and how that idea changes along with their encounters with 
modernity and Christianity – or Christianity in modernity. Converting to Christianity 
is, to the Atayals, perceived as adapting the Atayal belief to a ‘better’, modern 
‘version’ that fits what the villagers were taught about the gaga. Christianity, 
therefore, is now claimed as the Atayals’ religious tradition, which is seperated from 
their ‘cultural’ traditions. Following that, the concept of ‘an Atayal person’ has also 
experienced a rather radical change in terms of adapting the whole set of ideologies to 
the context of modern society. This not only influenced their cognition of ethnic 
identity by integrating Christianity with the gaga, but also brought a new connotation 
of tayan that is distant from its original reference.51 The changes in the idea and 
meaning of ‘tayan’ revealed what Keane (2007) describes in his influential book 
Christian Moderns as the tendency of separating religion from culture in modern 
Christianity (and especially Protestantism). That separation has led the term tayan to 
face a somewhat ‘schizophrenic’ state today. On the one hand, tayan is no longer a 
reference for the ‘religious’ social actor in the traditional Atayal sense, in which one 
could only bear the title by the daily practices of gaga. It is now a ‘genetic’ indication 
of those who share Atayal blood, or who share a similar cultural origin, in the same 
way that the villagers identify the Seediq people without the acquirement of religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Or, we can say that the tayan the Atayal people use today has become a simulacrum – in 
Baudrillard’s sense – of the ‘tayan’ in the pre-Christian Atayal society. Although the focus of this 
study does not allow me to further develop the arguments of how this term and other cultural signifiers 
are reconstructed with the conversion to Christianity, as a form of cultural appropriation, the two 
positions of simulation from Deleuze (1994) and Baudrillard (1994) might serve as the opposite angles 
towards religious syncretism in different cases. 
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(and daily) practice, as outlined in chapter three. On the other hand, to be the tayan 
that is more socially recognised and accepted in the modern Atayal society, one is 
also expected to be a Christian rather than just sharing cultural or blood ties. This 
radical change in the perception of the term tayan, in other words, is what Fredric 
Jameson (2001:34) calls the ‘breaking down of the signifying chain’ that reveals the 
disunity of time, the failure to experience a coherent sequence of memory (Jameson, 
1983), and that resulted in the ‘schizophrenia’ of the Atayal people’s reference of 
identity.  
    This rupture of the memory sequence and its consequences are what this chapter 
is looking into. As memory is constructed during interactions with others, it has been 
seen as critical in shaping our identity (Bartlett, 1995; Halbwachs, 1992; Marques, 
Paez, & Serra, 1997). When speaking about culture, the memory of the majority 
becomes the source of how they recognise themselves from others (Assmann, 2006, 
2009; Halbwachs, 1992). Whether it is to remember this collective memory, to 
construct a new memory, or to forget certain parts of memory, such framing of 
‘history’ not only defines ‘who we are’, but also reveals ‘what we are becoming’ (S. 
Hall, 1990). The changes in how the Atayals restore, remember and recognise their 
cultural memory can therefore reveal the factors influencing how their identities 
varied, and can sketch the image of their cultural identity. 
7.1 The Atayals’ cultural memory: what is ‘of us’? 
In 2011, the film ‘Seediq Bale’ (Warriors of the Rainbow) was released in Taiwan. It 
was based on the historical event known as the ‘Wushe Incident’, and told the story of 
how the chieftain of Mahebu (a Seediq community), Mona Rudao, led his people to 
fight against the Japanese rule in Taiwan. This epic film illustrates the social and 
cultural conflicts around the Mahebu Seediqs under the Japanese rule, as well as 
depicting how they practised to be a ‘true man’ (as ‘Seediq Bale’ translates directly) 
in fighting for their belief, autonomy and way of life. To promote this Taiwanese 
aboriginal film, many Bienjing villagers received free tickets for the screening, and 
that became a hot topic in the village during my first month there. The kids would 
imitate the dance the actors did in the movie, or repeat together the lines they had 
learnt from it. Some older villagers, though, found it overly long and thought it 
contained ‘too much blood’ (participant ZMC), and would ask me if I had seen the 
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film when they found out I was there to do some research.  
    Though they use a different language and are now classed as an independent 
aboriginal ethnic group from the Atayals, the Seediqs are still seen by most of the 
Bienjing villagers as ‘one of our own’ (participant ZCL), which is understood to mean 
sharing similarities in culture, traditional religious views and bloodline. While the 
Seediq independence movement claimed that its aim was to ‘restore’ what the Seediqs 
had always thought themselves to be – not ‘tayan’, but ‘Seediq’ – the participants 
believed that being independent from the Atayal family was a political operation 
designed to obtain better resources and government allowances, for this was ‘the only 
thing to gain out of being an independent indigenous group’ (participant GC).52 
Nonetheless, even though that was the common consensus amongst the Bienjing 
Atayals, their views of the film seemed to differ in relation to the cultural similarities 
between the Seediqs and the Atayals. To the older villagers, many scenes in the film 
brought up memories from their childhoods. While the scenes were not exactly the 
same as what they had experienced or heard, they did find connections in terms of the 
traditional lifestyle, the gaga that their parents’ or grandparents’ generation used to 
follow. Some would even claim that the film was just the Seediq version of ‘their 
story’. Many of the younger generations, aged 50 and under, saw the film as having 
little or nothing to do with the Atayals. While agreeing that some cultural symbols in 
the film (such as the patterns of facial tattoos and clothes, and the image of the 
‘warriors’) were similar to the Atayal tradition, these participants either denied that 
the behaviour (especially the beheading actions) in the film had been part of their 
culture, or saw those actions as false ‘superstitions’ in Atayal history. The most 
significant difference in perception between these younger participants and the older 
ones was that the former did not see themselves as sharing the belief in utux and gaga 
that the Seediqs had in their utux and gaya.  
    These two different attitudes held by Bienjing villagers towards the cultural 
presentation in the film suggest two different frames of cultural memory. To address 
this issue, it is necessary first to clarify the differences between the idea of ‘cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 In the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, as the budget for indigenous peoples’ welfare is fixed each 
year and assigned to ‘each’ indigenous group by the proportion of the population, the Atayals have 
suffered from unbalanced distribution of the resources, as they are the second largest and one of the 
most scattered indigenous groups in Taiwan. Politically speaking, for a small, geographically 
concentrated group such as the Seediq, being independent means that they can make more effective use 
of the resources. 
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memory’ and ‘communicative/collective memory’. Collective memory, as Halbwachs 
(1992) calls it, is a continuous current of thought that stays in the people’s 
consciousness within their group, and that is only relevant to the group. This 
collective memory is socially constructed (Halbwachs, 1992). Every individual of a 
certain group – for example, families or political parties – communicates their 
personal memories with each other in formless, wilful and disorganised ways, and 
through the process of retelling and re-forming their memories they share a set of 
common images of the group (Assmann, 2009). The preservation of collective 
memory is vital in the development of social identity (Connerton, 2003). However, 
most orally transmitted communicative collective memories last only for three or four 
generations, and their horizon also narrows with time (Assmann, 2009; Dodd & 
Boytner, 2010). This is why communicative memory cannot offer a ‘fix point’ to, in 
Assmann’s words (2009:127), connect ‘the ever expanding past in the passing time’ 
to create ‘history’. Meanwhile, if this living communication is ‘crystallised in the 
forms of objectivised culture’ – be it a text, ritual, or even a sacred place – the group 
relationship and its ‘contemporary reference’ would therefore be disengaged, and thus 
would cease to have the fundamental character of collective memory – the 
‘contemporary’ collective knowledge (Assmann, 2009). 
    While also being framed in groups, cultural memory, unlike collective memory – 
which is based on the contemporary, daily communication of individuals – can be 
fixed over time by being stored in cultural symbols. Cultural memory is characterised 
by its distance from people’s daily lives, objectivised cultural formation and 
institutional communications (Assmann, 2009). Through objectivised cultural 
formations and institutional communications (recitation, practice, observance), the 
‘fix point’ could therefore be built to connect the passing and the coming times, and 
certain experiences and meanings could thus be repeatedly gained in organised, 
specific ways without being attached to daily communicative practices (Assmann, 
2009). These long-lasting cultural formations and institutional communications are 
what Assmann (2009:129) called the ‘figures of memory’ that provide the ‘concretion 
of identity’ and the relation to the group. To him, cultural memory is the ‘collective 
concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive 
framework of a society’ (Assmann, 2009: 126). This knowledge is not only obtained 
‘through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation’ (Assmann, 2009: 
126), but also establishes the awareness of unity in the group, as in ‘we are this’, or 
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‘that’s our opposite’. The storage and circulation of this knowledge that derives from 
such ‘societal practice and initiation’, to a great extent, would therefore be 
manipulated by the institutionalisation of culture, authoritative power and value 
structure in the group (Assmann, 2009). Through the cooperation of these factors, the 
self-image could be conveyed and stabilised by ‘cultivation’ of the cultural memory, 
thereby revealing the society itself to its members and others (Assmann, 2006, 2009). 
‘Which past becomes evident in that heritage and which values emerge in its 
identificatory appropriation tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of a 
society’ (Assmann, 2009: 133). 
    Therefore, the discrepancies in the Bienjing Atayals’ views of the cultural 
presentation in ‘Seediq Bale’ are not just different ‘opinions’ of the film; they actually 
proclaim the inconsistency of cultural memory between the younger and the older 
villagers, and thus the variance of cultural identity between – to be more contextually 
specific – those who grew up with Christianity and those who ‘converted’ to 
Christianity. This rupture of the cultural memory indicates the change of cultural 
knowledge. To Assmann, cultural knowledge has two perspectives: normative texts 
and formative texts (Assmann, 2006, 2009). Normative texts are guidelines of social 
conduct. Assmann (2006:38) takes the tao in Chinese culture and the Jewish halakhah 
to indicate the function of normative texts. They are, in short, the answer to the 
question ‘what shall we do’ (Assmann, 2006:38). Formative texts, on the other hand, 
are the source of self-image and help to create social identity. Tribal myths and heroic 
stories are such texts of the knowledge that confirm the identity in cultural memory, 
as well as answer who we are (Assmann, 2006:38). From this point of view, the 
normative texts of the Atayal culture would therefore, as I have shown in the previous 
chapters, be the gaga, their religious reference for their ‘way of life’. Even though 
gaga was studied through the daily and communicative practices, as the whole set of 
behavioural guidelines, it was also the ‘islands of time’ (Assmann, 2009) that 
objectivised ideas to practices, and provided the ‘fix point’ of the Atayal culture. 
From the discussions of the Christianised gaga in the last chapter we can come to a 
conclusion about how the normative texts of the Atayals’ cultural knowledge were 
altered. This leaves the changes of the formative texts to be the focus of this chapter. 
Therefore, in order to have a better picture of the ‘formative texts’ of the Atayal 
people, I’d like to start from the transitions of the role of tumux and the heroic ideas in 
Bienjing village. I will look at how they revealed the presentation of traditional 
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Atayal culture, embodying the Atayals’ cultural values and carrying the function of 
storing and ‘orienting’ cultural memories, and how that changed after the villagers 
converted to Christianity. 
7.2 The power hierarchy and the cultural values of 
the Atayals 
Before the Japanese came to ‘rule’ the Atayals, an Atayal ‘alang/qalang’ (tribe) was 
traditionally led by the ‘nbkis’ (elder) – or maraho (leader) or pasapung (pacifier) in 
different dialects – a male position which was firstly elected and then inherited. The 
nbikis would decide the common practices of the tribe. ‘Nbkis’ was replaced by the 
term ‘tumux’ during the Japanese rule.53 As a tribe was formed by one or more clans, 
and each clan had their own tumux, a chief tumux would be elected from all the tumux 
of the clans.54 The tumux from the most powerful clan would normally lead the rest 
of the ‘nbkis’; anyone who was unwilling to obey the tumux could also choose to 
leave and establish his own tribe with his followers. The system of tumux was also 
applied by the Japanese government in making the ruling policies. During Japanese 
rule, the role of the chief tumux often involved a certain political alliance with the 
authorities, as it needed not only to lead its people, but also to assist the Japanese in 
carrying orders and coordinating issues between the two parties (Ishimaru, 2011). In 
1932, two years after the Wushe Incident, the Japanese government drew up the 
‘regulation of the tomoku medal’ (頭目章授與規程), which stated that the tumux of 
each niqan were only officially recognised with the tomoku medal (see figure 14), 
and made tumux a position that needed to be ‘authorised’ to better control the 
aborigines (Hung, 2009; Ishimaru, 2011). Meanwhile, the Japanese also started to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In the Qing Dynasty there had already been a set of similar positions carried by the chief, called 
‘tomu’ (頭目) or ‘tumu’ (土目). These positions functioned as the bridge between the aboriginal 
people and the government, but most of the Atayals were not included in such a system, as they were 
deemed to be ‘savages’ and not appropriate for such management at the time. The Japanese inherited 
this name for the chieftainship, and decided to unite the term ‘tomu’ in written character, whereas in 
Japanese it is pronounced as ‘tomoku’ (Ishimura, 2010). Why the Bienjing Atayals pronounce such a 
position as ‘tumux’ is unknown, but it possibly originated from the ‘tumu’ in the Qing Dynasty. 
54 However, in the Japanese anthropologist Mori Ushinosuke’s (1996) study, not every Atayal 
community would have the position of chief tumux, in which case the chief tumux would be chosen by 
the Japanese. 
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intervene in the appointment of tumux; they would favour the ones who were, for 
them, ‘good looking’, more ‘intelligent’ or politically friendly, and give them the 
‘medal of tomoku’ as a token of official authentication. The issue of medals caused 
fights over power in some tribes, particularly where the Japanese decided to choose a 
different tumux from the original one. Though, traditionally, one who was unwilling 
to follow the tumux could choose to leave and establish his own group, the Japanese 
strictly monitored the movement of aborigines, which made independence from one’s 
original community virtually impossible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14, a medal of tumux issued by the Japanese government in 1935. The front 
says ‘tumux medal’, and the back says ‘Governor-General of Taiwan’ with the issue 
number. (Provided by the tumux of Da-Xing village, Yu Han-Zhang) 
    In the Atayal culture, a tumux traditionally required the following characteristics: 
bravery, kindness, fairness and skill in rhetoric. Being kind, fair and articulate were 
skills that were considered necessary in presiding over contentious matters within or 
outside the tribe, and in organising ceremonies or praying for blessings; but being 
brave was the necessary quality of a great male tayan. Being brave, in traditional 
Atayal culture, means to be skilful in hunting and fighting, and to have ‘a fearless 
heart’. Bravery in this sense was also the most valued virtue for Atayal men. 
Traditionally, men would hang the skulls of their retrieved game outside the house to 
indicate the householder’s braveness, 55  whilst others would also judge the 
householder’s success by the number of skulls. The highest practice of braveness was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Hanging the skulls was also said to bring luck during later hunting activities. 
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the action of beheading (m’gaga), which was also the test of a young man’s initiation 
ceremony – only by passing this test could a ‘boy’ become a ‘man’ and be tattooed on 
the face to symbolise his status as a ‘true’ tayan (see Figure 8 in chapter three).56 The 
more ‘brave’ a tayan was, the more respect he would receive from others. Although a 
tumux was supposed to be produced hereditarily, they could also be unseated by the 
members of the tribe if they did not show enough ‘braveness’, making the tumux a 
position that was both ascribed and achieved. Sometimes even if a tayan did not hold 
the title of tumux, and was not yet old enough to be consulted, he could still be 
involved in the decision-making meetings if he had been seen to be brave enough by 
carrying out many successful beheadings.  
    Here I need to bring in the value theory of Louis Dumont (1980, 1986) and how 
Joel Robbins (2009) applied that to his study on the conversion of the Urapmin people. 
To put it simply, Dumont believes that the more valuable an idea is, the more 
‘rationalised’ – in a Weberian sense – the term will be (Robbins, 2009). That means 
the more valuable ideas will be more discussed and practised in their social context 
(Dumont, 1980). It is these super- and subordinated relationships of hierarchy 
between different cultural values that determine the framework of a culture (Dumont, 
1980). Based on such a theoretical context, Robbins (2009) observes how the change 
of values could be seen in the Urapmin people’s conversion to Christianity. He argues 
that the change of the cosmological view echoes the changes of the hierarchy of 
values, which would also cause the redistribution of social power (only those who 
adapt to the new values can re/gain the new social power) that further influences the 
transition of history and culture. In the previous chapters, we have found that the 
Atayals’ conversion to Christianity was based on the ‘sameness’ between Christianity 
and their traditional religious belief. This is different to Robbins’ (2009) conclusion 
that the Urapmin people chose the more ‘valuable’ one when facing contrasting ideas 
in their conversion. However, that does not mean that the Atayals’ conversion did not 
experience a similar rupture of continuity in values and religious ideas, as, in fact, if 
we agree with Dumont that cultural values frame the character of a society, we can 
see how today the Atayals’ cultural values have moved far away from those of 60 
years ago. Hence, Robbins’ value approach to the Urapmin people still provides a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 When an Atayal man reached the age of 12, he would usually be tattooed on the forehead and chin 
as his initiation ceremony; but, strictly speaking, a man could not be facially tattooed if he did not get 
his first human skull (in other words, perform his first beheading) by himself, and hence his father or 
brother would usually act for him. 
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reference for how we see such bravery played out in the traditional Atayal lives, as 
well as providing the key to understanding the orientation of social changes.  
    Bravery was shown to be an important value in the fact that ‘brave’ ones were 
included in the decision-making meetings, and it was also considered the key 
characteristic of a traditional Atayal ‘hero’ – especially in relation to beheadings.57 
Bravery and successful beheadings were believed to have been brought about by 
strictly following the gaga and thus the blessing of the utux. This was also why a 
traditional tumux of the Atayals, though not necessarily needing to be a ‘hero’, had to 
be ‘heroic’ to deserve his title (participants ZCL, YHP, YHZ, HSF) and to serve as a 
role model. The elders of Narima called such a figure ‘kazahou na tsokoliag’ – 
meaning ‘the person who is brave and flawless in morality’, who usually ‘required at 
least thirty heads’ to be able to be called so – or ‘luax na tsokoliag’, which means 
‘real man’. ‘Tsokoliag’ means ‘man’, whilst ‘kazahou’ refers to ‘sinless’, and ‘luax’ 
to ‘the core of stone or wood’.58 The kilhaku people in Sawig and Valus called this 
kind of heroic figure ‘maotox’, meaning ‘fearless fighter’. In order to represent the 
practices of the ‘braveness’ – meaning the number of people one had beheaded – the 
Atayal men would tattoo small stripes on their chest to manifest their deeds, gain their 
reputation and attract a future spouse (see Figure 15). 
   
Figure 15, drawings of chest tattoos of Atayal men from the Japanese period. From 
left to right are the tattoos of an elder, a tumux and the chief tumux Maay Gahu. 
(Source: S.-H. Wang, Historical literature and studies of the aboriginal groups in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The word ‘hero’ here means a man (or woman) who practised their cultural values and received 
respect for doing so, and who may even have served as the moral standard and as a role model.  
58 These terms of the heroic vary in different dialect groups. 
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Hsinchu and Miaoli in the Japanese period, 2003) 
    The horizontal stripes in the pictures above represent heads – one stripe means 
one head. Figure 16 depicts the chief tumux of the P’qwalic tribe in 1906, Maay Gahu, 
who claimed to have beheaded 30 men, and decorated his tattoo with vertical stripes 
(S.-H. Wang, 2003). From the elder to the chief tumux, these marks of ‘braveness’, as 
in Dumont and Robbins, not only functioned as a manifestation of bravery, but also 
represented the hierarchy of power and values in the traditional Atayal societies. In 
other words, when this ‘bravery’ was considered the standard of a hero, then the more 
‘heroic’ one was, the more influential he became in deciding the gaga of the Atayals. 
This not only served as the cultural formation of the Atayals, but also provided the 
basis for the Atayals’ institutional communication, both of which are critical in 
shaping cultural memory. 
    Even after the custom of beheading was strictly forbidden and gradually 
abandoned during the Japanese rule, this performance of bravery was still often the 
way the Atayals attempted to gain power in the villagers’ memory of their culture: 
Participant JWS: Before (converting to Christianity), people in the 
village fought a lot. They thought the one who won must be 
stronger, and so he should have a bigger say in the matters of the 
village. That was how (the Atayal) people were before. 
However, the terms used to describe the heroic figures – maotox and kazahou – are no 
longer indications of fearless, ‘brave’ ones. They are now given new interpretations in 
the modern context, and are both absorbed by local missionary usage. On a Sunday 
morning, the Atayal priest in the Presbyterian Church of Sawig passionately stated 
what maotox means in their modern, Christian traditions: ‘“maotox” is not someone 
who fights, but he fights for God and faith’.59 A ‘maotox’ is a ‘fighter for God’, he 
said. ‘Kazahou’, a word originally used by the Narima people to refer to sinlessness, 
is now being translated as “the Saints of Catholicism”. Here, we can see that the value 
of these signifiers has changed due to the shift in what they signify. Though the ideas 
of the two terms still remain – maotox for a ‘fighter’ and kazahou for a ‘sinless 
person’ – the value underlying the two ‘heroic’ references has been reoriented from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The original words were used in both the Atayal language and Mandarin, and in Chinese the 
sentence was: ‘（現在）maotox不是那些用蠻力取勝的人，而是要為了上帝和信仰征戰的人’. 
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the Atayal ‘bravery’ to a Christian context. The word ‘maotox’ is the best example 
here. With ‘maotox’, ‘bravery’ is no longer the focus of the term, as this ‘bravery’ is 
only valuable by serving God. This change of value in the modern Atayal culture can 
also be spotted by comparing the church’s usage of the term with the following 
statement:  
Participant SYK: We used to call the heroes ‘maotox’, meaning 
that they were afraid of nothing and were good in a fight. But now 
we also call those who only know how to use muscles and fight a 
lot ‘maotox’. Now ‘maotox’ also means pariah. 
    From the two modern contexts, we can see how ‘fighting’ itself has been 
transformed from physical force to the abstract idea of faithful, determined actions for 
God. It is also no longer the testimony of whether one follows the gaga or not, but a 
merit, and can only be a merit when such actions are taken on behalf of God. Here we 
can see how the Christian cosmology, the Christianised gaga, operates in shaping the 
modern Atayals’ cultural values. It not only shifted the religious subject from the utux 
to the Christian God, but also revealed the fracture of cultural values even when the 
Bienjing villagers claimed their adoption of Christianity was out of the ‘sameness’ 
between the traditional and this modern ‘way of life’. By the same token, the term 
‘kazahou’ further unveiled the transition of values due to the Christianised gaga. In 
the traditional Atayal society, the idea of the moral purity of ‘kazahou’ was 
manifested through fighting actions, and only by winning (surviving) could a man 
prove that he had followed the gaga and thus was ‘pure’ in the moral standards set by 
the utux. However, this moral purity of kazahou in the modern Catholic context is 
entirely based on following the Christian ‘way of life’, which has been clearly stated 
in the Bible: that the Lord cannot be ‘tested’ (Matthew, 4:7), but would put 
‘sufferings’ to men ‘in all kinds of trials’ (1 Peter, 1:6) even if they are ‘doing good’ 
(1 Peter, 3: 8–22). In other words, the Christianised gaga would not promise ‘living’ 
and a smooth life as ‘winning’; on the contrary, it values death not only because one 
must suffer for one’s faith in Christianity, but also because death means that a 
Christian can finally ‘meet his maker’. Most of all, death is also the only way a Saint 
can be canonised. These differences in the connotations of the ‘heroic’ and the view 
of death often appeared in the Sunday church services. In short, these differences 
marked the reorientation of the principal cultural value of the villagers from ‘bravery’ 
to ‘piety’, since actions now are only valuable with faith, and not as faith, as in the 
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pre-Christian Atayal society. On the one hand, we can say that this turn to piety in the 
cultural hero models echoes what Johnstone (2006) describes as the ‘internalisation’ 
of a series of knowledge and values in religious conversion, though this change of 
core values is contrary to what the villagers thought, in other words that Christianity 
was ‘the same’ as their traditional belief. On the other hand, we can also have a 
clearer picture of not only how, as I have demonstrated in the last chapter, the Atayals’ 
identity is deeply influenced by their religious character in the society, but also what 
their ideal character of a person and culture has become after their conversion to 
Christianity. 
7.3 The reorientation of value and the redistribution 
of power 
As the gaga determined the character of the Atayal culture, those who were in control 
of the gaga would therefore be in control of the cultural presentation. In the last 
chapter, I demonstrated how the gaga has been replaced with the Christian way of life, 
and that the clergy in the church are now in possession of the authority of the gaga. 
Although in Robbins’ (2004, 2009) study of the Urapmin people, this kind of turn of 
the social power was deemed to be brought about mainly by the prior changes of 
values, in the following section I will demonstrate how this change of the Atayals was 
firstly based on the differentiation of the power of tumux, and then further promoted 
the transition of cultural values. 
    We know that the decision-making meetings were no longer politically effective 
to the Atayals from the 1950s onwards, but the mindset of such a process still 
remained amongst the villagers when it came to the decision to adopt Christianity as 
the better and modern version of their religious belief (see the last chapter). The 
tumux, especially, had no actual power to decide the critical matters relating to their 
lands and economy, but was still able to exercise his social power in things that were 
less political, but were of immediate concern for their everyday life. Before 
converting to Christianity, or even during the early stage of their conversion, the 
tumux of each tribe in the village were still often being consulted on matters such as 
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marriage and fights between their own people or with other villages, or even when 
someone was sick. These matters were brought to the tumux to seek approval, a just 
settlement or a prayer for the unwell. This kind of prayer did not serve as ‘healing’, as 
the mahuni did to reconcile conflicts between the person and the utux, but was more 
like ‘saying good words for the person to the utux’ (participants YHF, YHP) with the 
authority of a tumux. The praying to tumux could also be seen in relation to other 
important matters such as moving or finding jobs, and of course on those occasions 
when tribal rituals had to be held. The tumux was said to be able to do such praying 
because he had a ‘stronger mind’, meaning that he was ‘better than normal people in 
every way’ and strictly followed the gaga, so that his words of blessing were more 
effective than others.60 When a tumux was not available for such activity, his place 
would be taken by the next reputable man in the tribe. 
    The phrase ‘stronger mind’ was also used to describe heroic figures in the 
traditional Atayal society (participant HSF, TYF), especially in the term ‘luax na 
tsokoliag’. Referring to the ‘core of stone or wood’, the ‘luax’ in this sense was also 
perceived as representing the character of the ‘stronger mind’. This connection not 
only revealed, again, the operation of ‘bravery’ in the pre-Christian Atayal culture, 
but also showed a deeper mechanism between power and value. In traditional Atayal 
society, the hierarchy of the prayer ‘effectiveness’ of the ‘brave ones’ was arranged 
according to the level of their ‘stronger minds’, which was determined by their 
practices of bravery. This was why, when it came to choosing someone to temporarily 
take the place of the tumux in praying, the ‘next reputable man’ would be the 
exceptionally ‘brave’, ‘heroic’ one, if there were any. This ‘stronger mind’ gave one 
the quality of being included in the group of power, and of being more ‘effective’ in 
praying. The status of social power of the pre-Christian Atayals could therefore be 
said to be positively related to the status of religious power, as the participant TMC 
stated: 
They (the pre-Christian Atayal people) believed that the more 
powerful people were stronger in praying. The older people in the 
tribe would know about the difficult language used in praying, but 
only the powerful ones like tumux could make the words be more 
effective than others. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The original words for ‘stronger mind’ were ‘心比較強’. 
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    Here, this mechanism between power and religion did not operate as a kind of 
divine-right kingship; rather, the position of power empowered the person’s religious 
effectiveness. We have learnt that the Atayals did not have distinctive political 
organisations, social classes or fixed power structures, and that reputations and 
authority were built on the personal characteristics and especially the practices of 
gaga. It was the practices of gaga and one’s cultural values that decided one’s power 
position in Atayal society, and thus that endowed a person with ‘sacred’ ability, which 
meant that his prayers received the blessing of the utux. In other words, it was the 
practices of gaga – which more or less involved the personal qualities to be able to 
follow it persistently – that enabled one to become a role model, gain a social position, 
and then obtain religious power. However, ‘those who made serious mistakes (in 
other words, violated the fundamental regulations of the gaga), even those who 
shared the authorities in deciding the tribal matters’, would also be regarded as 
‘having lost the trust of the utux’ (participant HSF). That loss of trust would not only 
result in adversities to one’s people or family, but would also mean that the individual 
would lose the efficacy of his praying. Therefore, practising the gaga, the ‘stronger 
mind’, was what empowered tumux with more ‘sacred’ missions, such as waiting for 
signs when making new gaga (see chapter 3), leading rituals and saying prayers for 
the Atayal people. That is, in traditional Atayal society, the practice of values could 
not only decide the hierarchy of power, but also determine the hierarchy of 
sacredness. 
    The religious power of tumux was challenged by the conversion to Christianity. 
Although the early Presbyterian missionary work was rejected, as detailed in the last 
chapter, in the 1950s Catholicism was shown to be the solution to the economical, 
cultural and identity-related problems of the Atayals in the modern state society. 
Christianity could not only reconcile the conflicts between the villagers and the state 
society, but also offered explanations of the ‘superstitions’ in the traditional Atayal 
beliefs, thus revealing itself as a superior, ‘better version’ of Atayal traditions. This 
Christianised gaga was believed to be ‘the same’ as in the villagers’ memories; 
however, Christianity also proved that many of the old beliefs were wrong, and this 
directly shattered the authenticity of the traditional Atayal ‘way of life’, and thereby 
the people who held such knowledge of it. This lopsided relationship between the 
traditional and the modern Atayal belief meant that any religious power that the tumux 
had left shifted to the Christian clergies. This transition of the power subordination in 
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religious matters was perceived by participant SYK as follows: 
… after that (believing in Christianity), we all went to the priests 
for the bigger matters of life, like weddings … in the Atayal 
traditions these customs were held by the tumux. He would pray 
for good luck for the newlyweds, but he did not know the gaga 
of the church as well as the priests … How to put it? Because 
you have to practise the gaga, you have to know and follow 
what is taught in the Bible in order to be heard by God. The 
tumux is of course a respectable position, but he knows our 
traditional culture better. Whereas in terms of belief, the priest 
knows better, his words would be stronger. 
    Since the tumux no longer commanded the authority of this modern gaga, his 
lack of knowledge meant that he could not function as an exemplar and role model in 
practising the gaga anymore. This transition of the knowledge paradigm of the gaga 
not only brought a shift of religious power in setting the role models for morality, but 
also revealed the reason for the shift in religious authority from tumux to the church, 
as stated in the previous chapter.61 That is, not knowing the gaga (and hence 
practising) as well as the priest, to the Atayals, represents the fact that the tumux could 
not speak for his people to God as ‘effectively’ as he used to in the old tradition. In 
this sense it seems to echo back to what the philosopher Francis Bacon states as early 
as the sixteenth century: that ‘knowledge is power’ (Religious Meditations, Of 
Heresies, 1597). On the other hand, we could even say that the transition of religious 
authority in the Atayals’ conversion, which established the knowledge–power 
paradigm, also manifests how ‘power is knowledge’ (Foucault, 1980, 1995) in a 
Foucauldian perspective. The transition not only changed the interpretation of the 
world and the social status of the group’s members, but also reaffirmed the new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The influences of the shifting of the religious authority from tumux to the clergies are perhaps 
greater than the reconstruction of power in the tribes. In some Atayal tribes in Miaoli, the position of 
tumux has been suspended for years, which is usually the result of the successors refusing to give up 
their jobs in the city and go back to the village, whilst the rest of the tribal members don’t think it’s 
necessary to elect another, since the functions of tumux have all been replaced by the government and 
the church. Meanwhile, the lack of specific responsibilities the tumux has to take in modern Atayal 
societies also made some of them feel less valued and made them question the meaning of being one. 
One participant showed such depression while I was in the field, and later he was charged with 
conversion of lands, extortion and bodily harm by the local court. This would have been unthinkable in 
the past for someone in his position, who used to serve as a ‘role model’ for the rest of the 
community. 
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structure of power and knowledge in the modern gaga. 
    To a certain extent, this is also similar to Eva Keller’s (2006) study of how the 
Seventh Day Adventists in Madagascar saw the study of the Bible as a way to 
manifest the power of those words from God. As a consequence, the ‘stronger mind’, 
that characteristic which enabled an Atayal to best follow the gaga and resulted in the 
‘effectiveness’ of saying prayer, has also shifted from the tumux to the priests. The 
Atayals’ idea of the relation between knowing/practising gaga and religious 
‘effectiveness’ also led to the redistribution of social power in each tribe of the village 
when facing the transition of religious knowledge. Though, at first, many of the 
villagers did not really understand the theological meaning of ‘converting’ to 
Christianity, but simply went to church on Sundays, they soon found out that this new 
place for learning the gaga was run not by the tumux, nor by the elders who had the 
‘wisdom’ and the ‘maotox’ that had the ‘bigger say’ before, but by the priest and 
those early converts who knew more about this modern gaga. The positions in the 
church were also hierarchically divided, into the leading priest, the ‘elders’, the 
ministers and the laity, to take the Presbyterian Church as an example. These 
positions are usually assigned based on how good one’s knowledge of the doctrines 
and one’s devotion to the church are. To the Atayals, this means not only that the 
‘powerful’ ones in the traditional Atayal societies were replaced by these church 
elders, but also that the approach to obtaining social reputation was institutionalised 
into these positions, rather than the practice of ‘bravery’ (K. C. Huang, 2000).62 This, 
again, not only showed the transition of the cultural value from the practice of bravery 
to piety, but also revealed the relation between power, cultural values and religious 
ideas in the modern Atayal society. 
    The knowledge of the gaga that the tumux possesses has become what the 
villagers called the ‘traditional culture’ – note that it is not ‘cultural tradition’ – which 
is separated from the church’s gaga, from their modern ‘way of life’. This is not to 
say that all traditional customs have disappeared from the Atayals’ modern lives, 
since we can see from the discussion in chapters 5 and 6 that the villagers still keep 
some rituals and some minor ‘superstitions’ without acknowledging it. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Reputation can also be gained by wealth, but such a reputation in the village is only seen as having 
‘a good business brain’ and does not relate to leadership. These people with good business brains 
would usually be asked for economical investment in the development of the village, whereas only 
those who are both wealthy and religious would be respected by the villagers, and would be invited to 
the communal meetings to take part in communal matters.  
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compared to the pre-Christian Atayals, who saw these rituals as the sacred practice of 
identity – that is, the practice of the gaga that constructed the group consciousness – 
the rituals are now held more as a part of the Atayals’ cultural heritage, which belongs 
to a different category from their current religious belief. This shall be further 
addressed in the following discussion. 
7.4 ‘Modern’ Atayal traditions and ‘old culture’ 
As knowledge is always defined and controlled by the people who are in power 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001; Telban, 2001), gaga as the cultural knowledge of the Atayals was 
also redefined and reframed when the religious power of the tumux shifted to the 
hands of the Christian church. In the last chapter I illustrated how the gaga was 
‘emplaced’ to the church by the embodiment of the Atayals’ modern identity in 
Christianity. During this process, the Christianised gaga not only continued and 
reframed the Atayals’ identity, but also gave them experiences of the ‘now time’ 
(Stewart & Strathern, 2009). This ‘now time’ is often revealed, if we look back at the 
statements of the villagers in the last chapters, through their referencing of the 
traditional culture as the ‘old times’ or ‘before’. They also distinguish between ‘old’ 
and ‘now’ gaga. In other words, rather than being divided purely by the sense of time 
or economic styles, the Atayals’ sense of history and ‘traditions’ is more likely to be 
divided by the change of cosmology.  
    In many cases, the ‘now time’ experiences following a religious conversion have 
appeared in the form of syncretism (Cannell, 2006; C. Stewart & Shaw, 1994; P. J. 
Stewart & Strathern, 2000, 2005; Toren, 2006). They are usually derived from the 
constant interaction between the current converting belief and the unconverted past 
(Stewart & Strathern, 2009; Whitehouse, 2006), which in a way can also be said to be 
the factor of reinventing traditions to adapt the change of time (Hobsbawm, 2003). 
However, ‘now time’ is often revealed during periods of obvious rupture from the 
past and from ‘traditions’, such as how the Samoan people saw their past rituals and 
behaviours as ‘meaningless’ when they converted to different sects of Christianity 
(Gershon, 2006), or how the Asabano people discontinued their previous relationships 
with the local, traditional supernatural beings ‘in favor of others’ during their 
conversion to Christianity (Lohmann, 2003:109). Such a rupture from the traditions in 
the past of the ‘now time’ can also be spotted in the modern Atayals’ view of the 
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‘traditions’. In 2011, the Maioli government organised the ‘Competition of the 
Traditional Songs and Dances of the Atayals’ with assistance from the Taiwanese 
Presbyterian Church. This competition included almost all Atayal villages throughout 
Taiwan. What was notable was the fact that in this competition of ‘traditional songs’, 
competing villages sang only hymns: the only trace of the ‘traditions’ was in the 
Atayal costumes. In the middle of the competition, I couldn’t help but ask my 
middle-aged participant friend – who, like most of the other middle-aged Atayals in 
the village, has been going regularly to church on Sundays since childhood under the 
influence of her parents – how these obviously modern church songs are seen as their 
‘traditional’ ones. Her answer was quite straightforward: ‘this is our tradition now’. 
The ‘traditions’ before the conversion to Christianity, she further added, were ‘the 
culture of before’. Although such reconceptualisation of cultural or religious 
‘traditions’ in the act of conversion are not rare – such as how the Bene Ephraim in 
India claimed the Jewish practices as their own in the conversion to Judaism (Egorova 
& Perwez, 2013) – my participant friend’s statement pointed out a sense of rupture of 
time rather than a reinterpretation of history. 
 
Figure 16, hymn singing in the Atayals’ traditional song competition. 
    A similar division of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ can also be seen in the Sumbanese 
conversion to Christianity, observed by Webb Keane (2007): that the missionary work 
created a unique sense of linear history by putting the unconverted time into the past, 
making it an anachronism, and putting the Christian faith in the present. The traditions 
of the ‘now time’ to the Atayals are what they are exercising in their daily lives, the 
Christianised gaga, throughout the year: they go to church on Sundays, celebrate the 
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birth of Jesus and support basically anything that is coming from the church. Amongst 
these new ‘traditions’, Christmas is especially remarkable in relation to the ‘now 
time’. Being the biggest activity in Bienjing village, the significance of Christmas lies 
not only in the fact that all age groups participate in it (unlike the adult-only zhulingji), 
but also in the villagers’ understanding of it being the ‘new tradition’. When asked 
how they see Christmas and zhulingji, and whether they perceive any conflicts 
between the two events, most of the participants gave similar answers to the 
following:  
Participant ZJW: zhulingji is our cultural tradition, which we now 
practise to preserve our traditions of the past … and, since now we 
all believe in Christianity, we should follow their traditions as 
well … we did not have Christmas in the past for we did not know 
there is such a thing as ‘Christmas’, but now that we do, it shall be 
our tradition, too. 
Whether those practices and beliefs of the old gaga from the utux are perceived as 
superstitions or part of the ‘culture’, they are all included in the anachronism that 
belongs to the past, ‘of before’. This division of history to the Atayals not only sets a 
distinction between the time before and after the conversion, but also implies a 
division between religious faith and ‘culture’. Such a division entails a twofold 
meaning. One is that it categorises the faith of utux as the ‘old culture’, and the 
Christian faith as the ongoing ‘traditions’ of ‘now’. The other – similar to Peel’s 
(1968) observations of the Yoruba people experiencing the African characteristics 
when confronting Christianity – is to see the conflicts between their traditional 
customs and Christian belief as conflicts between different ‘cultures’ rather than 
different religious faiths. 
    Though many Bienjing villagers could consciously state the first aspect by 
distinguishing which customs are from their (pre-conversion) ‘culture’ and which are 
from the church, the second aspect is now usually only pertinent to Atayal clergies 
and a small number of devoted churchgoers. As most Bienjing Atayals did not fully 
understand the theological meaning of converting to Christianity and were simply 
following what they were taught was the ‘way of life’, those who owned the 
knowledge of the modern gaga thus became the new elites of the Atayals. By 
mastering the modern ‘way of life’, as I have depicted in the last chapter, these elites 
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not only obtained the social power in the communities, but also became aware of the 
conflicts between the Christian faith and the traditional customs. Such a phenomenon 
is especially obvious to members of the Presbyterian churches, which have become 
the mainstream Christian sect of the Atayals both in Bienjing village and across 
Taiwan. This is largely due to the fact that, as the first Taiwanese Christian sector to 
train native aboriginal clergy (and the only church that has Atayal clergy in the 
village), the Presbyterian Church became more sensitive to the conflicts with the 
traditional beliefs of the Taiwanese aborigines than the Catholic Church. For example, 
the native Atayal priests were often referred to by the Bienjing participants as the 
reason they made the choice to be in the Presbyterian Church over the Catholic one, 
since the assigned Catholic priests – at least in the village – were either the Han 
Taiwanese or from different nations that could only speak Mandarin, and were less 
able to fit into the local culture and language. These Presbyterian Atayal priests, 
including the current priests of the Presbyterian churches in the village, therefore 
often see ‘passing on the gaga’ as one of their main duties along with missionary 
work. The Atayal traditional singing and dancing competition, which was held by the 
Presbyterian Church, was thus a product of such a sense of responsibility. This sense 
of responsibility was also why, at the end of the competition, one of the judges – who 
is also a Presbyterian Atayal – urged the entrants to ‘put the traditional culture into the 
belief of the Atayals’ and to develop ‘Christianity with Atayal characteristics’, since 
these two ‘share the same spirit of Jesus’. From here we can see how much the 
church’s attitude would shape the majority of the Atayals’ identification with culture 
and religion, making theological training of these future religious leaders crucial in 
the discourse of modern Atayal identity.  
    The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan currently has four institutes for training in 
the ministry: Presbyterian Bible College, Taiwan Theological College and Seminary, 
Yu-Shan Theological College, and Tainan Theological College and Seminary. The 
Yu-Shan Theological College (hereinafter referred to as YSTC) was established in 
1946 to train Taiwanese aboriginal preachers. At first most of the teachers in the 
YSTC were foreign or Han pastors, which to a great extent determined the 
fundamentalist attitudes of the early aboriginal preachers. Not until the 1980s did its 
theological orientation begin to turn to the development of inculturation, heavily 
influenced by the thriving contextual theology in Asia (Ku, 2002), through valuing 
and reinterpreting the importance of the idea of ‘incarnation’ in the Bible (K. -C. 
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Huang, 2000).63 Led by the Taiwanese theologian Shoki Coe (C. H. Hwang), whose 
theological concept was deeply influenced by the theologians Rudolf Karl Bultmann 
and Paul Tillich, the incarnation of Jesus in the Taiwan Presbyterian Church came to 
be understood not merely as how Christ ‘became flesh’ and is ‘dwelling among us’ 
(John, 1: 14) as a human, but how God’s word (logos) is incarnated as historical 
existence, the ultimate hope of which is salvation itself, not the flesh he becomes (B. 
H. Huang, 1990; K.-C. Huang, 2000). Bultmann’s (2000) idea of ‘de-mythologising’ 
the stories in the Bible suggested that the gospel can only be truly delivered with the 
readers’ own experiences, whilst Tillich’s (1951) theological ‘method of correlation’ 
also pointed out that the true understanding of the messages in the Bible has to be 
based on uniting one’s personal situation with the text (Tillich, 1951:8). In the Taiwan 
Presbyterian Church led by Shoki Coe, the truth of Christianity is thus to be revealed 
by first being ‘de-contextualised’ from the European traditions, and then being 
‘re-contextualised’ in local histories and experiences (Coe, 1993; Pobee, 1995). The 
‘incarnation’ of Christ was hence interpreted on such a level, establishing the 
discourse of the ‘cultural’ reconciliation between the Christian belief and different 
ethnic cultures (B. H. Huang, 1990). 
    This interpretation of the Christian faith and local culture explains how the 
church faces the significance of zhulingji (see chapter six) in Bienjing village now. 
The Atayal pastor RT, who was assigned to the Narima Presbyterian Church in 2010, 
stated his view (which means the statement can be read as being made on behalf of 
the church) to the members in a Sunday service:  
The foundation of us Atayal Christians is our culture. We can’t 
learn how to ‘become’ Christians without our culture, because 
God has always been in there. Some might say that zhulingji is to 
make deals with the devil, because the Bible says so; but it is not, 
that (argument) is a false understanding of the Bible.64 The 
meaning of these rituals is to remember our ancestors, not 
worship them; to be thankful to God in the way of tayan, not to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Contextual theology here is defined as ‘a way of doing theology in which one takes into account: the 
spirit and message of the gospel; the tradition of the Christian people; the culture in which one is 
theologising; and social change in that culture’ (Bevans, 1992).  
64 This statement resulted from RT being approached by some church members, asking whether it is 
okay to attend Zhulingji, as some of the members’ relatives in the True Jesus Church in neighbouring 
tribes were forbidden from taking part in Zhulingji. 
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make a sacrifice with the past superstitions. Zhulingji has always 
been a part of our culture, and so is our faith in God. 
    Very few people responded to RT’s speech, and some of the members told me 
later that they didn’t really understand what the pastor was trying to say but only got 
the message that ‘it’s okay to have zhulingji’. However, after the service, the pastor 
further explained his idea to me:  
The stories in the Bible were written in a different historical context, so 
many concepts have to adapt to the change in time and places. After all, 
Christian faith is about love, justice and truth, not about history … 
many customs in our traditional culture actually had the same principles 
as Christianity, such as be in awe of and thankful to God. It was these 
principles that mattered, that shaped who we were, so that we can say 
that we have always been the children of Jesus, not just after we 
believed in Christianity. Therefore, the problems we are facing are not 
problems between faith and culture, but are between the cultures of our 
time here, and of when and where the Bible was written. 
    This kind of acceptance of Christianity raises the problem of distinguishing the 
elements of Christianity and the converting culture in the modern Atayal syncretic 
religious practices. Whitehouse’s study (2006) of the Baining people’s conversion to 
Christianity in Papua New Guinea identified a similar issue with the pervasive 
Christian symbols shown in their traditional fire dance. Quoting Barker (1999:98), 
Whitehouse referred to such settlements of the conflicts between the indigenous 
culture and Christianity as the ‘appropriated Christianity’ (Whitehouse, 2006: 305) 
that guides us to understand how different groups recognise Christianity (Stewart & 
Strathern, 2009). From here, we can review the relation between Atayal culture and 
religious beliefs in terms of their cultural memory. Though the new religious 
experiences brought by Christianity, such as going to church on Sundays and the 
‘renewed’ zhulingji, may look different, in both process and in terms of the religious 
object, from the traditional religious practices, to the Atayals they actually shared 
similar cosmological and ethical principles. At the end of the song competition, for 
instance, the hostess made her closing speech by proudly stating ‘we Atayals have 
always been the ethnic group dedicated to God’. However, notwithstanding that they 
share similarities in principle that connected the Atayals’ indigenous and Christian 
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beliefs, the contradiction of the forms and the perceptions derived from the changes 
still require theological explanations to reconcile these ruptures (Stewart & Strathern, 
2009). In the Bienjing Atayals’ case, the two aspects of such an explanation – on the 
one hand creating a sense of linear history by making the non-Christian practices an 
anachronism and the Christian customs the ‘now time’, and on the other treating the 
conflicts as one ‘culture’ against another – represent precisely the ‘schizophrenic state’ 
of their cultural identity. 
    The Christian intervention in their sense of history, which caused Bienjing 
villagers to fail to experience the continuity of the past into the present, was the first 
schizophrenic symptom of the Atayals’ cultural identity. Fredric Jameson sees identity 
as ‘the effect of a certain temporal unification of past and future with one’s present’ 
(Jameson, 2001:34), and a ‘schizophrenic’ loss of identity is a loss of the continuous 
past (Jameson, 1983, 2001). This leads the schizophrenic to perceive themselves as 
disconnected from the past and only living in the contemporary moment (Jameson, 
1983, 2001) – isn’t that similar to how the Atayals disconnect themselves from the 
‘culture of before’ and see themselves living in the Christian ‘traditions’, which are 
expected to last eternally? Doesn’t the Atayals’ struggle to attend to traditional 
religious practices, and their eagerness to solve the contradictions between their 
religious faith and culture, reveal their anxiety about that historical discontinuity? This 
schizophrenic state was discernible to the Atayal clergy elites, who attempted to mend 
the rupture by giving renewed theological interpretations, which aimed to create 
‘cultural’ syncretism in order to avoid the question of the gap between the Atayal 
culture and Christianity. Yet this only made the schizophrenic state worse. On the one 
hand, such an interpretation is still only recognised by the church elites, which created 
the entirely different discourses of identity between the elites and the masses. On the 
other, even with the renewed theology that unites the cultural context and Christian 
beliefs, failing to identify the discontinuity between the signifier (traditional rituals) 
and the subject of the signified (utux or Christ), as most of the participants did, would 
still leave the actions exposed to ‘total instantaneity’ (Baudrillard, 1983:133), thus, 
again, returning them to the context-less status of schizophrenia. The schizophrenic 
experiences in the present Christian moment of the Atayals, therefore, revealed how 
the cultural memories of modern Bienjing villagers are of an anachronistic, 
discontinuous status, due primarily to their conversion to Christianity. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter, we saw how different Atayal age groups connected 
themselves with the cultural presentation in the film ‘Seediq Bale’ quite differently. 
The two sets of attitudes towards the film within the same tribe raise the issue of a 
rupture of cultural memory. I examined the relationship between cultural values and 
the power structure of the Atayals to understand better how these changed after their 
conversion to Christianity, and how that affected the cultural memories of those who 
‘converted’ compared with those who grew up with the churches. By attending to the 
Atayals’ ideas in relation to the term ‘heroic’, I have demonstrated how pre-Christian 
Atayals – that is, the Atayals before their conversion to Christianity – gained their 
social positions and were able to achieve influence in decision-making meetings by 
practising their foremost cultural value, bravery, embodied in the classical action of 
beheading (m’gaga). Such a practice of cultural value was vital for the Atayals’ 
cultural memory, as, first of all, it could buy a ticket to the power system, which, 
though less likely to control the gaga of the people, determined how the gaga was 
practised. In other words, the power system oriented what Jan Assmann (Assmann, 
2009:129) called the ‘figures of memory’, which not only concretised the formation of 
culture, but also embodied how one culture is identified. Secondly, for traditional 
Atayals, the strict practices of the gaga also meant that one would be singularly 
blessed by the utux while entering the power position and being given religious power. 
The ‘effectiveness’ of saying prayers was therefore almost the same as in the hierarchy 
of the social power structure. Therefore, we might say that social power, religious 
power and the practice of cultural values were in a dialectic relation that formed the 
deeper mechanism driving the relationship between religion and cultural memory. 
    Although Christianity was generally believed by my research participants to be 
‘the same’ as the traditional Atayal belief system, their conversion has indeed changed 
this relationship and ergo altered the cultural horizon of modern Atayals. With the 
acceptance of the Bible as their written, renewed ‘way of life’, the master of this 
knowledge of the modern gaga could no longer be the tumux but had to be the 
preachers who had received the right theological training. This heralded the fact that 
the cultural knowledge had turned to a more Christian-oriented base, and, more 
importantly, led to a redistribution of power, since the power structure was based on 
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the mastering and practising of gaga. Other influences on the transferring of cultural 
knowledge were that, without knowledge, one would not be able to act in the will of 
the high God, and thus would not be able to be blessed or heard by the God. The 
consequence of that was the marginalisation of the authority of the tumux and the old 
power system, for religious efficacy was the last power the tumux had of leading his 
people in the modern state society. The traditional power centre was replaced by the 
church, both physically and spiritually, which led to the deeper change of cultural 
values from ‘bravery’ to piety. Following that, the cultural horizon of the Atayals was 
then reshaped into the more Christianised scenery: the biggest ‘traditional’ event of the 
year for the Atayals became Christmas, and the interpretation and the decisive power 
of ‘traditions’ also shifted from the decision-making meeting led by the tumux to the 
church led by the priests. 
    Similar to what Hefner (1993) observed in the Javanese conversion to 
Christianity, I have also demonstrated in this chapter how Atayals have experienced a 
gradual, irreversible alteration of cultural transition that countered the fact that they 
had expected to ‘pass on’ their ‘original’ tradition during the conversion. This 
irreversible change in Bienjing village is exhibited firstly in the division of the sense 
of history: the Atayals refer to the Christianised time as ‘now’ and the 
non-Christianised time as the past. Many Atayals perceive this division as the 
separation of their ‘modern religion’ and ‘traditional culture’. In most cases, the 
principles of Christianity are now seen as more important and more ‘sacred’ than 
traditional customs, which we can say have descended to the secular realm. We can 
further suggest that the differences in the villagers’ perception of cultural memories, 
rather than being due to the change of time and the confrontation that they described 
as between ‘before’ and ‘now’, are actually a confrontation between ‘religion’ and 
‘culture’, the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’. Though the villagers claimed that this modern 
belief is ‘the same’ as their previous one, such a perception of temporal differences 
reveals the rupture of cultural memory. To borrow Fredric Jameson’s term, such a 
contradiction and struggle between the culture and faith(s) in that historical division 
revealed the ‘schizophrenic’ state of the Atayals’ cultural identity, and exemplified 
how they failed to experience a continuity of time, culture and religion after their 
conversion to Christianity. 
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Chapter 8 
Producing A New Boundary of Identity
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In chapters six and seven I discussed in some detail the changes of the idea of the 
Atayal ‘self’ from religious and cultural experiences. From these experiences, we saw 
how the gaga – the foundation of Atayal culture, the Atayal people’s ‘way of life’ – 
signified a tension between the old/traditional and the new/Christian belief systems, 
while facing the radical social changes brought about by the modern nation state. The 
transition of the content and idea of the gaga resulted in the redistribution of orders in 
the village: of social power, cultural values, rituals, the sense of time, and ideas about 
the sacred and profane. The transition also altered not just the geographical 
boundaries between the Atayal tribes, or between the Atayals and the Han Taiwanese, 
but also the symbolic boundaries that ‘encapsulate[d] the identity of the community’ 
(Cohen, 2001:12). During this process of transition, we have seen how the Atayal 
people stressed their ‘Atayalness’ by asserting their Christian ‘nature’, which, in the 
context of their conversion to Christianity, shows how, in Cohen’s words, ‘the 
symbolic expression of community and its boundaries increases in importance as the 
actual geo-social boundaries of the community are undermined, blurred or otherwise 
weakened’ (Cohen, 2001:50). This means that rapid social changes experienced by a 
community can lead to some reactions which reflect the commitment of its members 
to reconstructing the integration and boundaries of that community (H.-H. Lin, 2007). 
    This kind of reaction is based on the two perspectives of belonging. By 
confirming their belonging to a certain ethnicity, a person can paint him/herself in a 
‘much fuller portrait’ (Cohen, 2001:107) compared to the ‘others’. Whilst by 
establishing their belonging to a certain local ‘community’, a person is able to 
experience his/her social significance in matters such as kinship, friendship, domicile, 
modes of life, and love and death, which give him/her meaning as a ‘whole person’ 
(Cohen, 2001:107). The pursuit of identity through the connection between the 
individual and the community, in Cohen’s words, happens precisely because 
community is ‘the most adequate medium for the expression of their whole selves’ 
(Cohen, 2001:108). This not only provides the individual with a sense of belonging, 
but also allows them to be socialised within that culture of the community. 
‘Community’ is, therefore, the collection of the shared cultural experiences, the 
‘bounded symbolic whole’ (Cohen, 2001:9) that, in addition to geography, constructs 
the virtual boundaries of a group.  
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    In the previous chapters, I have attempted to disclose those shared cultural 
experiences of the Atayals and demonstrate how they were ‘reactions’ to the changes 
brought about by their modern cultural context. These experiences revealed how 
Bienjing villagers experienced a sense of belonging, that is, identity, while the idea of 
community, whether in the form of ethnicity or locality, was changing during a period 
of religious conversion. These experiences also, as I pointed out earlier, illustrate how 
the Atayals relate themselves to others, and become ‘whole persons’ under the 
guidelines (gaga) provided by their original religious beliefs and the localised 
Christianity. These experiences were critical in forming Atayal identity, not just in the 
way that the Atayals practised sacredness or created a sense of history that fitted their 
cosmology, but also in how the experiences were used and shared as a kind of 
language that could be understood by its social members. In other words, these 
experiences became the symbols that triggered the same attitude to certain matters 
amongst members of the same community, and thereby also constructed the sense of 
the group ‘self’ that distinguished them from ‘others’ (Mead, 1934a).  
    It is, then, the mechanism that transformed these experiences into symbolic 
power and influenced the Atayals’ identity boundary that I want to investigate in this 
chapter. I hope to give a broader and more thorough analysis of the reconstruction of 
Atayal identity along with their conversion process. I will, furthermore, discuss the 
consequences of this process based on the discussions presented in the previous 
chapters. Finally, I will conclude by providing a theoretical insight into not only the 
Atayals’ identity change, but also that of the Taiwanese aboriginal population more 
generally following the conversion to Christianity. 
8.1 The Atayals’ identity boundary: gaga 
An identity ‘boundary’ is not a concept to ‘categorise’ different groups or cultures 
ethnically, but one that helps to clarify a group’s notion of ‘self’ through the members’ 
social practices and how they experience social relations (A. P. Cohen, 2000). This 
kind of boundary does not ‘necessarily entail the distanciation of a group from its 
neighbour or interlocutor but, rather, may connect them and may thereby provide 
opportunities for social engagement “across” the boundary’ (Cohen, 2000:7). The 
cultural boundary is, therefore, the shared experiences that operate as the foundation 
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not only to bring together the members of the same group in terms of their sense of 
‘self’ as distinct from ‘others’, but also to create the space for communications 
between different ways of ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ by sensing the gap between 
boundaries (Fernandez, 2000). The ways of constructing such a mindset vary in 
different cultures or social contexts. The Lappish people in Norway, for example, see 
‘actual behaviours’ as the criteria to identify their cultural members (Eidheim, 1969), 
whereas the boundaries between the peoples of the Fur and the Baggara in Western 
Sudan are based on economical resource distribution (Haaland, 1969). Such 
‘boundary’ concepts, from the perspective of subjective agency, explain the conflicts 
of ‘identity’ between the Atayals and the Seediq people, as well as illustrating the 
relationships between the three Atayal tribes in Bienjing village. On the one hand, 
even though the early anthropologists put the two groups (Seediq and Atayal) into one 
ethnic category that influenced the Atayals’ idea of their ‘ethnicity’, it is still the 
Seediqs’ ‘way of life’ (gaya/waya) which determined their sense of belonging and 
drew the boundaries between them and the Atayals, whilst most of the outsiders 
would see them both as sharing similar culture and religious cosmology and thus as 
belonging together. On the other hand, this gaga-centric form of identification has 
also been the Atayal people’s conception of community. Whether it was the 
traditional gaga that was based on kinship and shared rules of practice within a tribe, 
or the ‘modern’ gaga that is established through the churches inter-tribally, the 
Atayals’ sense of community has always been bounded by the coverage of the gaga. 
    As I stated in chapter three, the traditional boundaries of the Atayals were set by 
the gaga, which was deemed to be the sacred contract made between the Atayals and 
the utux and was believed to affect the bounded community, which before the 
conversion to Christianity usually coincided with the territory of a tribe (qalang). 
Though the working groups within a tribe also set the sub-boundaries of the 
secondary communities of the tribal members and gave the individuals multiple 
‘identities’ in different contexts, the foremost means of identifying ‘themselves’ as 
distinct from ‘others’ was still each tribe’s sacred recognition of the gaga. The 
fundamental distinction between the tribes of Narima, Valus and Sawig, traditionally, 
as the locals said, was that ‘the gaga was different, and each tribe has its own gaga’. 
This was best exemplified by how the women, if they came from different tribes, saw 
their marriages: ‘marrying into another tribe means that you have to follow their gaga, 
and you become the person of this gaga’ (participant CT). This kind of conception of 
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identity still remains in the village today, and explains why, as discussed in chapter 
four, the wife would follow the husband’s religious choice regardless of the religion 
of her family of origin. However, the continuity of that idea reveals the discontinuity 
of the Atayals’ identity boundaries, since the gaga today is conceptualised as both the 
church’s physical location and its ideological denomination, rather than the domain of 
the tribe. This modern context of the gaga complicated the idea of identity among the 
Atayals. Where once identity was circumscribed by the geographical range of the 
tribe, the modern context created an identity that was split into two: one referring to 
the secular tribe, and the other belonging to the sacred, physical church and the 
individual’s religious denomination. 
    This modern gaga, therefore, is operated by what Timothy Jenkins (2004) called 
the ‘local particularity’, the ‘ways of life that create a sense of identity that relates to a 
particular place’ (Jenkins 2004:113), which forms the physical boundaries between 
the included and the excluded. Compared with the traditional gaga that was bound by 
the ‘sacred contract’ and embodied in the daily practices, the materialisation of the 
new gaga becomes responsible for the current discrepancy (and fluidity) of the 
Atayals’ idea of ‘self’ both personally and collectively, even within the same tribe. 
Although today all the tribal members can still clearly claim that their ethnic identity 
is linked to the tribes, in many cases there are also families or individuals who, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, find that they ‘belong’ to another ‘gaga’ (church) that is 
different from the majority in the village, and are thus often excluded from the 
mainstream church activities in the tribe. In chapter six we saw how in Atayal society 
this kind of ‘exclusion’ of tribal members in relation to different denominations, or 
different religious beliefs, is founded on the differentiation of the gaga, which is 
reflected in the changes in the villagers’ perceptions of a ‘tayan’. We also see how 
much religious transition has determined the Atayals’ self-identification in this 
supposed secularised world under the influences of the modern nation-state social 
structure. We cannot, of course, deny the influences of economic and political factors 
resulting from engagement with Han society in shifting the villagers’ boundaries, as 
they were critical in providing the social conditions for the Atayals’ conversion to 
Christianity. However, we should also distinguish between the conditions that 
provided the background to the changes, and the direct cause that led to the changes. 
This is why I focus on discussing the relations between Atayal identity and traditions. 
In the pre-Christian tradition, gaga was considered as the ‘way of life’, whilst being a 
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tayan was a sacred process of practising that way of life. In the modern, Christian 
tradition, gaga has become a term to index religion and its doctrines that not only 
separated themselves from the ‘secular’ domain, but could also be contrary to the 
‘Atayal culture’, which complicated and ‘secularised’ the meaning of the term tayan. 
    What I want to stress here, however, is not just the religious influences that 
shape Atayal identities, but that in a society which had basically been constructed on 
religious principles, the choice of religious conversion should not be seen as a purely 
functional act, through which communities and individulas are seeking religious 
support (and the material aid brought by it) in difficult times. Rather, I think ‘religion’ 
(if we need such a category) itself is the social foundation, the social mechanism of 
the Atayals. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the religious transition of the 
Atayals not only influenced their view of the world, but was also the driving force 
behind the transformation of the Atayal social structure, leading the Atayal society to 
experience a redistribution of social power, a change in the social hierarchy and 
changes in cultural values. To modern Atayals, ‘religion’ is the base that supports the 
community ethos and ethics and serves as a means of adjustment between the Atayal 
and the nation-state societies, which maintains their own distinct identity whilst 
enabling them to link up with each other. This reflects how Barth (2000) sees the 
boundary of identity as posing the characteristics of both connection and distinction in 
‘connecting’ the people inside and ‘separating’ the people from outside. Gaga, which 
is now understood more as an indication of religious belief, therefore becomes vital in 
discussing the Atayals’ identities. Further, borrowing from Barth (1969), who sees the 
boundaries of identity as drawn by social process, I think here we should take the 
Atayals’ religious transition not as part of their communal, social progress, but as 
their social transition, to discuss their changes and views of identity, given the 
inseparable nature of religious belief and society in the idea of the gaga. 
    To address what I mean by taking the Atayals’ religious transition as their social 
process, I must first elaborate on Fredrik Barth’s notion of the boundary of identity. 
For Barth (1969), ethnic groups are the culture-bearer units, whilst the 
communications and connections between the identity boundaries are established 
through the changes of social process, rather than being primarily defined by what is 
called the ‘nature’ of them. This is why a researcher should include a cognitive 
approach in order to consider more fully how the members of one ethnic group 
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experienced and defined the boundaries through their social practices (Barth, 1969, 
2000). This cognitive approach, however, should be applied discreetly. Echoing 
Bloch (1992), Barth further clarifies that human lives are constructed by social 
interactions, not just ‘cognitive representations’ – as in one society: ‘[E]very event 
has its precipitate in experience; each move made by someone will affect the nature of 
the connections that arise along the boundary, and thereby affect the “rich image” of 
the boundary that is retrieved’ (Barth, 2000:31). Through human interactions, social 
processes would ‘determine cognitive models, as much as cognitive models determine 
social processes – but with a degree of complexity in the connections so the two never 
become mirror images of each other’ (Barth, 2000:31). Barth (2000) then took the 
example of the ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia to explain how he sees 
cognitive categories and lived experience playing into the formation of the identities 
in different groups. Only by putting both the social and cognitive processes into the 
historical context can we have a fuller picture of the groups’ changes of identity. 
George Lakoff (1987) argues persuasively that people ‘are not merely playing out a 
structure, they are each a locus of reason and construction, using complex embodied 
imagery that they are trying to fit to what they perceive and experience’ (Barth, 
2000:33). Analogy, metaphor and mental imagery in life events, therefore, are critical 
in influencing how we ‘perceive’ the world, whilst the experiences we have would 
result in the actions we perform and the connections we make (Barth, 2000). 
    In short, by absorbing the schema concept presented by George Lakoff (1987),  
Barth values how mental imagery interacts with social practices and forms the various 
ideas of ‘boundary’ in different societies; and only by aligning that with the historical 
context can we understand how individuals internalise their culture through social 
practices, whilst culture is also simultaneously becoming the reference for social 
practices. The gaga, as I have pointed out in previous chapters, therefore drew its 
social and cultural significance from how the Bienjing Atayals used it as the cannon 
of actions to different changes of circumstances, since the Atayals’ references of 
social practices were based on the religious principles in the pre-Christian societies. 
Thus, when the Atayals took Christianity as the modern, upgraded gaga, their society 
was also altered to better fit the characteristics of the church. That alteration includes 
the redistribution of the power hierarchy, religious practices and cultural values, 
which, if they are not the essence of a society, are at least vital to the formation of 
cultural knowledge and cultural memory (Assmann, 2009). These alterations, on the 
	  	   165	  
other hand, have been revealed as a series of negotiations and struggles of different 
customs and rituals between the native Atayal and the Christian traditions. The 
negotiations and struggles thus unavoidably broke, as well as modified, the ‘chain of 
memory’ (Hervieu-Léger & Lee, 2000) of the Atayal society, since these rituals and 
customs are the foundation, the structure, the ‘normative texts’ and the ‘formative 
texts’ of their culture. Therefore, although gaga is now being used mostly as the 
signifier of religion/religious practices, it still serves as more than just another system 
that distinguishes itself from the secular realm. It creates the sense of time, marks the 
community of social belonging, shapes the interpretation of the world and defines the 
power structure. This goes beyond Clifford Geertz’s (1993: 90) view of religion ‘as a 
cultural system’; rather, I argue, gaga ‘is THE cultural system’ of the Atayals. 
8.2 The struggle of capitals in the transformation of 
gaga 
In relation to the above account, it is useful to draw on Bourdieu’s (1977, 1979, 1986, 
1989) concept of cultural and symbolic ‘capital’ to explain how the Atayals’ mental 
imageries and their perception of events were transformed during their conversion to 
Christianity, and how the missionaries and clergy rose and changed the traditional 
power hierarchy, thereby influencing the villagers’ conception of identity, culture and 
society. In the previous chapters, I have depicted how the Bienjing villagers gradually 
accepted Christianity after the missionaries took ‘contextual theology’ as the 
approach to cope with the conflicts between the two belief systems, and how they 
inter-translated the two systems in order to legitimise the inheritableness of 
Christianity as the modern gaga. The villagers believed that following the gaga would 
bring blessings to them and would also give them the opportunity to access the 
resources held by the church, although that was ‘misrecognised’ as reward for their 
continued participation. In these social structural changes, we see how different 
aspects – be they economic, cultural or social – were involved during the process of 
the Atayals converting to Christianity. From a more materialist angle, we can also say 
that these aspects represent the exchange and redistribution of economic, cultural and 
social resources; or, in Bourdieu’s (1986) terms, of economic, cultural and social 
capitals. 
	  	   166	  
    Drawing on classical economics and Karl Marx, Bourdieu extends the forms of 
capital from the economic scope and further defines it as ‘accumulated labour (in its 
materialised form or its “incorporated”, embodied form) which, when appropriated on 
a private, that is exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to 
appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour’ (Bourdieu, 1986:241). 
The idea of ‘capital’ here, in a way, becomes an exclusive productive ‘resource’ in 
different forms of labour that serves as the agents’ reference of actions. To address 
further how such a social mechanism works, Bourdieu distinguished the idea of 
capital into four different forms: economic, cultural, social and symbolic. In addition 
to the Marxist use of capital to refer to economic resources, Bourdieu defines social 
capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986:248). These relationships are 
‘made up of social obligations (“connections”), which are convertible, in certain 
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of a title of 
nobility’ (Bourdieu, 1986:243). Within the context of such social connections one 
also inherits, from the family, ‘cultural capital’ – the ‘forms of knowledge, skills, 
education, and advantages that a person has, which give them a higher status in 
society’ (C. Barker, 2004) – which is also convertible to economic capital and can be 
institutionalised as education (Bourdieu, 1986). To obtain a better social position, 
individuals would have to perform and also accumulate these capitals in different 
forms so as to exert influence either on themselves or others, not only making ‘capital’ 
a form of ‘power’ – the dominant power that the social agent possesses to struggle for 
certain interest – but also framing the differences of capitals between different agents 
as differences of power (Grenfell & James, 1998; Swartz, 1997). Capital, in 
Bourdieu’s sense, therefore decides the dynamic relations in a field and forms the 
foundation of locus in the social structures. The ways of accumulating, transmitting 
and converting capitals also becomes the mechanism of social and cultural 
reproduction (Bourdieu, 1986). 
8.2.1 Gaga as the social capital 
Bourdieu’s notion of capital helps us primarily to understand how the act of 
conversion in the Atayal communities would lead to the overall ‘reproduction’ of 
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their cultures. On one hand, we see how the social capitals (the ‘connections’, as 
Bourdieu sometimes calls them) amongst the Atayal tribes in Bienjing village were 
‘re-formed’ from the tribal-centred gaga to the church-centred gaga, which not only 
reset and complicated the very idea of ‘community’, but also changed the way tribe 
members were supported materially and spiritually: 
YHS (age 62): Although we are in the same tribe … the families of my brothers 
and mine belong to different churches … the people of his (one of the brothers) 
church (True Jesus) are rather … strange, they shake their bodies together (while 
doing the service), and they feel like by shaking together they can have a kind of 
connection to each other, but I couldn’t shake like them so I guess I still belong 
to my church … Different churches have different activities, so usually they (his 
brothers) would attend their churches and I go to mine. 
TH (age 41): All my family and relatives are in the Catholic church, but I am 
with the Presbyterian one, I like that church better … and you would feel the 
pressure coming from them because you didn’t join them (in the church). They 
didn’t say that out loud, but you can feel they just don’t support me as they 
support others, and you would feel like you are an alien in this family and in the 
tribe.  
    The ‘different activities’ range from the weekly meals cooked by the church 
members after the service on Sunday morning, to the zhulingji, Christmas celebrations 
and other group outing events. These activities take up church members’ time outside 
of working hours if they are active in participating and therefore frame their social 
network in the village. The frequent communications between the tribes in Bienjing 
village, in fact, were also mostly the church members visiting each other. Even within 
the same tribe, groups of people who spent time together were also usually divided by 
the churches to which they belonged. Such patterns in church-oriented social 
networking were not only revealed through the leisure times when the villagers hang 
out with ‘their people’, but also in the ways that contemporary ‘working groups’ are 
currently formed. For example, if we look at how the ‘hunting groups’ are currently 
formed in Bienjing village, we can see that their members are usually formed on the 
premise of being in the same church (whether one is a churchgoer or not) rather than 
the traditional bond of kinship, and so sometimes we may find that different family 
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members would go hunting separately as they are with different gaga.65 The same 
tendency emerged during the season of fruit harvesting when people would help those 
belonging to the same church, if they were not close to their family members.  
    Furthermore, as the majority of the church’s funding comes from members’ 
donations, the economic structure of church membership also affects the scale and 
quality of church events, as well as the resources or facilities that members can 
receive from the church. For instance, some ‘richer’ churches have a larger budget for 
the purchase of ‘nicer’ food and gifts for their members for Christmas celebration 
activities and to plan group trips or holidays, and they have more funding to help their 
members when sick or during difficult situations. On the other hand, in the village we 
also found that the populations of church members could be related to the church 
equipment. For example, one that has musical instruments would attract younger 
villagers, whilst another that has a karaoke machine has a larger mid-age population 
that enjoys singing. These observations indicate that the investment in church 
facilities also influences the composition of the congregation, though as shown in 
chapters five and six, the main factor for the majority of the villagers in choosing their 
churches was a person’s allegiance to tribal or family leaders. Younger generations 
manifest a tendency to join the churches that have a better ‘fit’ with their own 
interests or pursuits. Meanwhile, let us not forget that the churches often operated as a 
major local resource centre to promote welfare and governmental policies and that it 
was usually the ‘faithful’ members who would have first-hand information and access 
to those resources. This shows that even though the social capital gained from the 
church operates in rather different ways for the younger and older generations, the 
connections between each other, and the social, material and spiritual supports, have 
indeed changed. Whether it was the younger or the older generation, these changes 
were triggered due to the ‘transformation’ of the gaga from the invisible ties to the 
tangible church, and from a tribe-centred to a church-centred sense of community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Hunting activities, like most of the other traditional economic activities, are no longer as critical as 
they used to be in the lives of Atayal people. Although hunters are no longer required to follow the 
traditional strict rules, hunting groups still exist on a small scale, mostly as a result of the needs of the 
local restaurants, and sometimes are formed just for fun. 
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8.2.2 Gaga as cultural capital 
The re-formation of social networks (which, as discussed above, connotes changes in 
the gaga) not only brought about a structural shift in social resources and connections, 
but also changed the distribution and pattern of the cultural capital in the village, and 
influenced the generation of the Atayals’ habitus. In the past, gaga, as the ‘way of 
life’, was embodied and learned in the daily practices and, as Bourdieu (1986) pointed 
out, this cultural capital was also convertible to other forms of capital. The 
proficiency of the old gaga, manifested through the success of beheadings and age 
status, were the key to being involved in the power system that not only enabled the 
ones who had much cultural capital to enter the higher hierarchy of the society, but 
also allowed them to receive more respect for abiding by the sacred contract with utux. 
How much respect one received reflected one’s education and practice of the gaga, 
which, as the early Atayals believed, would result in how ‘effective’ one’s prayers 
were. An individual who had more cultural capital, such as the tumux and his family, 
would sometimes also be given raw or preserved meat, rice or wine as a gesture of 
thanks for praying for others. Such phenomena could be seen clearly in the family of 
the hereditary facial tattooist: 
ZSF (age 73): We Atayals’ facial tattoos had to be applied by the professional 
facial tattooist, who had to be female. The facial tattooist was a hereditary 
profession, and the gaga was usually only imparted from mother to daughter. 
Since facial tattooing was a specialised skill, and everyone in the tribe had to be 
tattooed, the facial tattooist took quite a high position in the early days, and 
almost everyone in the tribe needed to ingratiate themselves with her, otherwise 
you might get a very bad-looking tattoo on the face, or she might make the 
tattooing process more painful … The remuneration for facial tattooing was quite 
generous, so the facial tattooist’s family was usually the richest one in a tribe; 
and most of the remunerations were stuff like meats of different animals, rice 
wine, rice cakes or fabrics. 
    The payment for services such as facial tattooing later also included shell beads, 
which could be used as a kind of currency. But in those early days, when there was no 
currency to use as the economic unit for the exchange of goods and services, and for 
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the people who could not obtain shell beads, those gifts were actually equal to 
economic capital. Notwithstanding the fact that in practice, the gaga could be further 
subdivided into different sets of specialised working regulations and thus generate 
different types of cultural capital (for example, the facial tattooist and the mahuni 
would have their own professional skills and knowledge), the idea of gaga for the 
villagers was still based on the concept of ‘the words left by the ancestors’. In 
whichever walk of life and whatever social context, the gaga was always about the 
practice of those words, and each kind of gaga was always the sacred knowledge – 
the sacred cultural capital – that could be converted into certain ‘profits’. However, 
with the conversion to Christianity, I must reiterate the distinction made between the 
‘culture’ of the ‘old’ and the ‘life’ of the ‘present’ to depict the transition of the 
cultural capital in Bienjing village today. Although in the process of social 
reproduction we may find that the valued cultural capital in a field changes with time 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Nash, 1990; Swartz, 1997), we have to be aware that the villagers 
do not consider themselves culturally ‘changed’ but rather ‘advanced’, despite the 
conflicts between the church and the old traditions that are still happening every day.  
    The distinction that marks off the villagers’ sense of ‘culture’ and ‘living’ 
divides the cultural capital, the gaga, in two. As I have previously shown (in chapters 
three and seven), the success of a tumux nowadays lies in the proficiency of the old 
gaga; a tumux’s family is usually assumed to possess more knowledge of the old, 
‘traditional’ way of life, whilst one who has a better grasp of the old gaga – such as 
the local cultural and historical researcher – would also be respected as the authority 
of the ‘culture’ and be consulted on occasions. Most of the cultural capital of the old 
gaga, however, has lost its sacredness and become the mere secular knowledge of the 
past, which, at the same time, also forfeited its ability of converting such capital to 
economic profits. This, of course, was mainly due to the transformation of economic 
patterns during the Atayals’ adaption to modern society, yet we also have to take the 
role of the church into account in their process of modernisation. In chapter five, I 
addressed how the church was accepted as the ‘advanced’ gaga at first for its material 
support, and later for its resource connections between the government, the social 
organisations and church members. As this helped the followers to gain better 
economic positions, mastering the new gaga – meaning being a ‘good’ Christian – 
became vital in connecting their cosmology to the modern world. Although faith in 
Christianity represents the continuation of the ethos to the Atayals, the distinction 
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between ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’ traditions, as well as essential changes in the 
conception and practices of rituals, indicates the ‘otherness’ of Christianity, making 
the gaga ‘of the church’ ‘another’ category of cultural capital.   
    The otherness of Christianity manifests itself in the three states of cultural capital: 
the embodied state, the objectified state and the institutionalised state (Bourdieu, 
1986). As Bourdieu argues, the embodied state of cultural capital is ‘the form of what 
is called culture, cultivation, Bildung’ (1986:48). The very first distinction between 
the old and the new gaga in the process of the Atayals’ social reproduction lies not 
only in the separation of the ‘old culture’ and the ‘new tradition’, but also in the 
processes of acquisition and accumulation of the two. We have come to know how the 
education of the gaga differed in the traditional and the modern ways: the former, 
through the oral stories and daily practices, took ‘bravery’ as the most valuable 
cultural trait, while the latter, through the Bible, Sunday services and house churches, 
valued ‘piety’ above other qualities. This resulted in the fundamental differences in 
the sacred experience and the habitus. This differentiation in education also reflects 
the differentiation of the objectified state of the cultural capital. With the old gaga, its 
objectified state of cultural capital was not only in the form of the ‘cultural goods’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986:50), such as the delicacy of fabrics (for a good marriage), the 
strength of bows (for hunting) or the number of shell beads (the symbol of nobility), 
but, most of all, in the form of the living hei (body) – that is, an Atayal person. Let us 
make no mistake with the gaga in the embodied state: in the embodied state, the 
accumulated cultural capital was revealed through the habitus, the behaviours of each 
agent; whereas in the objectified state, the habitus would determine the blessings 
brought by the utux and thus decide the success, wellbeing or fate of an Atayal person, 
making the person him or herself the product of the accumulation of the gaga. Any 
defects of the body – be they physical or psychological disease, or any hypoplasia of 
the body parts – were also considered to be the result of one’s (or one’s family’s) lack 
(or violation) of the gaga. This state of cultural capital illustrated the Atayals’ view of 
a person as being constituted by the hei (body) and utux (spirit, soul). Under this view, 
the former was only the instrument for the latter to bring life into the world, the 
instrument for actions to become a true tayan and join the lines of the ‘utux’ with the 
last breath of the body, and the instrument that bore the different gaga in their tribes. 
    The objectified cultural capital in the modern Bienjing village, however, presents 
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a rather different picture. The foremost change of the embodied cultural capital 
encountered by the Bienjing Atayals was the coming of the Bible. Introduced as the 
written (not ‘foreign’) gaga, the Bible was the first concrete object of their ‘cultural 
capital’, records of the once untraceable ‘way of life’. This embodiment of the gaga 
gave the Atayals an investigable ground of their belief but also brought the variety of 
the gaga to an end. As I have noted in chapters six and seven, the gaga can no longer 
be ‘made’ by the decision meetings in the tribe, and gaga only varies by its 
‘interpretation’, by the form of ‘worship’ of different churches. Though the villagers 
still believe that following this modern gaga will bring them a ‘better life’, their 
success today – that is, economically speaking – does not always follow their piety in 
God. In fact, although most of the churchgoers do acquire a relatively stable life 
through the church’s connections, support and doctrines (such as being diligent and 
honest, and not abusing alcohol, which has been one of the main social problems for 
the Atayals), the few most ‘successful’ figures in the modern Bienjing village are 
either non-Christians or Christians who are not considered ‘good’ Christians. We 
could even say that this separation between economic status – or the secular life – and 
the gaga was derived not just from the adaption and connection to the modern society, 
but also from the objectification of the gaga in the Bible. Such fixed doctrines 
restricted the flexibility of this new gaga to react to the change of circumstances, 
which led to the fundamental turn of the objectified cultural capital from the person 
him/herself, to the more materialist presentation. Most of the believers would have a 
portrait of Jesus, the holy cross or even a shrine, to manifest the piety of their faith, of 
the gaga. These objects are also often used as part of the family education, to give the 
children ‘the Christian environment’. Yet here we can also notice what Bourdieu 
(1986) identified of the character of the objectified cultural capital: that one must first 
have sufficient embodied capital to be able to appropriate the objectified state for a 
certain purpose. In the houses of those who do not consider themselves to be ‘good’ 
Christians (who are usually the lower class of the society), such portraits and shrines 
are usually less likely to be seen, for these villagers would feel ‘embarrassed’ when 
aware that they are not properly following the gaga.  
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Figure 17, a private shrine in the Bienjing Catholic deacon’s house. As Catholicism in 
Taiwan was first rooted amongst the Han people, such Chinese-style shrines have 
become a common tradition in the Catholic Church in Taiwan, even in the aboriginal 
communities. 
    The institutionalised state of the gaga reveals the deeper impact of the changes 
of the previous two states of the cultural capital. The institutionalised state indicates 
the institutional recognition of the embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). As we 
have seen earlier in chapters three, four and seven, in the old Atayal culture, the only 
form of recognising one’s possession of the gaga was through the success in hunting 
and, most of all, the well-being of the individual; the institutionalised state of the 
cultural capital in the pre-Christian Atayal society was revealed through the hei, 
whilst the only extrinsic (and sacred) mark of such recognition was inscribed on the 
body – i.e., the facial and chest tattoos – to indicate the amount of cultural capital a 
person possessed. The body was literally their temple for such recognition. The form 
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of recognising the gaga in Christianity, however, is rather complicated and 
secular-oriented. Just as the early converters perceived that the missionaries held 
more genuine gaga then they did, with the Christianised society, one’s amount of 
gaga is not only recognised by the church, but, more importantly, is evaluated by the 
knowledge of the church rather than the actions relating to it. This is why when 
talking about the content of the modern gaga, the villagers would first recommend the 
preachers, then other clergies, according to their positions in the church. Even though 
one can act perfectly, just as the church taught them to and like most of the 
churchgoers do, one’s status of the gaga would only be recognisable – and thus be 
influential in the community – when they have ‘studied in the theological college’ 
(participant TSQ) or been ‘given a position in the church (participant CG)’. 
    This transformation of the institutionalised state of cultural capital, manifested 
through the set-up of the church and the hierarchy of rank in it, not only changed the 
Atayals’ way of recognising an individual’s gaga, but also later led to the 
redistribution of power in the village. The appointment and election system of clergy 
in both Catholic and Protestant churches played a critical role in this transition. 
Though the clergy is designated by evaluating their possession of the gaga, which, as 
the Atayal people claimed, is ‘exactly the same’ as how the traditional Atayals elected 
and appointed their leading figures, the process itself is rather secular. ‘Secular’ here 
means that, today, one’s possession of the gaga is no longer measured by the success 
of one’s actions due to the sacred blessing, but by how much one is familiar with the 
Bible. Of course, this is not to suggest that one can still be highly respected simply by 
knowing (but not practising) the gaga. However, it is exactly such a separation of 
knowing and practising in the recognition of the modern gaga that deepened the 
opposition between the secular and the sacred aspects in the modern Atayal society. 
8.2.3 Gaga as symbolic capital 
In the above sections, I illustrated how the transition of the gaga changed the 
production and reproduction of Atayal culture due to its vitality in the Atayals’ social 
and cultural capitals, which were deeply connected to forming the Atayals’ habitus. I 
also showed how, by putting them on the social axis, these factors determined the 
locus of each person in Atayal society before and after religious conversion, in which 
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the change of these social positions, or loci, would therefore indicate the 
redistribution of capital. Changes in the distribution of capital due to the growth of 
Christianity did not simply happen spontaneously along with the introduction of this 
modern gaga. They were, as the negotiations between the old and new traditions of 
the Atayals revealed in previous discussions (chapters five to seven), the result of a 
series of struggles of the agents in an attempt to maintain, or change, the balance of 
orders, or, in Bourdieu’s words (Bourdieu & Passeron, 2000; see also Swartz, 1997), 
the balance of power (between social positions, to fit the desired world view). In all 
those processes involved in the transition of capital in the Christianising Atayal 
society, we see how the changes were contingent upon the idea of the gaga. Gaga, 
therefore, could be said as generating its own symbolic power that legitimises the 
regulations deriving from it – that is, the symbolic capital that makes the gaga ‘true’ 
and ‘known and recognised as self-evident’ (Bourdieu, 1991:238) to the Atayal 
people. 
    ‘Recognising’ the gaga as the only supposed ‘way of life’ – be it the ‘traditional’ 
or the ‘modern’ version – is what Bourdieu (2000) sees as ‘misrecognising’ a 
subjective matter as objectively genuine. In his fieldwork in Algeria, Bourdieu (1977) 
referred to such misrecognition of the surroundings – that is, seeing the logic of their 
cultural system as natural and right – as ‘doxa’. Although some also recognise ‘doxa’ 
as similar in meaning to the concept of ‘ideology’ (Dickerson, Flanagan & O’Neill, 
2010; Eagleton, 1991; Žižek, 2012), Bourdieu argues that it stresses the ‘natural’, 
‘unconscious’ experience of life that is beyond the capacity of ‘ideology’ (Bourdieu 
& Eagleton, 2012). ‘Doxa’, as we have seen with the gaga and the Atayals, therefore, 
is the foundation for the agents to perceive and act on the given contexts, as well as 
the necessary condition to maintain the integration of society, reproducing social and 
power relations (Bourdieu, 1977). Contemporary Bienjing villagers, in seeing 
themselves enjoying a better life than those who do not follow the gaga, indicate how 
the Lacanian ‘fantasy screen’ of the ‘better life’ actually confirms and reinforces the 
disposition of the doxa through their daily practice. They believe it was the power of 
religious belief that led to a complete, abundant and righteous Atayal life without 
recognising the mechanism of resource distribution behind the power structure in the 
community. They go to church, give their tithes and participate in church activities, 
and in return they have better access to organised resources and information, and even 
share the power of the community. In exercising their given ‘duties’, therefore, 
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individuals further reduplicated the world’s misrecognised self-evidence of the doxa 
by the actions grounded in their beliefs, by the ‘instituted discourse about the world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:167). This cycle of gaga and Atayal practices shows that doxa not 
only functions as the unconscious consensus of a group, but would also lead the 
collective practice to ‘appear as “realized myth”’ (Bourdieu, 1977:163) by reconciling 
the ‘subjective demand and objective, or collective, necessity which grounds the 
belief of a whole group in what the group believes’ (Bourdieu, 1977:164). This is 
especially true in a group or society, like the Atayals, that is founded on religious 
belief. Based on such misrecognition, we may thus understand the mechanism behind 
the Atayals’ almost instinctual drive in following the gaga as the primary principle of 
life. The Atayals’ doxa of living by the gaga was often described as ‘how the Atayals 
ought to be, as it has been what the ancestors taught us’. This not only echoes what 
Bourdieu argues regarding the doxa’s role in the reproduction of society (that it makes 
the world of the agents a ‘realized ought-to-be’ (Bourdieu, 1977:166)), but also 
reveals how a society interacts with its members, becoming a ‘bounded symbolic 
whole’ (Cohen (2001:9) in constructing identities. 
    Such doxa come to light via the collective consciousness and the person’s sense 
of arbitrariness by culture contact, and through political and economic crises 
(Bourdieu, 1977). That is, ‘when social classifications become the object and 
instrument of class struggle, … the arbitrary principles of the prevailing classification 
can appear as such and it therefore becomes necessary to undertake the work of 
conscious systematisation and express rationalisation which marks the passage from 
doxa to orthodoxy’ (Bourdieu, 1977:169). Only by being aware of the potential 
arbitrariness (arising out of the change of circumstances) of the doxa can an orthodox 
way of viewing the world be built and accepted, and ‘heterodoxy’ be denied and 
rejected. How the villagers see their ‘old ways of life’ as incompatible with Christian 
doctrines and thus as heterodox ‘superstitions’, therefore, marks the movement from 
doxa to orthodoxy. By providing the contrast, as well as the similarity, to systemised 
Christian theology and the material advantage, the coming of Christianity not only 
revealed the prominence of the old gaga’s arbitrariness, but also made it the major 
candidate for orthodoxy with its solutions for political and economical issues 
generated by the modernisation of Atayal society.  
    We should further note here that political and economic crises had also posed 
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major problems during the Japanese rule due largely to the Japanese government’s 
interference in Atayal society by including the Atayals in the nation state. Even 
though the Japanese significantly influenced Atayal lifestyles, the authenticity of the 
old gaga was never in doubt, and the Japanese attempts to ‘reform’ the Atayal culture 
did not alter the gaga. For that, we have to first understand the preconditions for the 
‘passage from doxa to orthodoxy’. As Bourdieu states, to become the orthodoxy, the 
‘competing possibles’ have to be able to ‘restore the primal state of innocence of doxa’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:169) to make it not only a conscious discourse, but also the ‘right’ 
opinion within the group that meets the group members’ idea of the world. Such 
competing possibles, therefore, have to be contained within the universe of the doxa 
in order to restore its ‘primal state of innocence’ (see Bourdieu’s diagram below), to 
claim the legitimacy of the interpretation of doxa. This is why simply attributing the 
conversion to political, economical and cultural causes, and even ‘rational’ interest, is 
not sufficient in explaining the phenomenon of religious transition. In the case of the 
Bienjing Atayals, even when the traditional gaga’s arbitrariness was raised in the 
Japanese period through the change of circumstances resulting from ‘culture contact’ 
and economic and political oppression, the Atayals still chose to maintain their 
traditional belief rather than embrace Shintoism for the purpose of social advantage. 
Instead, the Atayals started to treat the traditional gaga as ‘hetero superstitions’ after a 
few years of missionary work in the early 1950s rather than during the previous 50 
years of ‘modern’ education under the Japanese government. The condition of the 
doxa thus provides an angle to understand such difference in religious choice, and is 
also why we have to go back to the sacred, religious nature of the gaga and Atayal 
society in order to grasp the essential element of their conversion.  
As I have pointed out, the Atayals’ sense of community and doxa were based on 
religious premises rather than political or economical principles. The ‘competing 
possibles’ thus had to share that religious nature, that universe of their doxa. 
Therefore, the economic and political dilemmas and the denial of their religious belief 
during the time of Japanese modernisation were seen by the Atayals as alien 
‘challenges’ and ‘repressions’ of their lifestyle and not as ‘competing possibles’. This 
was why, together with the material help being offered in difficult times, 
Christianity – the ‘infinitely translatable’ (Jenkins, 2002; Tennent, 2007; Walls, 2001) 
religious system – was able to break into Atayal society by ‘converting’ its cultural, 
ethical and theological terms to Atayal usage. It worked not only as a manifestation of 
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the arbitrariness of the ‘old’ gaga by contrasting it with the success of the ‘new’ one, 
but also as the means to restore the primal state of the innocence of the gaga in 
dealing with the adaption to modernisation. 
Figure 18, Bourdieu’s diagram of doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (1977:168) 
   Whilst the act of religious conversion is to transform one’s religious identity 
symbolised by special rituals (Meintel, 2007), and religious identity and rituals were 
the foundation of pre-Christian Atayal society, the ‘competing possible’ of 
Christianity here represents the transformation of the Atayals’ world view. This is 
why acquiring the position of orthodoxy is vital in the act of the Atayals’ religious 
conversion. From the recognition of ‘our gaga’ and ‘their gaga’ in different churches 
or amongst the tribes in the pre-Christian ages, we see how orthodoxy is distinguished 
as the ‘acceptable ways of thinking and speaking the natural and social world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:168) in different groups, whilst the ‘other’ is always the heterodoxy. 
Being in the orthodox position, therefore, indicates the possession of symbolic 
power – the ‘world-making’ (Bourdieu, 1989:22) power that can impose the 
legitimate vision of the social world onto the people (Bourdieu, 1989).  
    Bourdieu (1989) further states that to establish such ‘constitutional’ symbolic 
power, the power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital, which is 
generated from the symbolic system (religion, language, art, etc.). The symbolic 
system comprises both the ‘structuring structures’ (the symbolic forms that frame the 
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social world) and the ‘structured structure’ (the symbolic objectives that are 
embedded in the ways the agents perceive the world) (Bourdieu, 1979). In short, the 
symbolic system constructs, and is constructed by, the doxa – and the habitus 
corresponds to it. When one wins the power of discourse of the doxa, one is 
influential in forming the symbolic system. The translated, contextualised missionary 
work, therefore, not only functioned as the competing possibility of the doxa of the 
Atayals, but also as the means of acquiring the symbolic capital to establish its power 
of discourse, to shape its legitimate representation of the world. This opposition of the 
two forces of orthodoxy and heterodoxy is also what Bourdieu calls the ‘symbolic 
struggle’ (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 1994), which begins to contest the legitimate 
perception of the social world (Bourdieu, 1989). Such fighting over the symbolic 
capital within what I call ‘translated Christianity’ reflects what Bourdieu sees as the 
two forms taken in the symbolic struggle. The subjective form ‘transform[s] 
categories of perception and appreciation of the social world’ – the words and names 
referring to social realities – while the objective form takes actions of representation 
to bring into relief ‘certain realities’ (Bourdieu, 1989:20-21).  
On the one hand, the series of concept transformations, such as the idea of utux kayal 
to the Christian God, utux to souls, and kazahou to Saints, as well as the fundamental 
Atayal ethics to the Ten Commandments, gave Christianity legitimacy in inheriting 
the Atayals’ gaga. On the other hand, the economic advantage brought by church aid 
and their cooperation with the government further reflected the ways in which being a 
Christian, while fitting the domain of the Atayal doxa, could symbolise ‘relief’ from 
the Atayals’ social dilemmas. This included the economic situation and the 
discrimination the Atayals suffered from the majority Han people, as well as the 
failure of the old gaga to offer the community a mechanism of coping with the 
modern society. Relieving the pains of the social gaze through material support not 
only gave the villagers the concrete hope of a viable economic future, but also 
symbolised the ‘disenchantment’ with the doxa of the gaga. A ‘disenchantment’ that 
restored the ‘primal state of innocence’ of the contract made with god, and thereby 
restored the blessing from god. 
    Nonetheless, we should note that these symbolic influences occurred mainly 
among the early converters – that is, the leading figures in Bienjing village. Most 
Atayal people did not actively choose their religious belief and did not have a 
complete comprehension of what this conversion meant, but simply followed their 
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family leaders. However, from the leading figures’ wishes of ‘preserving’ and 
‘protecting’ the traditional culture by converting to Christianity, which was seen as 
‘the same’ as but ‘better’ than the traditional gaga, we can still see how the doxa was 
imposed by the agents as an objective principle to defend their symbolic capital – and 
that symbolic capital is, as Bourdieu (1977:183) puts it, ‘a transformed and thereby 
disguised form of physical “economic” capital’. This is why the participants of this 
study deny the importance of material support in their act of conversion but reiterate 
the ethical universality between Christianity and the traditional gaga, as the economic 
interest in Atayal society had never been revealed in its purest materialist form, but 
was transformed as the blessing for obeying the gaga. Yet it was exactly this 
materialist judgment of the faultiness of the old gaga that reflected the essence of 
secularity in the Atayal people’s conversion to Christianity. Even though in traditional 
Atayal culture one’s success or failure would be taken as mirroring one’s obedience to 
the gaga, and gaga would sometimes be added or adapted to the changing 
circumstances, the gaga had never been taken as false or erroneous when facing other 
financially superior groups, nor would any change of the gaga be practised without a 
sign of approval from the utux. The utterly rational choice of acknowledging 
Christianity as the genuine gaga, therefore, marked the fundamental rupture of the 
previous pattern of connection between the divine and secular worlds. It not only put 
secular, or economic, success before the practice of the gaga, but also created room 
for the Atayals to disengage and re-engage themselves from one gaga to another out 
of secular practice, and thereby multiplied the relations between the Atayals and the 
gaga. 
The rational decisions to convert based on symbolic struggle can only be applied 
to the few leading people in the village. However, the way most villagers followed 
them, similarly adjusting their self-identities, suggests exactly that which Bourdieu 
thinks is the most vital social function of the symbolic system: domination (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1990, 1991). Functioning so as to ensure ‘the reproduction of the established 
order’ (Bourdieu, 1977:190), domination is operated by each individual as ‘the 
condition of the appropriation of the material and symbolic profits of labour’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977:184) as the recognised social mechanism. For an established group to 
exercise domination, ‘the dominant class have only to let the system they dominate 
take its own course’ (Bourdieu, 1977:190), just as most of the Atayals would feel 
obligated to follow the decisions made by the ruling class (the tumux, elders and other 
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reputable people), since the hierarchical obedience to the decision-making group by 
age rank in each family was recognised as the natural social order in Atayal society. It 
was these mechanisms of domination, deriving from the belief in the gaga, that 
resulted in the early distribution of the church members. That is to say, rather than 
being a personal choice of religious affiliation, most of the villagers’ decisions about 
which church they converted to were a result of the power struggle between the 
different leading families. However, as relations of domination are required to be 
produced and reproduced by the interactions between persons through 
institutionalised mechanisms (Bourdieu, 1977), the social mechanisms that inevitably 
came with Christianity altered the goals that early converters wanted to achieve. 
Though failing to faithfully reproduce the old gaga, that alteration, hidden under its 
symbolic power and exercised by the operation of the social and cultural capitals of 
the Christian cosmology, still produced and reproduced the Atayals’ relations with 
others, and was perceived as legitimate progression in Atayal life.  
8.3 Conclusion 
Beginning with Fredrik Barth and Anthony P. Cohen’s idea of the ‘identity boundary’, 
in this chapter I have applied Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power and his 
forms of capital to address the ways in which the Atayals’ identity of self is 
constructed through the social process of interactions between individuals and the 
social structure, and how that identity changed through the supposed reproduction of 
the traditional culture with Christianity. First, I discussed the ways in which the gaga 
operated as the source of ‘power’ in the Atayal society and how this power could be 
treated as different forms of ‘capital’ that were possessed by individuals and 
determined their social positions. Based on this premise, I discussed the functions of 
the gaga as the social, cultural and symbolic capitals formulating the Atayal villagers’ 
social experiences, and demonstrated how, for each form of capital, converting to 
Christianity changed the meaning and forms of being Atayal, both as individuals and 
as a community. 
    As social capital, the greatest change in the gaga has been from one that refers to 
a tribe sharing the same sacred regulations, to one referring to a church to which one 
belongs. Since the modern way of life no longer requires sacred knowledge as the 
religious life has been separated from the secular one, the ‘private’ time of the Atayals 
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in Bienjing village has become the field of sacred practice supporting the villagers’ 
idea of identity. Instead of contributing in tribal matters, participating in church 
activities helps the villagers to form connections with other group members not only 
in terms of social support, which defines an individual’s sense of belonging, but also 
in terms of the material support that is combined with the resources held by the 
church in contemporary Atayal society. The different resources acquired by different 
churches, meanwhile, also attract different types of members to the churches. Such a 
way of acquiring social capital from the church fostered network and cross-regional 
identity, especially among Atayal youth. It further suggested a substantial change in 
the idea of community, from a means through which to carry out sacred practice to a 
way of sharing an interest in more secular matters. 
    However, the key to the reproduction of Atayal social structure lies in the gaga 
being exercised as cultural capital. With the examples of the tumux and the facial 
tattooist, I illustrated how the mode of cultural capital in the pre-Christian Atayal 
society operates: one’s knowledge and practice of the gaga is reflected in the received 
respect, and different types of knowledge of the old gaga are transformed into 
economic capital. And it was the sacredness inherent in the old gaga that chiefly 
supported this social reproduction. Now, despite the fact that most of the Christian 
villagers consider themselves to be continuing their ‘way of life’, from the distinction 
generated by cultural capital between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ gaga (that is, the gaga 
of the culture and the gaga of their current life), we can see how the operation of 
cultural reproduction has been changed into the sacred and the secular – a process 
which might as well have been unimaginable to pre-Christian Atayals. In this new 
mode, those who have knowledge of the old gaga would still be respected and 
honoured, but it is out of the people’s respect for tradition rather than for the 
sacredness one possesses. The practice of the old gaga, furthermore, would no longer 
gain direct profits. On the other hand, those who ‘practise’ the new sacred gaga, 
which to most of the villagers is simply a matter of church attendance and 
contributing to church activities, benefit in the less direct way of accessing 
information and connections.  
    In order to deepen the analysis of how the distinction between the secular and the 
sacred realms of modern Atayal life impacted upon the reproduction of Atayal culture 
and identity, I went on to examine the functions of the gaga by means of Bourdieu’s 
three states of cultural capital: embodied state, objectified state and institutionalised 
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state. In terms of education, the embodied state of the gaga changed from the delivery 
of oral stories along with daily practice, to Bible references and attending Sunday 
services. These differences in the embodiment of the gaga indicate the changes in 
both the spatial character and personal experience of the sacred, from body to church. 
This change was further reflected in the objectified state of the gaga. In the 
pre-Christian Atayal life, in addition to the ‘cultural goods’ such as fabrics and shell 
beads used to manifest their possession of cultural capital, the objectified state, the 
instrument of the gaga, was the human body – the hei. How much one possessed the 
cultural capital – that is, how much one had followed the gaga, as the villagers 
believed – would therefore be reflected in the conditions of the body. However, as the 
gaga is now ‘objectified’ as Biblical text, it not only lost the ability to adapt to the 
various conditions between the body’s practice and the environment, but also, as a 
consequence of that, cancelled the sacred interaction between the body and the 
environment. The detachment of one’s success and well-being from that sacred 
guidance reaffirmed the distinction between the sacred and the secular realms. 
Meanwhile, as the body is no longer the bearer of the gaga, presenting the objects of 
the religious belief thus became the way the villagers reveal their piety in the gaga, 
marking yet another critical turn of sacredness to material objectification in the 
Atayals’ religious experiences. In the meantime, this oppositional relation between 
substance and spirit is reflected and deepened through the institutionalised state of the 
gaga. That is to say, operated by the power of institutional recognition, the distinction 
between secular substance and sacred spirit is not only a result of the change in how 
the gaga is gained: in other words, that it is gained through knowledge of it, rather 
than by practising it. The change in the gaga’s recognition from the bodily to the 
churchly also resulted in the shift of power in the village, thereby reproducing such 
patterns of the sacred–secular relation, deconstructing and reconstructing the 
sacredness of the Atayal people’s identity. 
    Finally, in an attempt to explain further how these changes are accepted as ‘new 
traditions’ for the Atayals, I adopted Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power in order 
to analyse how Atayal social structure and individuals’ mental imageries interact to 
construct their boundary of identity. By elaborating on the operation of the ‘doxa’, I 
analysed how Atayal daily practices are integrated and dialectically related to their 
belief in the gaga and how, by not recognising that relationship between the actions 
and belief, the villagers recognised the gaga as their natural way of life. The exercise 
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of symbolic power, as Bourdieu points out, is dependent on the ‘belief’ of agents to 
naturalise once arbitrary social relations. This was the reason why Bienjing Atayals 
would only take Christianity as the orthodox gaga after the missionaries started to 
‘contextualise’ their approach – that is, to convert their missionary work as well as 
their material resources to symbolic capital – since this strategy provided the solution 
for the Atayals’ problems in reality, while fitting the universe of the doxa. The 
process of Christianity’s struggle against orthodoxy thus revealed the mechanism and 
the root of secularisation and of the Atayal people’s change of identity during their 
conversion. The recognition of an orthodox gaga by Christianity helps us understand 
the apparently paradoxical process that involves the Atayals believing that they are 
continuing their traditions when the adoption and practice of different capitals suggest 
otherwise.
	  	   185	  
Chapter 9 
Conclusion:  
an Alternate Understanding of 
Secularisation 
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The traditional Atayal life was based on the ideas of gaga and utux, which formed 
almost every principle of the ways of living, including the rules of hunting, 
worshipping, ethics and even talking. In other words, it was impossible to separate the 
traditional Atayal life into the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ domains, since the ideas of a 
traditional Atayal society were completely based on its religious beliefs. Even ideas 
that we view as secular technological knowledge today – such as how and when to 
plant crops – were part of the sacred practices, as they were practised in a religious 
way. They were all gaga; they all formed ‘the way of life’. The whole point of being a 
tayan, in tradition, was therefore to follow the gaga left by the ancestors, so as not to 
offend the bisani nor be punished by the utux, and become a ‘real man’ to face one’s 
ancestors after death, at the other side of the hongu utux. This ‘doxa’ explains why the 
Atayal people would not say what they ‘believed’ in the past – for them, it was just 
the right and wrong ways for living in the world with the rules left by their ancestors. 
However, together with the influences of modernisation in education, politics and 
economy, and the pervasion of Christianity, the ‘belief’ in Jesus made them aware of 
the existence of a more ‘secular’ world – a world where some laggard Atayal people 
have no faith, and where the growth of fruit does not depend on the will of God, but 
rather on the knowledge of farming. Hence, there exists a religious life separate from 
this secular livelihood: they go to church on Sundays, pray to God when ill, and seek 
answers from the priest when the knowledge of the secular world can no longer 
satisfy their curiosity.  
    In the progress of this ‘disenchantment’ of the Atayal people’s religious belief, 
we see how different factors are played out in driving them to embrace Christianity, 
which inevitably, to a culture and living style that were centred on religious principles 
like the Atayals, changed not just their ‘way of life’ but also how they viewed 
themselves. As I pointed out in Chapter One, the construction of ‘identity’ itself is 
never determined solely by social conditions, nor can it be built on subjective 
recognitions without the input of social contexts. The construction of identity is, again, 
a series of interactions between individuals and their surroundings, in terms of both 
the subjective and the objective conditions of the surroundings. The question I 
adopted from Alan and Irwin Howard (1977) at the beginning of this study, which 
seeks to understand the conditions of the ‘superordinate symbol of identification’ of 
the Atayal people, has thus been addressed in both social and psychological ways. 
Though most of the past studies chose only one of the two approaches (and most 
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likely the sociological one) to deal with the subjective and objective formations of 
self-identity, I believe that the combined use of Lacanian psychological ideas and the 
social theories of Bourdieu throughout this study should have justified the value of 
such an analytical style. While Bourdieu’s theory of practice provided a framework to 
examine the social reproduction of identity, it was only through psychological 
analysis that we could understand the workings of such a process and how it could 
actually be a valid mode to be applied to the issue. Psychoanalysis helps us to identify, 
as Ying-kuei Huang (1991) and Yi-hong Chang (2001) suggested (see chapter one), 
the critical factors in religious and cultural transitions that are considered subjectively 
as problems by the locals. In other words, by cognitive analysis, we can better 
understand the mechanisms of how and why certain events could serve as the 
‘conditions’, the ‘capitals’, in the cultural and religious transitions of one society, 
while having little effect in another.  
    While the changes in economic patterns and nationalism brought by modernity, 
for example, have been recognised as common factors in religious conversion 
(Buckser & Glazier, 2003; Veer, 1994) and were deemed in past studies to be the 
main elements influencing Taiwanese indigenous peoples’ modern identities (Ma, 
2002), they did not provide a satisfactory explanation of how they were linked to the 
peoples’ perception of their surroundings. However, with the introduction of 
psychoanalysis, we can now understand that in the case of the Atayals in this research, 
the changes of economic patterns and social environment not only triggered the 
antagonism between the Atayals and the Han (the major societies), but also resulted in 
the anxiety of the Atayal people toward the insufficiency of the gaga and their 
marginalised socio-economic status in the modern society. The Christian missionary 
with material aids, as another instance, thus came as the ‘fantasmatic supplement’ to 
sooth the trauma of that social dilemma. This ‘fantasmatic supplement’ not only 
represented the Atayals’ vision of having a ‘better life’, but also stood for the cultural 
boundary between the Atayal and the Han societies, while at the same time trying to 
fill that socio-economic gap. Converting to Christianity, while claimed by the Atayals 
to be out of the pursuit of ethical consistency in the modern world, is therefore also an 
act of social and political strategy. This understanding of the Atayals’ conversion is 
crucial. Although the political and socio-economical dimensions of their turn to 
Christianity have been brought up long ago, we should not, as many of the Jinshuei 
villagers accused some previous studies of doing, treat the Church’s material aid as 
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the blunt political and social inducement of their acceptance of Christianity. It was not 
the material aid that drove the Atayals into the arms of Christianity and became the 
political and economical agenda of their conversion, but the vision of a ‘better life’ 
and the cultural distinction from the Han society. This not only served as the missing 
piece, as I stated in the first chapter, between the transition and production of 
identities in Atayal studies, but, moreover, provided an insight into the uniqueness of 
Taiwanese indigenous groups’ mass religious conversions – as it was one rare 
instance of a group collectively embracing Christianity without the influence of 
‘white power’. 
    There were, of course, certain social and cultural conditions that established 
Christianity as the solution to the Atayals’ dilemma in modernity, and I have 
highlighted these conditions by using Bourdieu’s theory to deconstruct the ideologies 
and constructions of the Atayal society. First of all, from the traditional worldview of 
the Atayals we see how gaga was one ethical system based on the religious belief in 
utux. The anxiety of the gaga being insufficient in the modern world, therefore, could 
be viewed as the anxiety of both the religious practice and ethics for the Atayals. 
Under such circumstances, the Catholic Church, the missionary approach of which 
focused on the moral view and the monotheist structure, thus quickly provided the 
‘orthodoxy’ of the modern gaga through theological translation. In addition to that, 
the commonness of ethical values between Christianity and Atayal further reaffirmed 
the Atayals’ intuitive belief in the doxa – the need for being a ‘moral person’. The 
material aid brought by the Catholic Church and its coordination with the government, 
on the other hand, also helped to confirm this connection between the moral 
orthodoxy and the Christian Church, as in the traditional Atayal world the material 
abundance was deemed as the reward for righteous deeds. These factors of 
Christianity formed the modern orthodox gaga: which allowed the traditional ‘way of 
life’ to continue in a ‘disenchanted’ manner, but deeply influenced the Atayal culture 
in two ways, both of which suggest the introduction of a different mode of 
secularisation that does not conform to the public character of Western secularisation. 
9.1 Secularisation as fetishism 
The first sign of the secularisation of the Atayal culture lies in Christianity being the 
‘fantasmatic supplement’ of the Atayals’ social dilemma. Although the traditional 
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Atayal culture believed in the utux controlling the wellbeing of the tayan, the 
adversity of the people was also considered to be punishment from utux. Instead, 
turning to Christianity was a ‘rational’ decision. This means that this change of gaga 
did not pass through the traditional religious process, but resulted from a consensus 
opinion. This conversion thus showed the very secular reference in the Atayal 
people’s acknowledgement of their tradition’s ‘superstitions’ and the false belief in 
the utux. We might even say that this secular reference not only was based on the 
ideology of an ideal ego, but also served as a ‘fetish’ construction of the Atayals’ 
belief in Christianity. The fetishism here is not a bodily and sexually triggered trauma 
as in Sigmund Freud’s (2001)[1913] terms, which ‘the mother lacks a penis and the 
ensuing fear of castration that pathologically leads to the substitution of a sexual 
object with an Other.’ (Böhm, 2010: 350) Rather, we should understand this drive in 
terms of the fetishistic relation between the subject’s cause of desire and the object of 
desire in a Lacanian way, which is ‘not the real family father and his penis… but the 
Name-of-the-Father and the phallus, both of which are symbolic, mythical signifiers 
that mark the formation of society.’ (Böhm, 2010: 352) The Name-of-the-Father, 
according to Lacan (1977, 1978), signifies the lack and repression resulting from the 
gaze of the Other. It is because the phallus, as Lacan puts it, ‘is in the place of the 
Other that the subject has access to it. But since this signifier is only veiled… it is this 
desire of the Other as such that the subject must recognise.’ (Lacan, 1977: 288) The 
phallus, in other words, represents what is lacked by, as well as what is desired of the 
subject for the society. In the Atayals’ case, we found out how the need for better 
material life resulted from the ‘gaze’ of the Other, while such need became not only 
the ‘trauma’ of the Atayals for being in the marginalised social status, but also the 
‘desire’ for the Other, the modern society. Yet it was also, because the Other can 
never be fully obtained, that fetishism in this case operated as the substitution for the 
desire of the Other by transforming the desire/lack to the obsession with a certain 
object. (Lacan, 1977) I thus argue that the Atayals’ secular reference in their 
conversion to Christianity reveals the transformation of the trauma/desire from the 
Other to the ‘obsession’ with the ‘better life’ (that could possibly be) provided by 
Christianity.  
    When Christianity is recognised as the fetishistic image of the Atayals, this 
imagination of a better life represented by Christianity also became its symbolic 
capital that further shaped the modern world of the Atayals. In Bourdieu’s (2007) 
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theory of capital, symbolic capital is usually obtained through people’s economic 
capital, social status and reputation, making a ‘person’ as the bearer for symbolic 
capital. Yet in practical life, symbolic capital is not necessarily attached to human 
bodies, but can first be endowed to objects, and then circulate back to the body 
through the connection between the two physical ends. The Church, as representing 
the material abundance that is compatible with mainstream Han society, thus provided 
such symbolic capital to the Atayal converts, so that their believing in Christianity 
became symbolic of the promise of the material future. This promise, as we have seen 
in chapter eight, was what helped Christianity gain the position of orthodox gaga 
while sharing the Atayal ethical values. By legitimising Christianity itself as the 
modern orthodox way of life, the subsequent symbolic struggle against the premodern 
Atayal traditions further influenced the modern Atayals’ understanding of the world. 
    To the Atayals, such understanding of the world is never merely a ‘religious’ 
interpretation of the way the world is. Being a society founded on religious principles, 
this Christianised understanding of their history – the ‘now time’ of the conversion 
and the ‘past’ of the ‘culture’ – and rituals changed not only the perception of the 
symbolic meaning of these customs, but further reshaped the episteme (Foucault, 
2005), or the schemes of analogy and classification (Durkheim and Mauss, 1970) of 
the Atayal society. In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault (2005) had argued that 
how we ‘know’ and perceive the surroundings is related to the construction of social 
classification, and this episteme served as the reference for people to imagine the way 
that the world operates and the ‘order’ of everything within it. This is why, with the 
transformation of the content and practice of gaga to the Bible and Christian rituals, 
we witnessed in this study how the power structure, along with the subsequent 
cultural and social capitals, were redistributed in the process of the Atayals’ 
conversion to Christianity, thus further changing the villager’s idea of community.  
    What this new episteme of the world also brought to the Atayals, however, is the 
unsymmetrical relation between the knowledge and the faith of the religious subject. 
As I have discussed in chapters three through five, the pre-Christian Atayal people’s 
life was constituted by a series of sacred practices that involved both knowing and 
doing. Such actions also embodied the faith in utux. Yet as we have seen with the 
Bienjing villagers, the incomplete translation and transformation between the 
Christian and traditional customs, as well as the rather fixed doctrines, detached the 
practices of life from the belief itself. Meanwhile, the lack of reading ability among 
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the older generations, the pervasive Christian value of ‘piety’ in worshipping among 
the younger generations, and the church’s demand of biblical authority, also caused 
the disinterest of the villagers in pursuing theological knowledge. These factors, as I 
discussed in chapters seven and eight, not only were the result of the symbolic 
struggle between the Christian and traditional Atayal belief systems, as well as of the 
power struggle between different families, but also became the new doxa that 
dominated the attitude of the villagers towards Christianity, where the Atayal people 
are not even aware of such rupture between the faith and its knowledge.  
    The danger of this asymmetrical relation between faith and knowledge is that it 
further reproduces the fetishistic ideology of Christianity, and in a way that is 
different from that of the Atayals’ conversion. In earlier discussions, I presented how 
the Atayals believe Christianity provides them a ‘better life’ while ignoring the 
evidence that the most ‘successful’ figures in the village are not ‘good’ Christians – or 
even Christians at all. However, we should not understand such phenomenon as the 
evidence of the Atayals’ dematerialisation of Christianity. What we have to notice is 
how the Bienjing villagers failed to see that becoming less socio-economically 
vulnerable was not the direct result of believing in Christianity, but the consequence 
of the facilities and policies bridged through the Church. This logic of ‘faith’ in 
Christianity, as Slavoj Žižek (1997: 137) stated about the logic of religious fetishism 
in The Plague of Fantasies, is where the Atayal people ‘first believed in God and then, 
on the grounds of their [my] belief, become susceptible to the proof of their [my] 
belief.’ Unlike the rather empiricist tradition in the old gaga, which saw every action 
and consequence as the reflection of the belief of the utux (and vice versa), the 
modern Christian Atayals no longer connect the adversity to the anger of the god, but 
only see the ‘successful’ cases – such as the priests – as the reward for the faith in 
God. Fetishism thus works not as the belief in the direct promise of a better material 
life (the reason the Atayal people converted to Christianity in the first place), but as 
the distant, delayed driving power that makes them believe it would eventually lead to 
a better life, which, again, reproduced the secular reference in the belief of 
Christianity. 
9.2 Secularisation as the ideology of the secular 
This fetishistic doxa, therefore, takes us back to the discussion of the Atayal’s modern 
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episteme, and points to the second sign of secularisation by distinguishing the ‘secular’ 
practices from the ‘sacred’ ones. Throughout this study, I have demonstrated how the 
knowledge paradigm has shifted from oral stories to the written doctrines, as well as 
from the bodily practices to the teaching of the Bible in churches. Such transition not 
only brought, as I stated before, the rupture between the knowledge and the faith of 
the Atayals, but also changed their experience and the idea of the sacred. In chapters 
four and six, I illustrated how this transition of knowledge paradigm (gaga) 
influenced the Atayal people’s understanding of the way of life, and thereby separated 
the ‘religious’ traditions from the domain of ‘culture’. As the traditional Atayal world 
was formed by the daily practices, which were not just the practices of life, but the 
practices of the religious belief in utux, so this separation further marked the division 
of the ‘secular’ and the ‘culture’ from what used to be deemed as ‘sacred’.  
    The after effect of this division between the sacred and secular aspects of life is 
tremendous to the Atayals. The most distinctive influence of this is the Atayals’ idea 
of the self. In the traditional Atayal world, a tayan was composed of a lifetime of 
sacred practices, so as to ‘become’ the ‘true person’ – as tayan literally meant – of 
Atayal. Yet along with the division among faith, practices and knowledge that came 
with conversion, the idea of ‘the person of Atayal’ also differentiated into that of the 
secular (the sharing of the blood), and that of the religious (the sharing of the belief in 
Christianity). In the meantime, even among those who claim to be Christian Atayals, 
the affiliation to different sects also altered the connections tying the Atayals to the 
communities of which they belonged. As Christianity has taken over the orthodoxy of 
gaga, the affiliation to different sectarian churches thus replaced the old gaga and 
became the new centre of collective identity. However, unlike the traditional gaga 
that required communal practises in daily life and collateral religious responsibility, 
this modern belief creates yet another community that is independent from the 
premodern social groups such as niqan or qalan, resulting in the transformation and 
multiplication of the boundary of identity to a church-centred model. In other words, 
the modern Atayals no longer hold their social identity as did their predecessors, who 
formed their social and geographical boundaries through sharing the same gaga, both 
of which were united in this sacred practise. The Atayals today not only have the 
tribes as their secular social community, but also the churches as the sacred social 
community. The result of this is what we see in the Bienjing village, that one tribe 
would have several gaga (church affiliation), and in many cases one family (the old 
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qalan) would have different gaga as well.  
    However, though the Atayals’ idea of the social identity is complicated by the 
establishment of the Church, the ‘ethnic’ and cultural identities are simplified. As I 
stated earlier, the transformation of the gaga from oral stories and bodily practises to 
the Biblical doctrines limited the development and the particularity of ‘the way of life’ 
in different Atayal groups. Such reference of this modern gaga became the ‘common 
origin’ for the Atayal people to understand their ethnicity. Here, I’m not suggesting 
that the modern Atayals believe Christianity has been their tradition all along, 
although many of the participants do see the history before conversion as sharing ‘the 
same principle’ as that of Christianity. Rather, it is the episteme of the Christianised 
gaga that changed the way the Atayals understand their ‘ethnicity’: gaga no longer 
stands for what separates one Atayal group from another; it becomes what unites the 
Atayals as a whole. Of course, we cannot overlook the influence of the construction 
of the Atayal ‘ethnic’ from the national education based on previous, rather biased 
anthropological understandings, which categorised those communities sharing similar 
customs as one ‘ethnic group’. However, it is also such transformation of the gaga 
that replaced the traditional idea of the cultural and collective self-identification, 
which used to be in the form of the sacred practices, with the form of the belief in 
Christianity, and further established, or confirmed, this secular imagination of the 
Atayal ethnicity. 
9.3 Further reflections of the study 
By now, I hope I have demonstrated clearly the idea of secularisation of the Bienjing 
Atayals’ conversion to Christianity and how it affected the Atayals’ self-identification. 
Although the active religious lives of the Atayals seemed not to fit what we normally 
understand of the idea of ‘secularisation’, however, dividing a once sacred world into 
the secular and sacred realms has indicating a ‘secularised’ Atayal world. Meanwhile, 
I also want to point out the historical and economical contexts in the Atayals’ 
conversion, in which their marginalised economic and social status in modern 
civilisation created the conditions for this turn to Christianity. On these grounds, we 
could even say that many modern religious conversions – such as the examples I gave 
in the introduction – are, to a certain level, fetishistic. This kind of ‘secularisation’, 
originating from the separation of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’, may provide an explanation 
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of various religious transitions, including the decay of religious power and the rise of 
new religions, in the modern world. That is, if we don’t treat the idea of secularisation 
as the death of religion, the ‘privatisation’ or ‘pluralisation’ of religion, but the 
division and rupture of the ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ lives, we may further understand 
those diversified religious transitions in the post/modern world. With this division 
becomes deeper and greater, one might find the scope of religious life growing 
smaller, where one can only search for the ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger, 1967) in secular 
experiences, and replace it with the ‘faith’ in culture or science (Eagleton, 2014). 
Alternatively, one could also be like the Atayals in this study, who are ‘religious’ in 
their belief in Christianity, still being ‘secularised’ by contrasting the life on earth to 
the life in heaven.  
    Nevertheless, we should notice as well that even in a ‘smooth’ processes of 
conversion, in which the converts claim to experience a ‘continuation’ from their past, 
the disruptions between the ‘now time’ and ‘before’, and between ‘culture’ and 
‘religion’, are often being ignored or deemed as a legitimate innovation of the 
tradition. Therefore, I argue that, to better understand the influence brought by 
religious transition, we should not focus on the category of ‘religion’, but focus on the 
experience of ‘the sacred’ in order to grasp how, spatially and temporally, people 
‘position’ (Chua, 2012) themselves during the conversion. This also brings up my 
final reflection of this study – that while analysing the identity of the self of the 
Austronesian groups such as the Atayal (or even identity in general), we shall also 
take into consideration the religious transition. For, religion, as we have seen with the 
Atayals, not only is the foundation of culture, but also provides the ‘chain of memory’ 
(Hervieu-Léger and Lee, 2000) that shapes the concept of who we are.  
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Glossary  
(In alphabetic order) 
Bazi: a small ritual to offer a small share of food or wine to utux before meal. 
Blaq utux: Good spirit. 
Gaga: Literally ‘the words of ancestors’, then extended as the ‘way of life’. It could 
also be understood as manner, custom, tradition, or the church sectors. 
Hei: Body. 
Hmagup: Sorcery. 
Hongu utux: Literally the ‘bridge of utux’, referring to the bridge that connects 
between the worlds of human and utux. 
Kazahou na tsokoliag: The person who is brave and flawless in morality. 
Kilhaku: Borrowed from Japanese language, literally meaning ‘leaf’, then used to 
refer to the group emigrated from certain area in Hsinchu. 
Luax na tsokoliag: Real man with bravery and impeccable morality. 
Maho/Pslkotas: An annual ritual to thank utux for blessings. 
Mahuni: Femal shaman. 
Mai yurak: Make offerings. 
Mama: Respectful term to address a male who is as old as the parents’ generation. 
Maotox: Warrior, brave man, fearless fighter, sometimes can also mean a man with 
only strength. 
Maraho: Leader. 
Nabkis: Elderly person who has a seat in the decision meeting. 
Niqan: A group of people who shared the same gaga. Now understood as a family or 
clan. 
Pasapung: Pacifier. 
Psani: Taboo. 
Qalang/Alang: The ally of different niqan, and is now understood as a ‘tribe’. 
Smyus: A ritual that make offering to utux to heal disease and atone for sins. 
Utux/Lyutux: Spirit of human, in its pure form is the object of the Atayal’s religious 
belief. 
Utuxan: The world of utux. 
Utux kayal: Creator of the Universe, now also understood as Christian God. 
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Tminu utux: Literally the ‘spirit of weaving’, meaning the utux who created the world 
and the fate of people. 
Tumux: Chieftain of a qalan. 
Yagi: Respectful term to address a female who is as old as the grandparents’ 
generation. 
Yata: Respectful term to address a female who is as old as the grandparents’ 
generation. 
Yaqil utux: Evil spirit 
Yutas: Respectful term to address a male who is as old as the grandparents’ 
generation. 
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